#2dayIn1948
The limitations were shown first, when bad weather prevented the planes from supporting the crucial attack on 01 Nov, and the next two days. But after that the Tempests came over regularly on call, and their fierce attacks with ..
The limitations were shown first, when bad weather prevented the planes from supporting the crucial attack on 01 Nov, and the next two days. But after that the Tempests came over regularly on call, and their fierce attacks with ..
#2dayIn1948
.. rockets and cannon fire destroyed many hostile positions at Pindras. Even more useful were the Dakotas, which made it possible to stock Dras and to continue the advance to Kargil.
.. rockets and cannon fire destroyed many hostile positions at Pindras. Even more useful were the Dakotas, which made it possible to stock Dras and to continue the advance to Kargil.
#2dayIn1948
Of the lessons of the ops in the Zoji La Sector, there were many. The technicians in the army learnt much, particularly about the behaviour of arms and equipment at high altitudes and at arctic temperatures.
Of the lessons of the ops in the Zoji La Sector, there were many. The technicians in the army learnt much, particularly about the behaviour of arms and equipment at high altitudes and at arctic temperatures.
#2dayIn1948
Moreover, the age old principles of 'surprise' & 'offensive action' were again and again brought out.
Moreover, the age old principles of 'surprise' & 'offensive action' were again and again brought out.
#2dayIn1948
It was also brought out that what was normally considered impossible, was not impossible when the Indian Army took up the task!
It was also brought out that what was normally considered impossible, was not impossible when the Indian Army took up the task!
#2dayIn1948
From the changing fortunes of the war in Ladakh, several significant points emerged.
There appears no doubt that in the last week of May 1948, and again in July, Leh was within the raiders' grasp. It still remains a mystery why they didn't press ..
From the changing fortunes of the war in Ladakh, several significant points emerged.
There appears no doubt that in the last week of May 1948, and again in July, Leh was within the raiders' grasp. It still remains a mystery why they didn't press ..
#2dayIn1948
.. home their attacks and capture Leh when they could. Their leadership in Ladakh turned to to be of a vastly different quality from the daring and inspired performance against Kargil and Dras.
They can also be charged with having ignored the excellent ..
.. home their attacks and capture Leh when they could. Their leadership in Ladakh turned to to be of a vastly different quality from the daring and inspired performance against Kargil and Dras.
They can also be charged with having ignored the excellent ..
#2dayIn1948
.. opportunities for commando or guerilla type penetrations, for which the conditions were ideal. It is true that the local villagers were against them, but their opposition was meek and almost entirely passive, and it was of negligible importance ..
.. opportunities for commando or guerilla type penetrations, for which the conditions were ideal. It is true that the local villagers were against them, but their opposition was meek and almost entirely passive, and it was of negligible importance ..
#2dayIn1948
.. in that vast, sparsely populated and thinly held region. The raiders proved incapable even of learning from the example placed before them by Maj Hari Chand's guerillas. If they had adopted similar tactics, the defenders of Leh would have been ..
.. in that vast, sparsely populated and thinly held region. The raiders proved incapable even of learning from the example placed before them by Maj Hari Chand's guerillas. If they had adopted similar tactics, the defenders of Leh would have been ..
#2dayIn1948
.. in a very difficult position and would probably have suffered considerable losses.
The Indian commanders at Leh performed rather better. But the serious setback in July was entirely unexpected and it appears clear that Maj Prithi Chand went over..
.. in a very difficult position and would probably have suffered considerable losses.
The Indian commanders at Leh performed rather better. But the serious setback in July was entirely unexpected and it appears clear that Maj Prithi Chand went over..
#2dayIn1948
.. to the offensive without due preparation, instead of consolidating his defences & making sure of protecting Leh and the vital airfield. Col Parab was cautious in his moves and more thorough in his defensive preparations. Time was in his favour, and ..
.. to the offensive without due preparation, instead of consolidating his defences & making sure of protecting Leh and the vital airfield. Col Parab was cautious in his moves and more thorough in his defensive preparations. Time was in his favour, and ..
#2dayIn1948
.. his problem of recapturing Khalatse, Mulbekh etc. was in the end solved by the advance of 77 Para Brigade from Zoji La to Kargil. In the pursuit from Tharu westward in November, Col Parab was shown at his best, and his careful planning was ..
.. his problem of recapturing Khalatse, Mulbekh etc. was in the end solved by the advance of 77 Para Brigade from Zoji La to Kargil. In the pursuit from Tharu westward in November, Col Parab was shown at his best, and his careful planning was ..
#2dayIn1948
.. rewarded by the smooth rapidity of advance up to Khalatse.
Maj Hari Chand's brilliant exploits behind enemy lines were acknowledged by the grant of MVC to him after the campaign. His commandos certainly shook the raiders' morale and inflicted ..
.. rewarded by the smooth rapidity of advance up to Khalatse.
Maj Hari Chand's brilliant exploits behind enemy lines were acknowledged by the grant of MVC to him after the campaign. His commandos certainly shook the raiders' morale and inflicted ..
#2dayIn1948
.. losses on them, but the real value of those medium range penetrations must be as small scale models for appreciably bigger and long range penetrations by specially trained mountain troops supported and maintained from the air in future ops in that area.
.. losses on them, but the real value of those medium range penetrations must be as small scale models for appreciably bigger and long range penetrations by specially trained mountain troops supported and maintained from the air in future ops in that area.
#2dayIn1948
The Ladakh and Rupshu regions appear to offer tremendous opportunities for such tactics which, if properly exploited, can produce startling results.
Maj Prithi Chand too was awarded an MVC for his daring and death defying trek to Leh against all advice.
The Ladakh and Rupshu regions appear to offer tremendous opportunities for such tactics which, if properly exploited, can produce startling results.
Maj Prithi Chand too was awarded an MVC for his daring and death defying trek to Leh against all advice.
#2dayIn1948
The Ladakh ops showed once again the crucial importance of logistics, It was essentially a war of supplies and reinforcements, and the Manali route emerged from it as Line of Communication of great strategic importance. It was safe ..
The Ladakh ops showed once again the crucial importance of logistics, It was essentially a war of supplies and reinforcements, and the Manali route emerged from it as Line of Communication of great strategic importance. It was safe ..
#2dayIn1948
.. from attacks from every side, separated by broad mountain belts from possible hostile bases. In case of another emergency in that region, Gen Thimayya's proposal for setting up a big advance supply base at Manali, and organising a large force ..
.. from attacks from every side, separated by broad mountain belts from possible hostile bases. In case of another emergency in that region, Gen Thimayya's proposal for setting up a big advance supply base at Manali, and organising a large force ..
#2dayIn1948
.. of porters and ponies there, will prove invaluable.
.. of porters and ponies there, will prove invaluable.
#2dayIn1948
Air transport for men and supplies too proved of unique importance in Ladakh. The Dakotas of the RIAF didn't win the battle for Ladakh, but they certainly saved it from being lost.
In a region where the ..
Air transport for men and supplies too proved of unique importance in Ladakh. The Dakotas of the RIAF didn't win the battle for Ladakh, but they certainly saved it from being lost.
In a region where the ..
#2dayIn1948
.. alternative was a mule, supply planes, even in ridiculously small numbers, made a tremendous difference in the fighting potential of a force.
.. alternative was a mule, supply planes, even in ridiculously small numbers, made a tremendous difference in the fighting potential of a force.
#2dayIn1948
Still, the liberation of the occupied occupied area of Ladakh was greatly facilitated by 77 Para Brigade's advance from Zoji La to Kargil.
Still, the liberation of the occupied occupied area of Ladakh was greatly facilitated by 77 Para Brigade's advance from Zoji La to Kargil.
#2dayIn1948
Most of the battles of this epic campaign were over, less a few engagements which were to occur in the coming week.
Most of the battles of this epic campaign were over, less a few engagements which were to occur in the coming week.
#2dayIn1948
I'll now take a step back & recount the story of happenings in diplomatic parleys.
It continues from here 👇
I'll now take a step back & recount the story of happenings in diplomatic parleys.
It continues from here 👇
https://twitter.com/CestMoiz/status/1297205884112773121
#2dayIn1948
The UN Commission left the subcontinent for Geneva on 21 Sep. Its departure reduced the diplomatic constraints on launching a new military offensive. There was a further positive development from India's point of view. In Sep, the 'Police Action' ..
The UN Commission left the subcontinent for Geneva on 21 Sep. Its departure reduced the diplomatic constraints on launching a new military offensive. There was a further positive development from India's point of view. In Sep, the 'Police Action' ..
#2dayIn1948
.. to integrate Hyderabad in the Indian Union was successfully completed, releasing troops which now became available for Kashmir ops. Bucher and his Indian generals reacted in different ways to the new situation.
Bucher's thoughts turned once ..
.. to integrate Hyderabad in the Indian Union was successfully completed, releasing troops which now became available for Kashmir ops. Bucher and his Indian generals reacted in different ways to the new situation.
Bucher's thoughts turned once ..
#2dayIn1948
.. more to pre-empting an Indian offensive through a ceasefire. He secretly sent a telegram to London, through the UK High Commission channel, urging that the British Govt should get the UN to order a ceasefire. Bucher offered to personally ..
.. more to pre-empting an Indian offensive through a ceasefire. He secretly sent a telegram to London, through the UK High Commission channel, urging that the British Govt should get the UN to order a ceasefire. Bucher offered to personally ..
#2dayIn1948
.. guarantee that India would obey such an order.
He, however, didn't deem it fit to consult the Govt of the Dominion of India on an issue as important as this!
Moreover, the Commander-in-Chief of Indian Army also informed his Pakistani counterpart, of ..
.. guarantee that India would obey such an order.
He, however, didn't deem it fit to consult the Govt of the Dominion of India on an issue as important as this!
Moreover, the Commander-in-Chief of Indian Army also informed his Pakistani counterpart, of ..
#2dayIn1948
.. the initiative in order to point his thinking in the same direction too!
Once again Govt of India had NO CLUE!!
.. the initiative in order to point his thinking in the same direction too!
Once again Govt of India had NO CLUE!!
#2dayIn1948
Meanwhile, Indian generals in the field were calling for offensive action. Thimayya's view, expressed openly to a member of the UN Commission was that a military decision could be forced in a matter of weeks if the army were given a free hand.
Meanwhile, Indian generals in the field were calling for offensive action. Thimayya's view, expressed openly to a member of the UN Commission was that a military decision could be forced in a matter of weeks if the army were given a free hand.
#2dayIn1948
He was openly critical of the govt's 'cautious policy'. Cariappa, on his part, presented outline plans in early November for an advance to Mirpur & Muzaffarabad. These were not pursued as Army HQ felt that heavy reinforcements required for these ops ..
He was openly critical of the govt's 'cautious policy'. Cariappa, on his part, presented outline plans in early November for an advance to Mirpur & Muzaffarabad. These were not pursued as Army HQ felt that heavy reinforcements required for these ops ..
#2dayIn1948
.. would result in weakening Indian defences in East Punjab. Moreover, maintaining additional troops on the Jhangar front would pose major logistical problems. Army HQ was of the view that these problems made it impossible to mount a major offensive, ..
.. would result in weakening Indian defences in East Punjab. Moreover, maintaining additional troops on the Jhangar front would pose major logistical problems. Army HQ was of the view that these problems made it impossible to mount a major offensive, ..
#2dayIn1948
.. at any rate, till the following spring or early summer.
Furthermore, if the advance threatened vital strategic points for Pakistan, such as the Mangla headworks, it could lead to a full scale war with Pakistan, with serious political repercussions and dangers.
.. at any rate, till the following spring or early summer.
Furthermore, if the advance threatened vital strategic points for Pakistan, such as the Mangla headworks, it could lead to a full scale war with Pakistan, with serious political repercussions and dangers.
#2dayIn1948
In early October, before leaving for London to attend the Commonwealth Prime Ministers' conference, Nehru had asked his Commander-in-Chief to prepare a military appreciation of an Indian offensive to clear Kashmir of Paksitani troops and irregulars.
In early October, before leaving for London to attend the Commonwealth Prime Ministers' conference, Nehru had asked his Commander-in-Chief to prepare a military appreciation of an Indian offensive to clear Kashmir of Paksitani troops and irregulars.
#2dayIn1948
On the PM's return in November, Bucher submitted an appreciation in which he concluded that it would not be possible for the Indian forces to successfully clear Kashmir of the invaders during the winter months or even later when ..
On the PM's return in November, Bucher submitted an appreciation in which he concluded that it would not be possible for the Indian forces to successfully clear Kashmir of the invaders during the winter months or even later when ..
#2dayIn1948
.. weather conditions would improve. The Commander-in-Chief expressed the opinion that, while certain minor offensive ops might be successfully undertaken, from an overall point of view, India was confronted with a military stalemate.
.. weather conditions would improve. The Commander-in-Chief expressed the opinion that, while certain minor offensive ops might be successfully undertaken, from an overall point of view, India was confronted with a military stalemate.
#2dayIn1948
Even before his recommendations were considered in the Indian Cabinet, Bucher informed Nye, the new British High Commissioner, about the appreciation he had submitted to the Indian Govt. Gen Sir Archibald Nye, who had replaced Sir Terence Shone, was a ..
Even before his recommendations were considered in the Indian Cabinet, Bucher informed Nye, the new British High Commissioner, about the appreciation he had submitted to the Indian Govt. Gen Sir Archibald Nye, who had replaced Sir Terence Shone, was a ..
#2dayIn1948
.. distinguished soldier who had served as the Deputy Chief of the Imperial General Staff during WW2. His appointment as High Commissioner was an inspired choice.The esteem which Nye enjoyed in military circles enabled him to exercise great influence ..
.. distinguished soldier who had served as the Deputy Chief of the Imperial General Staff during WW2. His appointment as High Commissioner was an inspired choice.The esteem which Nye enjoyed in military circles enabled him to exercise great influence ..
#2dayIn1948
.. over the British Service Chiefs in India. Bucher, in particular, readily accepted and even sought his guidance.
Nye was to play an imp role in shaping military developments during the final stages of the war.
On the basis of the info supplied by ..
.. over the British Service Chiefs in India. Bucher, in particular, readily accepted and even sought his guidance.
Nye was to play an imp role in shaping military developments during the final stages of the war.
On the basis of the info supplied by ..
#2dayIn1948
.. Bucher, Nye was able to reassure London that an all out war was unlikely. 'I think it follows from this [Bucher's appreciation],' he cabled, ' that the possibility of war between the two Dominions breaking out as a result of successful ..
.. Bucher, Nye was able to reassure London that an all out war was unlikely. 'I think it follows from this [Bucher's appreciation],' he cabled, ' that the possibility of war between the two Dominions breaking out as a result of successful ..
#2dayIn1948
.. military ops in Kashmir penetrating into Pakistan is improbable.' Unquote.
Bucher also informed Nye that he had told Sardar Patel that the only effective military step which could be taken to drive the Pakistanis from Kashmir was to attack ..
.. military ops in Kashmir penetrating into Pakistan is improbable.' Unquote.
Bucher also informed Nye that he had told Sardar Patel that the only effective military step which could be taken to drive the Pakistanis from Kashmir was to attack ..
#2dayIn1948
.. the bases in Pakistan itself, a course which, he said, could not be contemplated. Bucher claimed that Sardar agreed with him.
.. the bases in Pakistan itself, a course which, he said, could not be contemplated. Bucher claimed that Sardar agreed with him.
#2dayIn1948
The Defence Committee of Cabinet met on 11Nov to decide on military initiatives in Kashmir. As usual, Bucher promptly informed Nye of the outcome. He revealed that the Cabinet had confirmed the general policy of acting on the defensive during the winter months.
The Defence Committee of Cabinet met on 11Nov to decide on military initiatives in Kashmir. As usual, Bucher promptly informed Nye of the outcome. He revealed that the Cabinet had confirmed the general policy of acting on the defensive during the winter months.
#2dayIn1948
The ongoing ops for a link-up with Poonch garrison were the only military operation likely to be undertaken.
The ongoing ops for a link-up with Poonch garrison were the only military operation likely to be undertaken.
#2dayIn1948
Bucher reported that a proposal made by Cariappa and Mehar Singh to bomb Mirpur and Muzaffarabad had been turned down on military as well as political grounds.
Bucher's version accurately reflected the manner in which he intended to implement ..
Bucher reported that a proposal made by Cariappa and Mehar Singh to bomb Mirpur and Muzaffarabad had been turned down on military as well as political grounds.
Bucher's version accurately reflected the manner in which he intended to implement ..
#2dayIn1948
.. the cabinet decision, but not the decision itself. The Cabinet had, indeed, accepted Bucher's military appreciation that an attack on Mirpur was not immediately feasible since it would have to be preceded by an extensive build up requiring a great deal of time.
.. the cabinet decision, but not the decision itself. The Cabinet had, indeed, accepted Bucher's military appreciation that an attack on Mirpur was not immediately feasible since it would have to be preceded by an extensive build up requiring a great deal of time.
#2dayIn1948
The Govt was also reluctant to precipitate a crisis in relations with Pakistan. The main immediate objectives envisaged by the Cabinet were to regain control of the lines of communication between Srinagar and Leh and to wrest control ..
The Govt was also reluctant to precipitate a crisis in relations with Pakistan. The main immediate objectives envisaged by the Cabinet were to regain control of the lines of communication between Srinagar and Leh and to wrest control ..
#2dayIn1948
.. of lines of communication linking Naushera to Poonch. To this extent, Bucher's summary was not inaccurate. But he omitted to mention that it was also the Govt's objective, in the Poonch-Mirpur sector, to bring the Kotli area under Indian control.
.. of lines of communication linking Naushera to Poonch. To this extent, Bucher's summary was not inaccurate. But he omitted to mention that it was also the Govt's objective, in the Poonch-Mirpur sector, to bring the Kotli area under Indian control.
#2dayIn1948
This was an important objective since Kotli controlled the approach to Mirpur; an advance upto Kotli would have been a major gain for India and a serious setback for Pakistan.
Nehru outlined the Cabinet decision as follows, in a letter to ..
This was an important objective since Kotli controlled the approach to Mirpur; an advance upto Kotli would have been a major gain for India and a serious setback for Pakistan.
Nehru outlined the Cabinet decision as follows, in a letter to ..
#2dayIn1948
.. Krishna Menon -
'I might add that winter prospects of fighting are our clearing up Ladakh Valley (which we are in process of doing now), our establishing a safe route to Poonch from the Jammu side (which we are also doing now) and our gradually ..
.. Krishna Menon -
'I might add that winter prospects of fighting are our clearing up Ladakh Valley (which we are in process of doing now), our establishing a safe route to Poonch from the Jammu side (which we are also doing now) and our gradually ..
#2dayIn1948
.. extending the area under our control in Jammu Province to Kotli and round about. This is not very much but this is about all that we can do in winter conditions. We can perhaps attack Mirpur, but that would be a major operation requiring a great ..
.. extending the area under our control in Jammu Province to Kotli and round about. This is not very much but this is about all that we can do in winter conditions. We can perhaps attack Mirpur, but that would be a major operation requiring a great ..
#2dayIn1948
.. deal of preparation and taking time .. For the present we are avoiding any major operation towards Mirpur partly because that might lead to complications near the Pakistan frontier. We hope, during the winter, to build some more roads & collect ..
.. deal of preparation and taking time .. For the present we are avoiding any major operation towards Mirpur partly because that might lead to complications near the Pakistan frontier. We hope, during the winter, to build some more roads & collect ..
#2dayIn1948
Pakistan too had anticipated an Indian offensive after the departure of the UNCIP mission from the subcontinent, fearing an Indian advance right up to the Jhelum river boundary in the Mirpur ..
Pakistan too had anticipated an Indian offensive after the departure of the UNCIP mission from the subcontinent, fearing an Indian advance right up to the Jhelum river boundary in the Mirpur ..
#2dayIn1948
.. area. Such an advance would give India control of the headworks of the Chhamb and Jhelum irrigation system on which Pakistan's agricultural economy was critically dependent and would, moreover, bring India within striking distance of ..
.. area. Such an advance would give India control of the headworks of the Chhamb and Jhelum irrigation system on which Pakistan's agricultural economy was critically dependent and would, moreover, bring India within striking distance of ..
#2dayIn1948
.. Pakistan's military heartland centred around Rawalpindi.
Pakistan concluded that British assistance was essential in order to meet the threat & that it was time to renew the search for a military understanding. Liaqat Ali Khan decided to urgently ..
.. Pakistan's military heartland centred around Rawalpindi.
Pakistan concluded that British assistance was essential in order to meet the threat & that it was time to renew the search for a military understanding. Liaqat Ali Khan decided to urgently ..
#2dayIn1948
.. explore through a back channel the possibility of a defence pact. The emissary he selected for this purpose was the Deputy Chief of the Pakistani Army, Maj Gen Cawthorn. Born in Australia, Cawthorn had seen action with the Australian forces in Gallipoli in WW1.
.. explore through a back channel the possibility of a defence pact. The emissary he selected for this purpose was the Deputy Chief of the Pakistani Army, Maj Gen Cawthorn. Born in Australia, Cawthorn had seen action with the Australian forces in Gallipoli in WW1.
#2dayIn1948
He had an intelligence background, having served as the Head of the Middle East Intelligence Centre in Egypt and later as Director of Intelligence in India during WW2.
Cawthorn met Noel-Baker in London on 18 Sep and told him ..
He had an intelligence background, having served as the Head of the Middle East Intelligence Centre in Egypt and later as Director of Intelligence in India during WW2.
Cawthorn met Noel-Baker in London on 18 Sep and told him ..
#2dayIn1948
.. that he HAd come on a 'Very Secret Mission' to explore the possibility of beginning staff talks for joint defence arrangements with the UK as soon as possible. He said that Pakistan was greatly alarmed by the world situation and the danger posed by communism.
.. that he HAd come on a 'Very Secret Mission' to explore the possibility of beginning staff talks for joint defence arrangements with the UK as soon as possible. He said that Pakistan was greatly alarmed by the world situation and the danger posed by communism.
#2dayIn1948
She was resolutely determined to play her part in collective defence against Russian aggression. Cawthorn explained that Liaqat had not yet presented a formal proposal to the Cabinet as he didn't wish to do so until he could be ..
She was resolutely determined to play her part in collective defence against Russian aggression. Cawthorn explained that Liaqat had not yet presented a formal proposal to the Cabinet as he didn't wish to do so until he could be ..
#2dayIn1948
.. sure the UK would respond positively.
From the British point of view, the approach was most welcome but it did raise the difficult question whether a pact should be considered with Pakistan alone without exhausting the possibility of reaching a..
.. sure the UK would respond positively.
From the British point of view, the approach was most welcome but it did raise the difficult question whether a pact should be considered with Pakistan alone without exhausting the possibility of reaching a..
#2dayIn1948
.. similar agreement with India? Noel-Baker arranged for Cawthorn to meet Attlee. The PM was in favour of accepting Liaqat's proposal, provided India was kept informed.
Alexander, Bevin and the Chiefs of Staff were all in agreement with this view ..
.. similar agreement with India? Noel-Baker arranged for Cawthorn to meet Attlee. The PM was in favour of accepting Liaqat's proposal, provided India was kept informed.
Alexander, Bevin and the Chiefs of Staff were all in agreement with this view ..
#2dayIn1948
.. and the CRO was instructed to inform Cawthorn orally that a formal proposal from Pakistan was welcome.
Cawthorn's conversations in London served to enhance the pro Pakistan tilt in British policy. Liaqat personally followed up in October, seizing ..
.. and the CRO was instructed to inform Cawthorn orally that a formal proposal from Pakistan was welcome.
Cawthorn's conversations in London served to enhance the pro Pakistan tilt in British policy. Liaqat personally followed up in October, seizing ..
#2dayIn1948
.. the opportunity provided by the Commonwealth Prime Ministers' Conference. Outwardly, Britain maintained the stance of a neutral conciliator between the warring dominions. Thus, on Attlee's suggestion, Liaqat met with Nehru in the presence ..
.. the opportunity provided by the Commonwealth Prime Ministers' Conference. Outwardly, Britain maintained the stance of a neutral conciliator between the warring dominions. Thus, on Attlee's suggestion, Liaqat met with Nehru in the presence ..
#2dayIn1948
.. of Attlee and Bevin to explore options for a settlement. The talks failed to produce any results & the British role behind the scenes served only to make the Pakistani position inflexible. unknown to Nehru, Bevin & Noel-Baker held separate talks ..
.. of Attlee and Bevin to explore options for a settlement. The talks failed to produce any results & the British role behind the scenes served only to make the Pakistani position inflexible. unknown to Nehru, Bevin & Noel-Baker held separate talks ..
#2dayIn1948
.. with the Pakistani PM during which they informed the delighted Liaqat that it was time to return the Kashmir question to the UN Security Council.
This was not all. The Pakistani army received 'hints' and 'assurances' from London on the basis of ..
.. with the Pakistani PM during which they informed the delighted Liaqat that it was time to return the Kashmir question to the UN Security Council.
This was not all. The Pakistani army received 'hints' and 'assurances' from London on the basis of ..
#2dayIn1948
.. which it carried out a major redeployment of forces. A brigade of 7th Division, which was being held in reserve for the defence of West Punjab against a possible Indian attack, was now moved to Palandri, inside Jammu & Kashmir, with the ..
.. which it carried out a major redeployment of forces. A brigade of 7th Division, which was being held in reserve for the defence of West Punjab against a possible Indian attack, was now moved to Palandri, inside Jammu & Kashmir, with the ..
#2dayIn1948
.. objective of covering Kotli. The move left West Punjab vulnerable to an Indian onslaught.
Why was the Pakistani army prepared to accept a risk of this magnitude?
The tale is told in British archives.
On 26 Oct 1948, the British Post in ..
.. objective of covering Kotli. The move left West Punjab vulnerable to an Indian onslaught.
Why was the Pakistani army prepared to accept a risk of this magnitude?
The tale is told in British archives.
On 26 Oct 1948, the British Post in ..
#2dayIn1948
.. Rawalpindi reported:
'The Army command has received two 'tips' of a most important kind, from a source considered absolutely reliable. The first of them is to the effect that there is now a strong likelihood of HMG agreeing to allow ..
.. Rawalpindi reported:
'The Army command has received two 'tips' of a most important kind, from a source considered absolutely reliable. The first of them is to the effect that there is now a strong likelihood of HMG agreeing to allow ..
#2dayIn1948
.. British officers to remain with the Pak Forces in the event of Indian aggression against Pakistan. The second suggests that the UNO would be inclined to impose sanctions on the Union if she attacked her neighbour.'
Unquote.
.. British officers to remain with the Pak Forces in the event of Indian aggression against Pakistan. The second suggests that the UNO would be inclined to impose sanctions on the Union if she attacked her neighbour.'
Unquote.
#2dayIn1948
This was confirmed by another report from an officer of the Military Wing of UK High Commission in Karachi, who recorded:
'During a conversation with Lt Col Wilson, the C-in-'s Private Secretary, he told me he understood from London assurance had now been given by ..
This was confirmed by another report from an officer of the Military Wing of UK High Commission in Karachi, who recorded:
'During a conversation with Lt Col Wilson, the C-in-'s Private Secretary, he told me he understood from London assurance had now been given by ..
#2dayIn1948
.. HMG that an attack by India on West Punjab 'would not be tolerated.' This assurance had been quite definite and in consequence GHQ had felt able to move the reserve Brigade of 7 Div up to Palandri to cover the Kotli road in case the present Indian ..
.. HMG that an attack by India on West Punjab 'would not be tolerated.' This assurance had been quite definite and in consequence GHQ had felt able to move the reserve Brigade of 7 Div up to Palandri to cover the Kotli road in case the present Indian ..
#2dayIn1948
Cawthorn's secret mission thus yielded important diplomatic and military dividends for Pakistan even though it was to turn out that conditions were not yet ripe for a military pact.
Cawthorn's secret mission thus yielded important diplomatic and military dividends for Pakistan even though it was to turn out that conditions were not yet ripe for a military pact.
#2dayIn1948
Pakistan's real objective was, of course, to obtain British assistance against India, and not to participate in a war against the communist powers. In December, Pakistan conveyed its unqualified acceptance of proposals for Commonwealth defence but failed ..
Pakistan's real objective was, of course, to obtain British assistance against India, and not to participate in a war against the communist powers. In December, Pakistan conveyed its unqualified acceptance of proposals for Commonwealth defence but failed ..
#2dayIn1948
.. to make the expected formal request for staff consultations. In Jul, 1949, Liaqat sought clarification on two points: Firstly, whether the defence talks would involve the UK and Pakistan exclusively or whether it was intended to also bring in other ..
.. to make the expected formal request for staff consultations. In Jul, 1949, Liaqat sought clarification on two points: Firstly, whether the defence talks would involve the UK and Pakistan exclusively or whether it was intended to also bring in other ..
#2dayIn1948
.. regional countries (i.e. India); and, Secondly, whether the defence talk would relate only to a 'world war' or also to situations where the security of Pakistan was threatened by a Commonwealth or non-Commonwealth country (i.e. India again).
.. regional countries (i.e. India); and, Secondly, whether the defence talk would relate only to a 'world war' or also to situations where the security of Pakistan was threatened by a Commonwealth or non-Commonwealth country (i.e. India again).
#2dayIn1948
The British response was that the talks would initially be confined to the UK and Pakistan, with India and other countries coming in later. On the second point, Britain replied that the talks would be confined to problems relating to a global ..
The British response was that the talks would initially be confined to the UK and Pakistan, with India and other countries coming in later. On the second point, Britain replied that the talks would be confined to problems relating to a global ..
#2dayIn1948
.. conflict and to a threat from outside the Commonwealth.
Liaqat expressed his disappointment with the response and requested reconsideration. It was not until the 1950s that mutually acceptable terms were found for a defence pact between Pakistan ..
.. conflict and to a threat from outside the Commonwealth.
Liaqat expressed his disappointment with the response and requested reconsideration. It was not until the 1950s that mutually acceptable terms were found for a defence pact between Pakistan ..
#2dayIn1948
.. and the Western powers. The terms didn't cover a conflict with India but this was more than compensated, in Pakistani eyes, by a massive military aid programme which altered the India-Pakistan military balance.
Only the US - not Britain - was in a position ..
.. and the Western powers. The terms didn't cover a conflict with India but this was more than compensated, in Pakistani eyes, by a massive military aid programme which altered the India-Pakistan military balance.
Only the US - not Britain - was in a position ..
#2dayIn1948
.. to offer military aid on such a scale.
This is a story to be discussed some other day. Right now, back to 1948.
.. to offer military aid on such a scale.
This is a story to be discussed some other day. Right now, back to 1948.
#2dayIn1948
India's winter offensive which resulted in linkup with Poonch and Leh didn't involve an advance to areas which Pakistan considered vital for her security and it does not seem to have aroused particular concern on the part of the British ..
India's winter offensive which resulted in linkup with Poonch and Leh didn't involve an advance to areas which Pakistan considered vital for her security and it does not seem to have aroused particular concern on the part of the British ..
#2dayIn1948
.. Commanders-in-Chief of the rival armies. Bucher set Gracey's mind at ease by informing him that an advance to Skardu was not contemplated.
An incident did occur, however, in what was essentially for a side-show in the Northern theatre, which caused ..
.. Commanders-in-Chief of the rival armies. Bucher set Gracey's mind at ease by informing him that an advance to Skardu was not contemplated.
An incident did occur, however, in what was essentially for a side-show in the Northern theatre, which caused ..
#2dayIn1948
.. great anxiety to the British. The event could have led to a serious threat to Pakistani ops in the Northern theatre and to the escalation of hostilities into Pakistani territory. The way in which the British service chiefs in India & Pakistan ..
.. great anxiety to the British. The event could have led to a serious threat to Pakistani ops in the Northern theatre and to the escalation of hostilities into Pakistani territory. The way in which the British service chiefs in India & Pakistan ..
#2dayIn1948
.. dealt with the incident throws light on the contacts they maintained with each other in order to contain the hostilities.
.. dealt with the incident throws light on the contacts they maintained with each other in order to contain the hostilities.
#2dayIn1948
On 04 Nov, a PAF Dakota on a supply dropping flight to Gilgit was attacked in the air by the RIAF. Grafftey-Smith cabled the CRO as well as his colleague in New Delhi about the incident, adding:
'I am informed that AOC-in-C, India and Air Commander, Pakistan, have ..
On 04 Nov, a PAF Dakota on a supply dropping flight to Gilgit was attacked in the air by the RIAF. Grafftey-Smith cabled the CRO as well as his colleague in New Delhi about the incident, adding:
'I am informed that AOC-in-C, India and Air Commander, Pakistan, have ..
#2dayIn1948
.. a 'gentlemen's agreement' that Pakistani aircraft should not be attacked in the air, though liable to attack on the ground there, and it may well be that his attack was made without former's sanction!'
Unquote.
.. a 'gentlemen's agreement' that Pakistani aircraft should not be attacked in the air, though liable to attack on the ground there, and it may well be that his attack was made without former's sanction!'
Unquote.
#2dayIn1948
Grafftey-Smith suggested that, if the attack was indeed unauthorised, a renewed assurance from Air Marshal Elmhirst that the 'gentleman's agreement' would be enforced would be invaluable in restraining the Pakistanis from 'provocative action.'
Grafftey-Smith suggested that, if the attack was indeed unauthorised, a renewed assurance from Air Marshal Elmhirst that the 'gentleman's agreement' would be enforced would be invaluable in restraining the Pakistanis from 'provocative action.'
#2dayIn1948
The 'provocative action' feared by Grafftey-Smith was that Pakistan would decide to provide a fighter escort for supply dropping aircraft, rather than accept the alternative of suspending the air supply operations for Gilgit.
A note on the CRO files in ..
The 'provocative action' feared by Grafftey-Smith was that Pakistan would decide to provide a fighter escort for supply dropping aircraft, rather than accept the alternative of suspending the air supply operations for Gilgit.
A note on the CRO files in ..
#2dayIn1948
.. Whitehall brings out the further implications.
The apprehension was that if fighters were used to escort Pakistani supply aircraft, India would view this as 'commitment' of the PAF in Kashmir, justifying Indian air attacks on airfields in Pakistan.
.. Whitehall brings out the further implications.
The apprehension was that if fighters were used to escort Pakistani supply aircraft, India would view this as 'commitment' of the PAF in Kashmir, justifying Indian air attacks on airfields in Pakistan.
#2dayIn1948
Moreover, India would call for a 'Stand Down' of British officers on the basis of a 'fallacious' interpretation of the UK Govt's July statement.
The 04 Nov attack had been carried out under orders from Air Vice Marshal Mukerjee, who was officiating ..
Moreover, India would call for a 'Stand Down' of British officers on the basis of a 'fallacious' interpretation of the UK Govt's July statement.
The 04 Nov attack had been carried out under orders from Air Vice Marshal Mukerjee, who was officiating ..
#2dayIn1948
.. for Air Marshal Elmhirst during the latter's absence on tour. Mukerjee informed Perry-Keene, the PAF Chief, that he had ordered the RIAF to shoot down 'any unidentified aircraft' operating over Jammu and Kashmir.
Confronted with a choice ..
.. for Air Marshal Elmhirst during the latter's absence on tour. Mukerjee informed Perry-Keene, the PAF Chief, that he had ordered the RIAF to shoot down 'any unidentified aircraft' operating over Jammu and Kashmir.
Confronted with a choice ..
#2dayIn1948
.. between suspending air supplies to Gilgit or providing fighter escorts and thereby risking possible Indian attacks on airbases inside Pakistan, the Pakistani Cabinet decided on 09 Nov on the latter alternative despite its attendant dangers.
.. between suspending air supplies to Gilgit or providing fighter escorts and thereby risking possible Indian attacks on airbases inside Pakistan, the Pakistani Cabinet decided on 09 Nov on the latter alternative despite its attendant dangers.
#2dayIn1948
Suspension of the supply operation would have jeopardized the entire Pakistani position in the Northern theatre because of the importance of the Gilgit base.
Gracey and Peere-Keene came straight from the Cabinet meeting to report the development to ..
Suspension of the supply operation would have jeopardized the entire Pakistani position in the Northern theatre because of the importance of the Gilgit base.
Gracey and Peere-Keene came straight from the Cabinet meeting to report the development to ..
#2dayIn1948
.. High Commissioner Grafftey-Smith. The High Commissioner pointed out that the decision would be 'criminally foolish' if it turned out that Elmhirst didn't endorse Mukerjee's orders. The army and air chiefs agreed to press this point of view on ..
.. High Commissioner Grafftey-Smith. The High Commissioner pointed out that the decision would be 'criminally foolish' if it turned out that Elmhirst didn't endorse Mukerjee's orders. The army and air chiefs agreed to press this point of view on ..
#2dayIn1948
.. the Pakistani Govt and to counsel them to refrain from taking any provocative step until Elmhirst's position became clear.
.. the Pakistani Govt and to counsel them to refrain from taking any provocative step until Elmhirst's position became clear.
#2dayIn1948
Later in the day, the Secretary-General of the Pakistani Govt, Mohammad Ali, rang up the British High Commissioner to say that his suggestion had been accepted and Pakistan would hold up the implementation of its decision for some days.
Later in the day, the Secretary-General of the Pakistani Govt, Mohammad Ali, rang up the British High Commissioner to say that his suggestion had been accepted and Pakistan would hold up the implementation of its decision for some days.
#2dayIn1948
In New Delhi, High Commissioner Nye decided to take matters in hand. On Elmhirst's return, Nye took up the issue with him. Elmhirst stood.
by his Indian deputy. He denied the existence of a 'gentleman's agreement' between him and Perry-Keene and said that ..
In New Delhi, High Commissioner Nye decided to take matters in hand. On Elmhirst's return, Nye took up the issue with him. Elmhirst stood.
by his Indian deputy. He denied the existence of a 'gentleman's agreement' between him and Perry-Keene and said that ..
#2dayIn1948
.. Mukerjee had correctly spelt out the existing instructions of the Indian Govt. (The dealing official in Whitehall noted in the file: 'Although no agreement may have existed between Elmhirst and Perry-Keene, the fact remains that India didn't take ..
.. Mukerjee had correctly spelt out the existing instructions of the Indian Govt. (The dealing official in Whitehall noted in the file: 'Although no agreement may have existed between Elmhirst and Perry-Keene, the fact remains that India didn't take ..
#2dayIn1948
.. any offensive action against these aircraft in the air till a fortnight ago.')
However, Perry-Keene readily agreed that the the current instructions should be amended and so did Bucher. Nye informed the CRO and Grafftey-Smith in Karachi:
'The important point ..
.. any offensive action against these aircraft in the air till a fortnight ago.')
However, Perry-Keene readily agreed that the the current instructions should be amended and so did Bucher. Nye informed the CRO and Grafftey-Smith in Karachi:
'The important point ..
#2dayIn1948
.. that emerges is what action is now likely to be taken by the Indian Govt. I have discussed the matter with both Bucher and Elmhirst and pointed out to them the serious consequences which would ensue if Pakistan provided their ..
.. that emerges is what action is now likely to be taken by the Indian Govt. I have discussed the matter with both Bucher and Elmhirst and pointed out to them the serious consequences which would ensue if Pakistan provided their ..
#2dayIn1948
.. supply-dropping aircraft with a fighter escort. They fully appreciated the issues involved. At the next meeting of the Defence Council they propose to raise this question and Gen Bucher will say that whilst it is true that the supplies ..
.. supply-dropping aircraft with a fighter escort. They fully appreciated the issues involved. At the next meeting of the Defence Council they propose to raise this question and Gen Bucher will say that whilst it is true that the supplies ..
#2dayIn1948
.. dropped from these aircraft are assisting Pakistan military ops, nevertheless since these are of a relatively trivial nature, he is prepared to recommend that in future such aircraft should not be attacked and Elmhirst is prepared to take the same view.'
Unquote
.. dropped from these aircraft are assisting Pakistan military ops, nevertheless since these are of a relatively trivial nature, he is prepared to recommend that in future such aircraft should not be attacked and Elmhirst is prepared to take the same view.'
Unquote
#2dayIn1948
A few days later, Elmhirst informed the British High Commissioner that he had had an hour-long discussion on the subject of bombing ops with Nehru and had finally persuaded him to ignore Pakistani supply-dropping aircraft over Gilgit.
A few days later, Elmhirst informed the British High Commissioner that he had had an hour-long discussion on the subject of bombing ops with Nehru and had finally persuaded him to ignore Pakistani supply-dropping aircraft over Gilgit.
#2dayIn1948
Thus, acting in concert, the British High Commissioners in New Delhi and Karachi and the British officers in command of the air forces of India and Pakistan had succeeded in preventing an escalation of the air conflict by reversing the ..
Thus, acting in concert, the British High Commissioners in New Delhi and Karachi and the British officers in command of the air forces of India and Pakistan had succeeded in preventing an escalation of the air conflict by reversing the ..
#2dayIn1948
.. decisions of the warring states. In the process, they had removed a serious potential threat to the Pakistani ops in the Northern Theatre.
.. decisions of the warring states. In the process, they had removed a serious potential threat to the Pakistani ops in the Northern Theatre.
#2dayIn1948
Thus, it can be safely assumed that India was still not fully independent, even FIFTEEN months after independence.
Thus, it can be safely assumed that India was still not fully independent, even FIFTEEN months after independence.
#2dayIn1948
It was under these circumstances that the link ups with Leh and Poonch were effected. But the question remained of implementing the next objective envisaged by the Indian Cabinet - that of 'gradually extending the area under our control ..
It was under these circumstances that the link ups with Leh and Poonch were effected. But the question remained of implementing the next objective envisaged by the Indian Cabinet - that of 'gradually extending the area under our control ..
#2dayIn1948
.. in Jammu Province to Kotli and round about.'
This objective had far reaching political implications. Indian commanders were however, to remain in dark about the role played by their Commander-in-Chief behind the scenes, which led to failure in the endeavour.
.. in Jammu Province to Kotli and round about.'
This objective had far reaching political implications. Indian commanders were however, to remain in dark about the role played by their Commander-in-Chief behind the scenes, which led to failure in the endeavour.
#2dayIn1948
In mid-Nov, with the Indian army poised to raise the siege of Poonch town, panic spread in Pakistan. Karachi feared that after gaining her objective in Poonch, India would focus her attention on a push right upto the border.
In mid-Nov, with the Indian army poised to raise the siege of Poonch town, panic spread in Pakistan. Karachi feared that after gaining her objective in Poonch, India would focus her attention on a push right upto the border.
#2dayIn1948
This was a prospect which Pakistan believed would have dire implications for her continued existence. Pakistani govt instructed its C-in-C to prevent such an advance at all costs. Gen Gracey decided to throw in all available forces, if necessary, ..
This was a prospect which Pakistan believed would have dire implications for her continued existence. Pakistani govt instructed its C-in-C to prevent such an advance at all costs. Gen Gracey decided to throw in all available forces, if necessary, ..
#2dayIn1948
.. including the fledgling Pakistani Air Force, to prevent an Indian advance upto the Jhelum boundary.
High Commissioner Grafftey-Smith informed London:-
'Pakistan C-in-C has reported that he sees no hope of being able to prevent an Indian Army..
.. including the fledgling Pakistani Air Force, to prevent an Indian advance upto the Jhelum boundary.
High Commissioner Grafftey-Smith informed London:-
'Pakistan C-in-C has reported that he sees no hope of being able to prevent an Indian Army..
#2dayIn1948
.. link-up with Poonch and he fears that an all-out effort will be made by India after that to throw out the Azad Kashmir and Pakistani forces back on to the Jhelum River. He has been instructed by the Pakistan Govt that Gen Gracey may find it ..
.. link-up with Poonch and he fears that an all-out effort will be made by India after that to throw out the Azad Kashmir and Pakistani forces back on to the Jhelum River. He has been instructed by the Pakistan Govt that Gen Gracey may find it ..
#2dayIn1948
.. necessary to throw in what further Pakistan armed forces he can collect & to make use of the PAF for offensive tasks.'
Unquote
.. necessary to throw in what further Pakistan armed forces he can collect & to make use of the PAF for offensive tasks.'
Unquote
#2dayIn1948
Its willingness to utilise the fledgling PAF offensively was a measure of Pakistan's desperation. Pakistan had previously refrained from this course because it would inevitably draw a devastating response from the vastly superior RIAF.
Its willingness to utilise the fledgling PAF offensively was a measure of Pakistan's desperation. Pakistan had previously refrained from this course because it would inevitably draw a devastating response from the vastly superior RIAF.
#2dayIn1948
Moreover, an Indian counter attack against the airfields in Pakistan would carry the war into the latter's territory, an escalation which could spell disaster for Pakistan. Grafftey-Smith also reported another sign of Pakistan's desperation - plans for a ..
Moreover, an Indian counter attack against the airfields in Pakistan would carry the war into the latter's territory, an escalation which could spell disaster for Pakistan. Grafftey-Smith also reported another sign of Pakistan's desperation - plans for a ..
#2dayIn1948
.. counter offensive, even though this meant that the West Punjab heartland would be left defenceless.
Pakistan's strategy was to defend her positions across the Jhelum even at the cost of leaving her own national territory virtually defenceless.
.. counter offensive, even though this meant that the West Punjab heartland would be left defenceless.
Pakistan's strategy was to defend her positions across the Jhelum even at the cost of leaving her own national territory virtually defenceless.
#2dayIn1948
As seen earlier, this was a strategic posture which relied heavily on what were believed to be British 'assurances'. This became a cause of anxiety for Grafftey-Smith who felt that it would be disastrous for Pakistan if its moves were based on an ..
As seen earlier, this was a strategic posture which relied heavily on what were believed to be British 'assurances'. This became a cause of anxiety for Grafftey-Smith who felt that it would be disastrous for Pakistan if its moves were based on an ..
#2dayIn1948
.. incorrect reading of British policy. A full fledged inter-dominion war would leave Pakistan vulnerable to an Indian attack.
.. incorrect reading of British policy. A full fledged inter-dominion war would leave Pakistan vulnerable to an Indian attack.
#2dayIn1948
If, at the same time, London were to withdraw all British officers in accordance with the 'Stand Down' policy, the effect on Pakistan would be devastating. The High Commissioner therefore sought direct conformation of Whitehall's position.
If, at the same time, London were to withdraw all British officers in accordance with the 'Stand Down' policy, the effect on Pakistan would be devastating. The High Commissioner therefore sought direct conformation of Whitehall's position.
#2dayIn1948
He wrote:
'I feel it is vital that I should know whether there are any grounds for Pakistan GHQ assumptions and whether there have been any developments on lines suggested in UK Govt's 'stand-down' policy. If these rumours are totally without ..
He wrote:
'I feel it is vital that I should know whether there are any grounds for Pakistan GHQ assumptions and whether there have been any developments on lines suggested in UK Govt's 'stand-down' policy. If these rumours are totally without ..
#2dayIn1948
.. foundation and 'stand-down' policy remains unchanged, I shall have to try to find a way of warning Pakistan Govt that this is the case .. Pakistan Govt have already denuded their defensive front in West Punjab of the key brigade without which ..
.. foundation and 'stand-down' policy remains unchanged, I shall have to try to find a way of warning Pakistan Govt that this is the case .. Pakistan Govt have already denuded their defensive front in West Punjab of the key brigade without which ..
#2dayIn1948
.. they will be in no position to effectively resist Indian attack from East Punjab & they are planning a counter-offensive in Kashmir in reply to present Indian offensive there. Both these moves are almost certainly based on supposed assurance from ..
.. they will be in no position to effectively resist Indian attack from East Punjab & they are planning a counter-offensive in Kashmir in reply to present Indian offensive there. Both these moves are almost certainly based on supposed assurance from ..
#2dayIn1948
.. the UK Govt, and if disaster should overtake them as a result of misplaced confidence in this assurance, effect on relations between Pakistan and UK would be incalculable.'
Unquote.
.. the UK Govt, and if disaster should overtake them as a result of misplaced confidence in this assurance, effect on relations between Pakistan and UK would be incalculable.'
Unquote.
#2dayIn1948
Grafftey-Smith now provided an indication of the identities of the recipient as well as the source of the 'hints' and 'assurances'. These were received, he said, by Maj Gen Cawthorn from a member of the cabinet.
Grafftey-Smith now provided an indication of the identities of the recipient as well as the source of the 'hints' and 'assurances'. These were received, he said, by Maj Gen Cawthorn from a member of the cabinet.
#2dayIn1948
The High Commissioner had raised an awkward question. As is common in such cases, the source of 'hints' and 'informal assurances' had neglected to bring his initiative on the official record.
The obvious suspect was Noel-Baker.
The High Commissioner had raised an awkward question. As is common in such cases, the source of 'hints' and 'informal assurances' had neglected to bring his initiative on the official record.
The obvious suspect was Noel-Baker.
#2dayIn1948
It was to him that Cawthorn had conveyed Liaqat's proposal for an alliance. Noel-Baker had led the UK delegation in the discussions over Kashmir in the Security Council. As Commonwealth Secretary, he had a major say in interpreting the 'Stand-Down' Order.
It was to him that Cawthorn had conveyed Liaqat's proposal for an alliance. Noel-Baker had led the UK delegation in the discussions over Kashmir in the Security Council. As Commonwealth Secretary, he had a major say in interpreting the 'Stand-Down' Order.
#2dayIn1948
It is difficult to think of any other minister who might be inclined to anticipate Cabinet decisions and offer informal assurances concerning a 'Stand-Down' or about British policy on Kashmir in the UN.
It is difficult to think of any other minister who might be inclined to anticipate Cabinet decisions and offer informal assurances concerning a 'Stand-Down' or about British policy on Kashmir in the UN.
#2dayIn1948
The Commonwealth Relations Office replied with a well formulated evasion.
We still cannot trace [the] basis for these rumours and believe them to be quite unfounded,' cabled Patrick, the Deputy Secretary. 'It is difficult to pursue the matter without knowing ..
The Commonwealth Relations Office replied with a well formulated evasion.
We still cannot trace [the] basis for these rumours and believe them to be quite unfounded,' cabled Patrick, the Deputy Secretary. 'It is difficult to pursue the matter without knowing ..
#2dayIn1948
.. which Minister is alleged to have spoken to Cawthorn.' And, since it was a simple matter for Grafftey-Smith to ascertain this from Cawthorn, Patrick cautioned, 'But we appreciate the difficulty of obtaining this.'!
There is nothing on file to ..
.. which Minister is alleged to have spoken to Cawthorn.' And, since it was a simple matter for Grafftey-Smith to ascertain this from Cawthorn, Patrick cautioned, 'But we appreciate the difficulty of obtaining this.'!
There is nothing on file to ..
#2dayIn1948
.. indicate whether Patrick had consulted his Minister, Noel-Baker.
British interests were still paramount, even at the cost of India.
.. indicate whether Patrick had consulted his Minister, Noel-Baker.
British interests were still paramount, even at the cost of India.
#2dayIn1948
The Poonch Brigade undertook an operation to capture Thanpir and Pt. 7030.
1/4 GR and 1 Kashmir Infantry were assigned this task. The force moved out of Poonch at 1800Hr, with 1 Kashmir Infantry leading the advance.
The Poonch Brigade undertook an operation to capture Thanpir and Pt. 7030.
1/4 GR and 1 Kashmir Infantry were assigned this task. The force moved out of Poonch at 1800Hr, with 1 Kashmir Infantry leading the advance.
#2dayIn1948
1 Kashmir Infantry captured Thanpir without much opposition by 0230Hr. Then 1/4 GR swept forward for the attack on Pt 7030.
At 0300Hr, 'C' Company, leading the advance, came under heavy fire from a feature dominating the route of advance.
1 Kashmir Infantry captured Thanpir without much opposition by 0230Hr. Then 1/4 GR swept forward for the attack on Pt 7030.
At 0300Hr, 'C' Company, leading the advance, came under heavy fire from a feature dominating the route of advance.
#2dayIn1948
It was a bright moonlit night and the ground was covered with snow. It was, therefore, difficult for the company to manoeuvre to the right or left of the track without being observed by the enemy, who was hardly 90m from the forward platoon, and was ..
It was a bright moonlit night and the ground was covered with snow. It was, therefore, difficult for the company to manoeuvre to the right or left of the track without being observed by the enemy, who was hardly 90m from the forward platoon, and was ..
#2dayIn1948
.. supported by MMGs. The Gorkhas, however, faced the problem boldly. While 'B' Company moved from the right of the hill, 'C' Company swept through the left flank of the enemy. Both the companies advanced in face of heavy fire.
.. supported by MMGs. The Gorkhas, however, faced the problem boldly. While 'B' Company moved from the right of the hill, 'C' Company swept through the left flank of the enemy. Both the companies advanced in face of heavy fire.
#2dayIn1948
But nothing could stop the Gorkhas from climbing up the hill and securing the feature by 0415Hr!
The enemy fled, pursued by 'A' Company.
But nothing could stop the Gorkhas from climbing up the hill and securing the feature by 0415Hr!
The enemy fled, pursued by 'A' Company.
#2dayIn1948
Hardly had the 'A' Company covered about a km when the enemy rallied on a dominating feature wherefrom he could observe the line of approach.
Supported by 25 pounders, 'A' Company & a platoon ex 'C' Company boldly attacked & captured this feature too in about 20 mins!
Hardly had the 'A' Company covered about a km when the enemy rallied on a dominating feature wherefrom he could observe the line of approach.
Supported by 25 pounders, 'A' Company & a platoon ex 'C' Company boldly attacked & captured this feature too in about 20 mins!
#2dayIn1948
Unnerved by the impetuosity of the attack, the hostiles fled in wild confusion. Pt. 7030, the final objective, was captured at 1000Hr without much difficulty.
Unnerved by the impetuosity of the attack, the hostiles fled in wild confusion. Pt. 7030, the final objective, was captured at 1000Hr without much difficulty.
#2dayIn1948
Meanwhile Naushera, which had had respite from enemy attacks for a while now, was exposed to the full fury of enemy shelling.
Meanwhile Naushera, which had had respite from enemy attacks for a while now, was exposed to the full fury of enemy shelling.
#2dayIn1948
Hell seemed to have gotten loose when this day enemy turned all available guns of two medium regiments on the Naushera area.
Hell seemed to have gotten loose when this day enemy turned all available guns of two medium regiments on the Naushera area.
#2dayIn1948
5.5-inch medium guns, 25 pounders, 3.7-inch heavy ack-ack guns and 75mms from medium tanks pounded Naushera mercilessly. Between 1100Hr and 2000Hr, the enemy fired more than 2000 shells into an area with a radius of 11km. At the farthest point ..
5.5-inch medium guns, 25 pounders, 3.7-inch heavy ack-ack guns and 75mms from medium tanks pounded Naushera mercilessly. Between 1100Hr and 2000Hr, the enemy fired more than 2000 shells into an area with a radius of 11km. At the farthest point ..
#2dayIn1948
.. they picked targets at Beri Pattan, 16km South-East of Naushera. Their targets included Beri Pattan, Seri, Naushera, Punjab Hill, Nothi Dhar, Kaman Gosha, Grund Gala & the much shelled Chhawa Ridge.
The shelling continued throughout the night with varying intensity
.. they picked targets at Beri Pattan, 16km South-East of Naushera. Their targets included Beri Pattan, Seri, Naushera, Punjab Hill, Nothi Dhar, Kaman Gosha, Grund Gala & the much shelled Chhawa Ridge.
The shelling continued throughout the night with varying intensity
#2dayIn1948
In Beri Pattan, 2 J&K Rifles suffered the brunt of the heavy shelling. It started at 1515Hr from the direction of Kabutargala, and continued throughout the day.
In Beri Pattan, 2 J&K Rifles suffered the brunt of the heavy shelling. It started at 1515Hr from the direction of Kabutargala, and continued throughout the day.
#2dayIn1948
Shelling in Naushera continued this day as well. In Beri Pattan too, more than 500 shells landed, causing considerable damage when the petrol, oil and lubricants dump caught fire and consequently, the ammo dump of 2 J&K Rifles too exploded.
Shelling in Naushera continued this day as well. In Beri Pattan too, more than 500 shells landed, causing considerable damage when the petrol, oil and lubricants dump caught fire and consequently, the ammo dump of 2 J&K Rifles too exploded.
#2dayIn1948
Commander 80 Brigade visited Beri Pattan and helped restore morale by sending reinforcements. One company 7/2 Punjab came up to strengthen 2 J&K Rifles.
Commander 80 Brigade visited Beri Pattan and helped restore morale by sending reinforcements. One company 7/2 Punjab came up to strengthen 2 J&K Rifles.
#2dayIn1948
This day also witnessed a saga of epic bravery in Chhawa, Naushera.
Captain D.D. Mistry was the observation officer of the forward most picquet. The hostiles relentlessly shelled his position. In spite of this lethal ..
This day also witnessed a saga of epic bravery in Chhawa, Naushera.
Captain D.D. Mistry was the observation officer of the forward most picquet. The hostiles relentlessly shelled his position. In spite of this lethal ..
#2dayIn1948
.. fire, Captain Mistry stuck to his post and pinpointed the hostile guns and tanks in that sector, till a shell hit his position and killed him instantaneously.
He was awarded the Maha Vir Chakra posthumously.
.. fire, Captain Mistry stuck to his post and pinpointed the hostile guns and tanks in that sector, till a shell hit his position and killed him instantaneously.
He was awarded the Maha Vir Chakra posthumously.
#2dayIn1948
Back in the corridors of power, even as officials exchanged cables, British Govt at the highest level signalled the position it would take in the event of a major Indian offensive.
On 17 Nov 1948, Liaqat sent a desperate telegram to Attlee appealing ..
Back in the corridors of power, even as officials exchanged cables, British Govt at the highest level signalled the position it would take in the event of a major Indian offensive.
On 17 Nov 1948, Liaqat sent a desperate telegram to Attlee appealing ..
#2dayIn1948
.. for support in the Security Council for a ceasefire call. He wrote:
'Now clear that Indian Army and Air Force have actually started major offensive on both Mirpur-Poonch and Dras fronts. Object of former undoubtedly to secure all territory upto ..
.. for support in the Security Council for a ceasefire call. He wrote:
'Now clear that Indian Army and Air Force have actually started major offensive on both Mirpur-Poonch and Dras fronts. Object of former undoubtedly to secure all territory upto ..
#2dayIn1948
.. Jhelum river including whole of Poonch and face UN with fait accompli. Quite clear that Azad forces with present defensive support by minimum of Pakistan regular forces cannot hope to hold up advance in Mirpur-Poonch. Unless Security Council can ..
.. Jhelum river including whole of Poonch and face UN with fait accompli. Quite clear that Azad forces with present defensive support by minimum of Pakistan regular forces cannot hope to hold up advance in Mirpur-Poonch. Unless Security Council can ..
#2dayIn1948
.. be induced to order unconditional ceasefire immediately, Pakistan will be forced to stage counter-offensive with all resources including armour and air to stop this Indian offensive.'
Unquote
.. be induced to order unconditional ceasefire immediately, Pakistan will be forced to stage counter-offensive with all resources including armour and air to stop this Indian offensive.'
Unquote
#2dayIn1948
Attlee sent an immediate reply. 'I am taking action to do anything I can to secure the halting of any offensive that may be taking place,' he responded. 'I hope that you ..
Attlee sent an immediate reply. 'I am taking action to do anything I can to secure the halting of any offensive that may be taking place,' he responded. 'I hope that you ..
#2dayIn1948
.. will not precipitate any action on your part until these measures have been tried out.'
Unquote.
.. will not precipitate any action on your part until these measures have been tried out.'
Unquote.
#2dayIn1948
Simultaneously, Attlee sought an assurance from Nehru that India didn't intend to launch an all out offensive. His message read:
'I am informed that a communication is being made to the Security Council alleging that Indian Army and Air Force operating in Kashmir ..
Simultaneously, Attlee sought an assurance from Nehru that India didn't intend to launch an all out offensive. His message read:
'I am informed that a communication is being made to the Security Council alleging that Indian Army and Air Force operating in Kashmir ..
#2dayIn1948
.. have been considerably reinforced and that Indian forces have started an all-out offensive in the State.
I sincerely trust you will be able to assure me that this is not the fact. Remembering the assurances from yourself and the PM of Pakistan when ..
.. have been considerably reinforced and that Indian forces have started an all-out offensive in the State.
I sincerely trust you will be able to assure me that this is not the fact. Remembering the assurances from yourself and the PM of Pakistan when ..
#2dayIn1948
.. you were in London, I am sure that neither of you would wish to settle the fate of Kashmir by military force.'
Unquote.
.. you were in London, I am sure that neither of you would wish to settle the fate of Kashmir by military force.'
Unquote.
#2dayIn1948
This exchange of messages left no doubt regarding the biased position the UK would take in the Security Council and elsewhere if India were to try driving out Pakistan's forces from the Jammu province.
Nehru was furious and his anger showed in his ..
This exchange of messages left no doubt regarding the biased position the UK would take in the Security Council and elsewhere if India were to try driving out Pakistan's forces from the Jammu province.
Nehru was furious and his anger showed in his ..
#2dayIn1948
.. reply to Attlee:
'This message has surprised me. We have had no protest yet from UK Govt about Pakistan army's functioning in Kashmir and being continually reinforced and carrying on offensive ops ... We have also not had any expression of opinion ..
.. reply to Attlee:
'This message has surprised me. We have had no protest yet from UK Govt about Pakistan army's functioning in Kashmir and being continually reinforced and carrying on offensive ops ... We have also not had any expression of opinion ..
#2dayIn1948
.. of UK Govt on our acceptance of Kashmir Commission's ceasefire resolution and Pakistan's rejection of it. But now Pakistan objects & that objection is apparently supported by the UK Govt.
We have no desire to settle any question by military force, but ..
.. of UK Govt on our acceptance of Kashmir Commission's ceasefire resolution and Pakistan's rejection of it. But now Pakistan objects & that objection is apparently supported by the UK Govt.
We have no desire to settle any question by military force, but ..
#2dayIn1948
.. if our territory is invaded as it has been invaded in Kashmir, it is our intention to resist to the utmost of our capacity .... There has been no major offensive and there is no question of an all-out offensive in the State...
It will be ..
.. if our territory is invaded as it has been invaded in Kashmir, it is our intention to resist to the utmost of our capacity .... There has been no major offensive and there is no question of an all-out offensive in the State...
It will be ..
#2dayIn1948
.. observed Pakistan complaint is without foundation and we have deliberately avoided major offensive. I should like to make it clear however, that presence of Pakistan troops on Indian Union territory is a continuing irritation and we cannot ..
.. observed Pakistan complaint is without foundation and we have deliberately avoided major offensive. I should like to make it clear however, that presence of Pakistan troops on Indian Union territory is a continuing irritation and we cannot ..
#2dayIn1948
.. possibly agree to their staying there ...
It is a matter of deep regret to my Govt that these hostile forces are controlled and led by British officers who are thus participating in invasion of the territory of the Indian Dominion.'
Unquote.
.. possibly agree to their staying there ...
It is a matter of deep regret to my Govt that these hostile forces are controlled and led by British officers who are thus participating in invasion of the territory of the Indian Dominion.'
Unquote.
#2dayIn1948
Nehru thus registered a protest against Britan's pro-Pakistan stance. he defended India's right to expel Pakistani forces from her territory in Kashmir, while rejecting Liaqat's charge of an all-out Indian offensive. He offered no assurances concerning limited ops.
Nehru thus registered a protest against Britan's pro-Pakistan stance. he defended India's right to expel Pakistani forces from her territory in Kashmir, while rejecting Liaqat's charge of an all-out Indian offensive. He offered no assurances concerning limited ops.
#2dayIn1948
Lt Gen Nye, the British High Commissioner to India, called on Nehru to probe his intentions and reported: 'He did not say categorically that they had no intention of carrying out further ops, but he implied quite clearly that if any ..
Lt Gen Nye, the British High Commissioner to India, called on Nehru to probe his intentions and reported: 'He did not say categorically that they had no intention of carrying out further ops, but he implied quite clearly that if any ..
#2dayIn1948
.. thing more was undertaken during the winter it should be of a minor nature.'
Nye added the further assurance that he knew from 'unimpeachable sources' that India had no plans in existence for any large scale offensive.
Around this time, the UK ..
.. thing more was undertaken during the winter it should be of a minor nature.'
Nye added the further assurance that he knew from 'unimpeachable sources' that India had no plans in existence for any large scale offensive.
Around this time, the UK ..
#2dayIn1948
.. again took recourse to delaying military supplies urgently required by India. In mid-Dec, Nehru complained to Krishna Menon about British prevarication and instructed him to seek a clear answer as to whether the promised supplies would be sent.
.. again took recourse to delaying military supplies urgently required by India. In mid-Dec, Nehru complained to Krishna Menon about British prevarication and instructed him to seek a clear answer as to whether the promised supplies would be sent.
#2dayIn1948
If not, Nehru intended to 'make other arrangements' - presumably to explore the possibility of sourcing defence requirements from the US.
In 1948, India possessed only a rudimentary defence industry and her dependence on the UK for spares and ..
If not, Nehru intended to 'make other arrangements' - presumably to explore the possibility of sourcing defence requirements from the US.
In 1948, India possessed only a rudimentary defence industry and her dependence on the UK for spares and ..
#2dayIn1948
.. equipment was almost total.
.. equipment was almost total.
#2dayIn1948
Last night, 'B' Company 11 J&K Militia ex Poonch Brigade had moved ahead to Mandi via the newly captured Pt 7030, Nurpur and Dhangri. On its way, the company cleared the hostiles from the area and resettled local Muslims. At 1600Hr this day, the ..
Last night, 'B' Company 11 J&K Militia ex Poonch Brigade had moved ahead to Mandi via the newly captured Pt 7030, Nurpur and Dhangri. On its way, the company cleared the hostiles from the area and resettled local Muslims. At 1600Hr this day, the ..
#2dayIn1948
.. company set up its HQ at Mandi. Thus the Poonch garrison freed the Suran and Mandi valleys astride the tracks leading into the Kashmir Valley across the Pir Panjal Range.
.. company set up its HQ at Mandi. Thus the Poonch garrison freed the Suran and Mandi valleys astride the tracks leading into the Kashmir Valley across the Pir Panjal Range.
#2dayIn1948
Meanwhile shelling in Naushera / Beri Pattan continued. In Naushera, enemy shelled the Tactical HQ accurately and heavily.
Meanwhile shelling in Naushera / Beri Pattan continued. In Naushera, enemy shelled the Tactical HQ accurately and heavily.
#2dayIn1948
Although he fired well over 5,000 shells in this bombardment, the defenders simply stayed put and held on.
In Beri Pattan, two iron ropes of the bridge were broken due to the shelling. As the bridge was rendered incapable of bearing the weight of ..
Although he fired well over 5,000 shells in this bombardment, the defenders simply stayed put and held on.
In Beri Pattan, two iron ropes of the bridge were broken due to the shelling. As the bridge was rendered incapable of bearing the weight of ..
#2dayIn1948
.. vehicles, convoys carrying supplies and ammo for the forward troops tried to cross the river by a diversion.
.. vehicles, convoys carrying supplies and ammo for the forward troops tried to cross the river by a diversion.
#2dayIn1948
In spite of heavy shelling during previous night, 15 trucks and three jeeps managed to cross the river successfully. The intensity of shelling now decreased considerably on 17 Dec.
On this day 7/2 Punjab relieved 2 J&K Rifles, who withdrew from their ..
In spite of heavy shelling during previous night, 15 trucks and three jeeps managed to cross the river successfully. The intensity of shelling now decreased considerably on 17 Dec.
On this day 7/2 Punjab relieved 2 J&K Rifles, who withdrew from their ..
#2dayIn1948
.. positions at Beri Pattan to occupy new positions at Pt. 3779, Pt. 3192 and Pt. 3807. The Brigade Commander now decided to deal with the hostile Observation Post which had been so troublesome.
.. positions at Beri Pattan to occupy new positions at Pt. 3779, Pt. 3192 and Pt. 3807. The Brigade Commander now decided to deal with the hostile Observation Post which had been so troublesome.
#2dayIn1948
Enemy attempts to force own troops to withdraw under weight of arty fire had failed. This day two enemy battalions were seen advancing towards Chhawa Ridge and Punjab Hill, hoping that own troops would have abandoned these positions because of the heavy plastering.
Enemy attempts to force own troops to withdraw under weight of arty fire had failed. This day two enemy battalions were seen advancing towards Chhawa Ridge and Punjab Hill, hoping that own troops would have abandoned these positions because of the heavy plastering.
#2dayIn1948
But they were, however, sorely disappointed and had to recoil against the fire of the defenders!
But they were, however, sorely disappointed and had to recoil against the fire of the defenders!
#2dayIn1948
Own arty too, had engaged and attrited enemy arty in counter bombardment in past three days. Own commanders were confident in their ability to hold out .
One only had to see the men who were taking all this 'punishment' ..
Own arty too, had engaged and attrited enemy arty in counter bombardment in past three days. Own commanders were confident in their ability to hold out .
One only had to see the men who were taking all this 'punishment' ..
#2dayIn1948
.. to be convinced that we would be able to keep the enemy at bay. The cheerful spirit of our jawans going through all that shelling was a great morale booster for any worried commanders in the field.
In the event, all this shelling turned out to be a ..
.. to be convinced that we would be able to keep the enemy at bay. The cheerful spirit of our jawans going through all that shelling was a great morale booster for any worried commanders in the field.
In the event, all this shelling turned out to be a ..
#2dayIn1948
.. flicker of the flame. The enemy realized the futility of continuing these ops in view of his inability to secure any local victories and also in the light of his mounting losses in this theatre.
The 13 Aug resolution suddenly became acceptable to Pakistan!
.. flicker of the flame. The enemy realized the futility of continuing these ops in view of his inability to secure any local victories and also in the light of his mounting losses in this theatre.
The 13 Aug resolution suddenly became acceptable to Pakistan!
#2dayIn1948
Stocking position of Leh, Dras and Kargil had reached healthy proportions. Dras was now stocked with supplies for 68 days for 3000 troops, Leh with supplies for 17 days for 1200 troops and Kargil with supplies for 23 days for 3000 troops.
Stocking position of Leh, Dras and Kargil had reached healthy proportions. Dras was now stocked with supplies for 68 days for 3000 troops, Leh with supplies for 17 days for 1200 troops and Kargil with supplies for 23 days for 3000 troops.
#2dayIn1948
At this time, active ops had already been suspended due to the winter. The war in the Northern front remained in suspended animation, or a state of hibernation till the ceasefire came into effect.
Thus was established the link up with Ladakh, after many ..
At this time, active ops had already been suspended due to the winter. The war in the Northern front remained in suspended animation, or a state of hibernation till the ceasefire came into effect.
Thus was established the link up with Ladakh, after many ..
#2dayIn1948
.. months of anxiety and several gallant attempts.
The tank thrust over Zoji La was certainly the most spectacular operation of the entire campaign in J&K. The altitude & terrible reputation of the Himalayan pass, the race against time, & political ..
.. months of anxiety and several gallant attempts.
The tank thrust over Zoji La was certainly the most spectacular operation of the entire campaign in J&K. The altitude & terrible reputation of the Himalayan pass, the race against time, & political ..
#2dayIn1948
..and strategic importance of the issues at stake made it a unique operation.
Like most great concepts, the plan of 'Op Bison' was simple. It succeeded primarily because of its stunning boldness, which took the enemy completely by surprise.
..and strategic importance of the issues at stake made it a unique operation.
Like most great concepts, the plan of 'Op Bison' was simple. It succeeded primarily because of its stunning boldness, which took the enemy completely by surprise.
#2dayIn1948
The fighting qualities of Indian soldiers of all classes, the skill and efficiency of their commanders at the front as well as in Srinagar and Delhi, and, finally, the kindness of 'Dame Fortune', were elements without which success would have been impossible.
The fighting qualities of Indian soldiers of all classes, the skill and efficiency of their commanders at the front as well as in Srinagar and Delhi, and, finally, the kindness of 'Dame Fortune', were elements without which success would have been impossible.
#2dayIn1948
The op amply demonstrated the skill and gallantry of the armour and infantry. The gunners too gave an excellent account of themselves, even though they had frequently to place their observation posts at the staggering height of 4875m above sea level.
The op amply demonstrated the skill and gallantry of the armour and infantry. The gunners too gave an excellent account of themselves, even though they had frequently to place their observation posts at the staggering height of 4875m above sea level.
#2dayIn1948
On 01 Nov 1948, the three arty units fired over 2000 shells on the Zoji La. 51(Para) Field Battery advanced over the pass upto Gumri, while the J&K Mountain Battery advanced with the column all through and wintered in Kargil itself.
On 01 Nov 1948, the three arty units fired over 2000 shells on the Zoji La. 51(Para) Field Battery advanced over the pass upto Gumri, while the J&K Mountain Battery advanced with the column all through and wintered in Kargil itself.
#2dayIn1948
The supporting arms and services also, esp the Royal Indian Engineers, gave an excellent account of themselves and paved the way for the advance, literally as well as idiomatically.
The op also revealed the invaluable role of the RIAF and its scope and limitations.
The supporting arms and services also, esp the Royal Indian Engineers, gave an excellent account of themselves and paved the way for the advance, literally as well as idiomatically.
The op also revealed the invaluable role of the RIAF and its scope and limitations.
#2dayIn1948
The limitations were shown first, when bad weather prevented the planes from supporting the crucial attack on 01 Nov 1948 and the next two days. But after that the Tempests came over regularly on call, and their fierce ..
The limitations were shown first, when bad weather prevented the planes from supporting the crucial attack on 01 Nov 1948 and the next two days. But after that the Tempests came over regularly on call, and their fierce ..
#2dayIn1948
.. attacks with rockets and cannon fire destroyed many hostile positions at Pindras.
Even more useful were the Dakotas, which made it possible to stock Dras and to continue the advance to Kargil.
Of the lessons of the ops in Zoji La area, there were many.
.. attacks with rockets and cannon fire destroyed many hostile positions at Pindras.
Even more useful were the Dakotas, which made it possible to stock Dras and to continue the advance to Kargil.
Of the lessons of the ops in Zoji La area, there were many.
#2dayIn1948
The technicians in the army learnt much, particularly about the behaviour of arms and equipment at high altitudes and at arctic temperatures. Moreover, the age old principles of 'surprise' and 'offensive action' were again brought out.
The technicians in the army learnt much, particularly about the behaviour of arms and equipment at high altitudes and at arctic temperatures. Moreover, the age old principles of 'surprise' and 'offensive action' were again brought out.
#2dayIn1948
It was also brought out that what was normally considered impossible was not impossible when the Indian Army took up the task!
It was also brought out that what was normally considered impossible was not impossible when the Indian Army took up the task!
#2dayIn1948
In another part of the theatre, while the long siege of Poonch was finally broken, significant areas of the State of J&K still remained under enemy occupation. The task of the Indian army couldn't be considered completed until these areas of ..
In another part of the theatre, while the long siege of Poonch was finally broken, significant areas of the State of J&K still remained under enemy occupation. The task of the Indian army couldn't be considered completed until these areas of ..
#2dayIn1948
.. Mirpur, Kotli and Muzaffarabad were also liberated, apart from the large and more difficult areas of Gilgit. Plans were indeed considered in early November for recapturing of Mirpur & Muzaffarabad.
Possible routes of advance, their respective merits ..
.. Mirpur, Kotli and Muzaffarabad were also liberated, apart from the large and more difficult areas of Gilgit. Plans were indeed considered in early November for recapturing of Mirpur & Muzaffarabad.
Possible routes of advance, their respective merits ..
#2dayIn1948
.. and de-merits, and the forces required, were seriously debated between Lt Gen Cariappa and Army HQ. But these tentative plans were not pursued, for reasons part military & part sabotage by the erstwhile colonial power that was looking out for ..
.. and de-merits, and the forces required, were seriously debated between Lt Gen Cariappa and Army HQ. But these tentative plans were not pursued, for reasons part military & part sabotage by the erstwhile colonial power that was looking out for ..
#2dayIn1948
.. its own interests at the cost of one of its Dominions.
.. its own interests at the cost of one of its Dominions.
#2dayIn1948
After the furious exchanges of November, Bucher now set himself a twofold task: to restrict Indian offensive action to the extent possible and to reassure the Pakistani army about Indian intentions. Spurred on by Nye, he lost no opportunity to ..
After the furious exchanges of November, Bucher now set himself a twofold task: to restrict Indian offensive action to the extent possible and to reassure the Pakistani army about Indian intentions. Spurred on by Nye, he lost no opportunity to ..
#2dayIn1948
.. impress upon the Indian Govt the limitations of its army & the need to adopt a strictly defensive posture. The cable traffic from the UK High Commission provides glimpses of the modus operandi.
Thus, Nye reported on 22 Nov that he was 'arranging to ..
.. impress upon the Indian Govt the limitations of its army & the need to adopt a strictly defensive posture. The cable traffic from the UK High Commission provides glimpses of the modus operandi.
Thus, Nye reported on 22 Nov that he was 'arranging to ..
#2dayIn1948
.. be fed into' Nehru from professional sources that the morale of Indian troops in Kashmir had begun to deteriorate.
.. be fed into' Nehru from professional sources that the morale of Indian troops in Kashmir had begun to deteriorate.
#2dayIn1948
'I hope that by making these various representations to Nehru that it'll be possible to bring home to him that there is no military solution to this [Kashmir] problem.'
Unquote.
'I hope that by making these various representations to Nehru that it'll be possible to bring home to him that there is no military solution to this [Kashmir] problem.'
Unquote.
#2dayIn1948
The same day, Bucher wrote to Nehru on the indicated lines, adding for good measure that the army was very short of transport and vehicle spares as well as certain types of ammo and that there was no prospect of new supplies in the near future.
The same day, Bucher wrote to Nehru on the indicated lines, adding for good measure that the army was very short of transport and vehicle spares as well as certain types of ammo and that there was no prospect of new supplies in the near future.
#2dayIn1948
These representations generally served to reinforce the restraint reflected in Indian op plans. Nehru's thinking was conditioned also by the prospects of a ceasefire emerging from the labours of the UN Commission.
These representations generally served to reinforce the restraint reflected in Indian op plans. Nehru's thinking was conditioned also by the prospects of a ceasefire emerging from the labours of the UN Commission.
#2dayIn1948
Responding to Bucher, he wrote that 'Muzaffarabad & Mirpur are out of our reach at the present for many months and I can't say just yet what line in regard to them might be. But Kotli is of somewhat different category. It is conceivable ..
Responding to Bucher, he wrote that 'Muzaffarabad & Mirpur are out of our reach at the present for many months and I can't say just yet what line in regard to them might be. But Kotli is of somewhat different category. It is conceivable ..
#2dayIn1948
.. that we might consider it desirable to go towards Kotli. But not yet or in the near future.'
Unquote.
.. that we might consider it desirable to go towards Kotli. But not yet or in the near future.'
Unquote.
#2dayIn1948
Thus the govt kept its options on Kotli open, thought the objective was not treated as urgent.
Bucher attended an inter-dominion conference of ..
Thus the govt kept its options on Kotli open, thought the objective was not treated as urgent.
Bucher attended an inter-dominion conference of ..
#2dayIn1948
.. Defence Secretaries and Officers in Karachi on 26-27 Nov and took the opportunity to hold private discussions with the Pakistani C-in-C, Gen Gracey, and Chief of Staff, Gen McCay.
.. Defence Secretaries and Officers in Karachi on 26-27 Nov and took the opportunity to hold private discussions with the Pakistani C-in-C, Gen Gracey, and Chief of Staff, Gen McCay.
#2dayIn1948
Grafftey-Smith cabled that Bucher had assured McCay that:
'There would be no (repeat no) attack on Irpur [sic, Mirpur?] or any staged (repeat staged) attack on Kotli or Bhimbar ..
Grafftey-Smith cabled that Bucher had assured McCay that:
'There would be no (repeat no) attack on Irpur [sic, Mirpur?] or any staged (repeat staged) attack on Kotli or Bhimbar ..
#2dayIn1948
.. [Bucher] had indeed promised to send him [McCay] a personal signal should Indian govt 'double-cross' him over this. Most strict orders had been given that towns (he mentioned Domel and Muzaffarabad) were not (repeat not) to be bombed.
.. [Bucher] had indeed promised to send him [McCay] a personal signal should Indian govt 'double-cross' him over this. Most strict orders had been given that towns (he mentioned Domel and Muzaffarabad) were not (repeat not) to be bombed.
#2dayIn1948
After much difficulty he had succeeded in getting one RIAF squadron withdrawn from Jammu.'
Unquote.
After much difficulty he had succeeded in getting one RIAF squadron withdrawn from Jammu.'
Unquote.
#2dayIn1948
Bucher had considerable success in reassuring Gracey. In Graffey-Smith's words:
.. ' it is clear that confidential exchanges between him [Gen Gracey] and Gen ..
Bucher had considerable success in reassuring Gracey. In Graffey-Smith's words:
.. ' it is clear that confidential exchanges between him [Gen Gracey] and Gen ..
#2dayIn1948
.. Bucher during recent defence discussions here have usefully cleared the air and very considerably relieved tension, atleast on top level. But situation in Poonch area remains precarious because of risk that Indian commanders on the spot may edge ..
.. Bucher during recent defence discussions here have usefully cleared the air and very considerably relieved tension, atleast on top level. But situation in Poonch area remains precarious because of risk that Indian commanders on the spot may edge ..
#2dayIn1948
.. forward here & there in search of better position with dangerously provocative effect on morale of Azad Kashmir and Pak Army.
2. Both C-in-Cs were agreed on essential necessity of localising effect of Indian advance of Poonch, and Gracey has no doubt ..
.. forward here & there in search of better position with dangerously provocative effect on morale of Azad Kashmir and Pak Army.
2. Both C-in-Cs were agreed on essential necessity of localising effect of Indian advance of Poonch, and Gracey has no doubt ..
#2dayIn1948
.. of Bucher's good intentions in this respect. He is less sure whether Gen Cariappa is firmly under Bucher's control, and is very apprehensive of forward actions (militarily unexceptionable) by local commanders in sense suggested above. He insists ..
.. of Bucher's good intentions in this respect. He is less sure whether Gen Cariappa is firmly under Bucher's control, and is very apprehensive of forward actions (militarily unexceptionable) by local commanders in sense suggested above. He insists ..
#2dayIn1948
.. that any suggestion of an Indian advance towards Kotli, Palundri and Mirpur would be fatal and would involve instant counter offensive by Pakistani forces.'
Unquote.
.. that any suggestion of an Indian advance towards Kotli, Palundri and Mirpur would be fatal and would involve instant counter offensive by Pakistani forces.'
Unquote.
#2dayIn1948
Thus Bucher was able to calm Gracey's fears of an all-out Indian drive to Jhelum River but the Pakistani army remained uncertain about more limited actions on part of India.
Bucher's dedication to ..
Thus Bucher was able to calm Gracey's fears of an all-out Indian drive to Jhelum River but the Pakistani army remained uncertain about more limited actions on part of India.
Bucher's dedication to ..
#2dayIn1948
.. curbing Indian initiatives was not in doubt; the question was whether he would succeed in restraining Indian Generals from launching forward actions which were 'militarily unexceptionable.' Bucher 'frankly admitted to Gen Gracey that he cannot control Cariappa.'
.. curbing Indian initiatives was not in doubt; the question was whether he would succeed in restraining Indian Generals from launching forward actions which were 'militarily unexceptionable.' Bucher 'frankly admitted to Gen Gracey that he cannot control Cariappa.'
#2dayIn1948
Regarding Kotli, Gracey noted that Bucher offered a qualified assurance - that there would be no 'staged' attack on Kotli.
Bucher's offer to alert Pakistan in case the Indian Govt tried to 'double-cross' him was deeply appreciated.
Regarding Kotli, Gracey noted that Bucher offered a qualified assurance - that there would be no 'staged' attack on Kotli.
Bucher's offer to alert Pakistan in case the Indian Govt tried to 'double-cross' him was deeply appreciated.
#2dayIn1948
(Did Bucher choose his words for their delicious irony?).
There was no mention of any reciprocal assurance sought by Bucher and it is clear that Gracey, on his part, volunteered no assurance. It continued to be Pakistan's policy to retaliate with ..
(Did Bucher choose his words for their delicious irony?).
There was no mention of any reciprocal assurance sought by Bucher and it is clear that Gracey, on his part, volunteered no assurance. It continued to be Pakistan's policy to retaliate with ..
#2dayIn1948
.. a counter-offensive if there were to be 'any suggestion of an Indian advance' towards Kotli. As High Commissioner Grafftey-Smith reported: 'Gracey considers that the Indian forces are in a highly vulnerable position and that a Pakistani ..
.. a counter-offensive if there were to be 'any suggestion of an Indian advance' towards Kotli. As High Commissioner Grafftey-Smith reported: 'Gracey considers that the Indian forces are in a highly vulnerable position and that a Pakistani ..
#2dayIn1948
.. brigade shelling the Indian L of C between Akhnur and Naushera would cause havoc.'
Unquote
.. brigade shelling the Indian L of C between Akhnur and Naushera would cause havoc.'
Unquote
#2dayIn1948
It was a high risk strategy.
It was a high risk strategy.
#2dayIn1948
Since the Indian Army in Kashmir was critically dependent on the single road running through this area to the Valley, a strong reaction was to be expected to a Pakistani attack at this point. One can only speculate that military planners in Pakistan ..
Since the Indian Army in Kashmir was critically dependent on the single road running through this area to the Valley, a strong reaction was to be expected to a Pakistani attack at this point. One can only speculate that military planners in Pakistan ..
#2dayIn1948
.. were confident that India had no plans for carrying the war into Pakistan (as was indeed the case) and, furthermore, that India would be restrained from launching such an attack by the UK and the Security Council.
.. were confident that India had no plans for carrying the war into Pakistan (as was indeed the case) and, furthermore, that India would be restrained from launching such an attack by the UK and the Security Council.
#2dayIn1948
Now coming back to the battlefield, in early December the Indian Army launched some local initiatives in the Poonch-Mendhar area. Indian forces took the Salhotri Ridge, where Paksitan had earlier established a forward HQ.
By 15 Dec, the Indian Army ..
Now coming back to the battlefield, in early December the Indian Army launched some local initiatives in the Poonch-Mendhar area. Indian forces took the Salhotri Ridge, where Paksitan had earlier established a forward HQ.
By 15 Dec, the Indian Army ..
#2dayIn1948
.. dominated the main road from Mendhar to Kotli. These actions were in full conformity with the Govt's decisions as summarized in Nehru's message to Krishna Menon. As Gracey had feared, Bucher had not succeeded in preventing his generals from taking ..
.. dominated the main road from Mendhar to Kotli. These actions were in full conformity with the Govt's decisions as summarized in Nehru's message to Krishna Menon. As Gracey had feared, Bucher had not succeeded in preventing his generals from taking ..
#2dayIn1948
.. militarily unexceptionable forward actions.
Though these were only local actions, they triggered off Pakistani fears about a major Indian offensive.
.. militarily unexceptionable forward actions.
Though these were only local actions, they triggered off Pakistani fears about a major Indian offensive.
#2dayIn1948
After the action at the Salhotri Ridge, Liaqat sent a telegram to Attlee (on 08 Dec) alleging that 'Indian forces are making preparations for a further offensive in the near future with the probable object of capturing Kotli.'
After the action at the Salhotri Ridge, Liaqat sent a telegram to Attlee (on 08 Dec) alleging that 'Indian forces are making preparations for a further offensive in the near future with the probable object of capturing Kotli.'
#2dayIn1948
He warned: 'Unless .. India immediately orders her commanders to restrict their dispositions and activities to the minimum areas essential for the protection of the above [Rajauri-Poonch & Srinagar-Leh] routes, I shall be compelled to ..
He warned: 'Unless .. India immediately orders her commanders to restrict their dispositions and activities to the minimum areas essential for the protection of the above [Rajauri-Poonch & Srinagar-Leh] routes, I shall be compelled to ..
#2dayIn1948
He called for an urgent Security Council decision to send military observers to the State & sought Attlee's assistance to 'avert the tragedy that is looming ahead.'
At the time of Liaqat's appeal, Pakistan's ..
He called for an urgent Security Council decision to send military observers to the State & sought Attlee's assistance to 'avert the tragedy that is looming ahead.'
At the time of Liaqat's appeal, Pakistan's ..
#2dayIn1948
.. military dispositions were described by the UK High Commission in Karachi as follows:
'For the first time Pakistan forces are so placed that they can deliver a blow .. against Indian lines of communication in Kashmir, splitting Indian Army and ..
.. military dispositions were described by the UK High Commission in Karachi as follows:
'For the first time Pakistan forces are so placed that they can deliver a blow .. against Indian lines of communication in Kashmir, splitting Indian Army and ..
#2dayIn1948
.. endangering the safety of a large part of it.
Any such counter-offensive would, of course, entail major clash between two dominion armies which could hardly fail to extend beyond Kashmir.'
Unquote.
.. endangering the safety of a large part of it.
Any such counter-offensive would, of course, entail major clash between two dominion armies which could hardly fail to extend beyond Kashmir.'
Unquote.
#2dayIn1948
The planned counter-Offensive, codenamed 'Operation Venus' envisaged a major arty attack on the vital Indian line of communications in Naushera area, particularly the bridge at Beri Pattan.
The planned counter-Offensive, codenamed 'Operation Venus' envisaged a major arty attack on the vital Indian line of communications in Naushera area, particularly the bridge at Beri Pattan.
#2dayIn1948
.Akhnur, an even more vulnerable position on account of its proximity to the border, was initially considered for the target area, but it was realised that a successful Indian counter-attack here would inevitably carry the ..
.Akhnur, an even more vulnerable position on account of its proximity to the border, was initially considered for the target area, but it was realised that a successful Indian counter-attack here would inevitably carry the ..
#2dayIn1948
.. war into Pakistani territory.
Beri Pattan had the advantage of being situated at a slightly greater distance from the border. The idea apparently was to create a 'running sore' where Pakistan could turn on the pressure at will in order to divert India's ..
.. war into Pakistani territory.
Beri Pattan had the advantage of being situated at a slightly greater distance from the border. The idea apparently was to create a 'running sore' where Pakistan could turn on the pressure at will in order to divert India's ..
#2dayIn1948
.. forces from advancing in other sectors. The beleaguered Poonch garrison had served this purpose at an earlier stage but Pakistan lost this advantage when Indian Army linked up with Poonch after establishing control over lines of communication ..
.. forces from advancing in other sectors. The beleaguered Poonch garrison had served this purpose at an earlier stage but Pakistan lost this advantage when Indian Army linked up with Poonch after establishing control over lines of communication ..
#2dayIn1948
.. between Rajauri and Poonch. The Beri Pattan area was thus viewed as a substitute.
On 12 and 13 Dec, the RIAF bombed the Pakistani positon at Palak, which lay behind Kotli in the direction of Mirpur. This was a minor operation intended to ..
.. between Rajauri and Poonch. The Beri Pattan area was thus viewed as a substitute.
On 12 and 13 Dec, the RIAF bombed the Pakistani positon at Palak, which lay behind Kotli in the direction of Mirpur. This was a minor operation intended to ..
#2dayIn1948
.. destroy the military stores and ammo dump in Palak. The Pakistani army, however, viewed the action as a breach of the assurance which they believed was given by Bucher that no attack would be launched in this area.
Pakistan responded on ..
.. destroy the military stores and ammo dump in Palak. The Pakistani army, however, viewed the action as a breach of the assurance which they believed was given by Bucher that no attack would be launched in this area.
Pakistan responded on ..
#2dayIn1948
.. 14 Dec by launching 'Operation Venus'. This has already been discussed earlier.
.. 14 Dec by launching 'Operation Venus'. This has already been discussed earlier.
https://twitter.com/CestMoiz/status/1338507432570576899
#2dayIn1948
The threat at this vital point aroused strong feelings in India. The general feeling in Army HQ was that the only satisfactory response would be to drive the Pakistani forces in the area back across the border. Prime Minister Nehru, in a message to ..
The threat at this vital point aroused strong feelings in India. The general feeling in Army HQ was that the only satisfactory response would be to drive the Pakistani forces in the area back across the border. Prime Minister Nehru, in a message to ..
#2dayIn1948
.. Attlee, hinted at a possible counter-attack across Pakistani border. 'In view of Pakistan Army's offensive against our Army in Indian Union territory,' he cabled, 'we consider ourselves free to take any appropriate action to check this wherever necessary.'
Unquote
.. Attlee, hinted at a possible counter-attack across Pakistani border. 'In view of Pakistan Army's offensive against our Army in Indian Union territory,' he cabled, 'we consider ourselves free to take any appropriate action to check this wherever necessary.'
Unquote
#2dayIn1948
In later years, Bucher was to claim that his initial reaction to the Pakistani attack was to assemble armoured units and send them into Pakistan. If so, he quickly composed himself, regaining sight of his primary ..
In later years, Bucher was to claim that his initial reaction to the Pakistani attack was to assemble armoured units and send them into Pakistan. If so, he quickly composed himself, regaining sight of his primary ..
#2dayIn1948
.. responsibility as a British officer to prevent a full-scale inter-dominion war. Advised by High Commissioner Nye, the C-in-C restrained his generals.
According to Nye, Bucher 'admitted' to him on 17 Dec that he found that an Indian battalion in the ..
.. responsibility as a British officer to prevent a full-scale inter-dominion war. Advised by High Commissioner Nye, the C-in-C restrained his generals.
According to Nye, Bucher 'admitted' to him on 17 Dec that he found that an Indian battalion in the ..
#2dayIn1948
.. Mendhar area had 'moved much further West than was necessary to occupy objectives ordered' and that he had 'issued instructions to Cariappa that this battalion is to be withdrawn East at once.' It is possible though that Bucher somewhat ..
.. Mendhar area had 'moved much further West than was necessary to occupy objectives ordered' and that he had 'issued instructions to Cariappa that this battalion is to be withdrawn East at once.' It is possible though that Bucher somewhat ..
#2dayIn1948
.. exaggerated the categorical nature of his instructions in order to satisfy Nye. He gave a slightly different account to the High Commissioner's Military Advisor. To the latter, Bucher revealed that 'one or two Indian battalions advanced further ..
.. exaggerated the categorical nature of his instructions in order to satisfy Nye. He gave a slightly different account to the High Commissioner's Military Advisor. To the latter, Bucher revealed that 'one or two Indian battalions advanced further ..
#2dayIn1948
.. West than intended in the Mendhar area' and that 'he had ordered Lt Gen Cariappa & Lt Gen Shrinagesh that these battalions were on no account to be allowed to advance further West and that if possible, they should withdraw to positions further East.'
.. West than intended in the Mendhar area' and that 'he had ordered Lt Gen Cariappa & Lt Gen Shrinagesh that these battalions were on no account to be allowed to advance further West and that if possible, they should withdraw to positions further East.'
#2dayIn1948
It is clear in any case that the burden of C-in-C's instructions were to halt and pull back Indian advance.
It is clear in any case that the burden of C-in-C's instructions were to halt and pull back Indian advance.
#2dayIn1948
Questioned by Nye about the Palak incident, Bucher said that his assurance to Gracey related only to action by land forces in the area, not the RIAF. The bombing attack, he said, was carried out under the authority of Air Marshal Elmhirst. 'It was ..
Questioned by Nye about the Palak incident, Bucher said that his assurance to Gracey related only to action by land forces in the area, not the RIAF. The bombing attack, he said, was carried out under the authority of Air Marshal Elmhirst. 'It was ..
#2dayIn1948
.. of course a very foolish, unnecessary and provocative action,' observed Nye, 'and I have made my views very clear to all concerned in Delhi.' In other words, the High Commissioner had pulled up the Chief of the RIAF!
On the same day, despite ..
.. of course a very foolish, unnecessary and provocative action,' observed Nye, 'and I have made my views very clear to all concerned in Delhi.' In other words, the High Commissioner had pulled up the Chief of the RIAF!
On the same day, despite ..
#2dayIn1948
.. the strong feelings in India that she was the aggrieved party, Bucher took the initiative to call the Pakistan Chief of Army Staff on the telephone in order to propose cessation of hostilities in the Naushera area. In Nye's words:
'I have done ..
.. the strong feelings in India that she was the aggrieved party, Bucher took the initiative to call the Pakistan Chief of Army Staff on the telephone in order to propose cessation of hostilities in the Naushera area. In Nye's words:
'I have done ..
#2dayIn1948
.. and will continue to do everything in my power to restrain people on this side from doing anything foolish. In taking these measures, I have found Bucher extraordinarily cooperative ... He has taken the initiative in telephoning and sending ..
.. and will continue to do everything in my power to restrain people on this side from doing anything foolish. In taking these measures, I have found Bucher extraordinarily cooperative ... He has taken the initiative in telephoning and sending ..
#2dayIn1948
.. signals to either Gen Gracey or his Chief of Staff ... Bucher talked to the COS Pakistan yesterday evening on telephone, told him of the action taken by the Pakistan troops, impressed on him the seriousness of the situation which would result and ..
.. signals to either Gen Gracey or his Chief of Staff ... Bucher talked to the COS Pakistan yesterday evening on telephone, told him of the action taken by the Pakistan troops, impressed on him the seriousness of the situation which would result and ..
#2dayIn1948
.. the COS promised that he would give categorical orders for the firing or arty etc. to cease.'
Unquote.
.. the COS promised that he would give categorical orders for the firing or arty etc. to cease.'
Unquote.
#2dayIn1948
The understanding between British officers leading the two armies was spelt out in more specific terms in a telegram from High Commissioner Grafftey-Smith. Gen Gracey, he reported, 'assured me that , unless India started a counter-attack against Pakistan gun ..
The understanding between British officers leading the two armies was spelt out in more specific terms in a telegram from High Commissioner Grafftey-Smith. Gen Gracey, he reported, 'assured me that , unless India started a counter-attack against Pakistan gun ..
#2dayIn1948
.. positions, no further action would be taken.'
Whitehall commented on the actions of the rival C-in-Cs. In identical cables addressed to Nye and Grafftey-Smith, Noel-Baker pronounced:
'We welcome Gracey's assurances ... that unless Indians counter ..
.. positions, no further action would be taken.'
Whitehall commented on the actions of the rival C-in-Cs. In identical cables addressed to Nye and Grafftey-Smith, Noel-Baker pronounced:
'We welcome Gracey's assurances ... that unless Indians counter ..
#2dayIn1948
.. attack Pakistan gun positions there will be no further action by Pakistan and we note helpful attitude of Bucher ... in restraining Indian commanders of air and land forces ...
You and Grafftey-Smith / Nye are the best judges whether there is ..
.. attack Pakistan gun positions there will be no further action by Pakistan and we note helpful attitude of Bucher ... in restraining Indian commanders of air and land forces ...
You and Grafftey-Smith / Nye are the best judges whether there is ..
#2dayIn1948
.. anything further, and if so what, that can be done to help to make an understanding between the two Commanders-in-Chief stronger and perhaps more extensive.'
Unquote.
.. anything further, and if so what, that can be done to help to make an understanding between the two Commanders-in-Chief stronger and perhaps more extensive.'
Unquote.
#2dayIn1948
Thus the guns fell silent on the Naushera front, averting the possibility of a full scale Indo-Pakistan war.
Notwithstanding the above games that were being played behind the Indian Govt's back, more ..
Thus the guns fell silent on the Naushera front, averting the possibility of a full scale Indo-Pakistan war.
Notwithstanding the above games that were being played behind the Indian Govt's back, more ..
#2dayIn1948
.. was in the offing. A final twist was being given to the 'Stand Down' Instructions in favour of Pakistan.
The last round of the war provided proof that Pakistan's faith in the informal assurances it had received from London were not misplaced.
.. was in the offing. A final twist was being given to the 'Stand Down' Instructions in favour of Pakistan.
The last round of the war provided proof that Pakistan's faith in the informal assurances it had received from London were not misplaced.
#2dayIn1948
Operation Venus carried a serious link of precipitating an all out war. Yet the British Govt made no effort to hold back Pakistan, a result which it could easily have achieved by threatening to implement the 'Stand Down' order.
Operation Venus carried a serious link of precipitating an all out war. Yet the British Govt made no effort to hold back Pakistan, a result which it could easily have achieved by threatening to implement the 'Stand Down' order.
#2dayIn1948
Unlike India, Pakistan remained critically dependent on the services of British officers to man her seniormost posts. A British officer, Maj Gen Loftus Tottenham, was in charge of 'Operation Venus' and he was assisted by other compatriots holding senior ..
Unlike India, Pakistan remained critically dependent on the services of British officers to man her seniormost posts. A British officer, Maj Gen Loftus Tottenham, was in charge of 'Operation Venus' and he was assisted by other compatriots holding senior ..
#2dayIn1948
.. positions in the Pakistani forces.
British officers were thus responsible for both planning and executing the Naushera attack.
.. positions in the Pakistani forces.
British officers were thus responsible for both planning and executing the Naushera attack.
#2dayIn1948
Nehru protested in the strongest terms against the role of these British officers. 'We take the strongest exception, 'he cabled Attlee, 'to this carefully planned operation of Pakistan and more especially to the part that British officers have taken in it.'
Nehru protested in the strongest terms against the role of these British officers. 'We take the strongest exception, 'he cabled Attlee, 'to this carefully planned operation of Pakistan and more especially to the part that British officers have taken in it.'
#2dayIn1948
He demanded that these British officers be withdrawn from Pakistan. 'The Govt of India, as is well known, desires to maintain close and friendly relations with the UK. It is not in keeping with such relations that British officers should be ..
He demanded that these British officers be withdrawn from Pakistan. 'The Govt of India, as is well known, desires to maintain close and friendly relations with the UK. It is not in keeping with such relations that British officers should be ..
#2dayIn1948
He received no satisfaction form the UK Premier. Attlee reminded Nehru that 'the purpose of our Stand Down arrangements is to prevent British officers and men actively taking the ..
He received no satisfaction form the UK Premier. Attlee reminded Nehru that 'the purpose of our Stand Down arrangements is to prevent British officers and men actively taking the ..
#2dayIn1948
.. field against one another ... I do not think it would be right for us to withdraw British officers from one side except in pursuance of some decision of the Security Council.'
Unquote
.. field against one another ... I do not think it would be right for us to withdraw British officers from one side except in pursuance of some decision of the Security Council.'
Unquote
#2dayIn1948
The UK Govt had thus deftly changed the rules of the game to render the 'Stand Down' order meaningless. The few remaining British officers in the Indian forces served at the highest level and there was no question of their personally 'taking the field.'
The UK Govt had thus deftly changed the rules of the game to render the 'Stand Down' order meaningless. The few remaining British officers in the Indian forces served at the highest level and there was no question of their personally 'taking the field.'
#2dayIn1948
This was very far from the interpretation given to the decision in Oct 1947 (when it had been employed to thwart Jinnah's order to the Pakistani army) or Dec 1947 (when Gen Russel ..
This was very far from the interpretation given to the decision in Oct 1947 (when it had been employed to thwart Jinnah's order to the Pakistani army) or Dec 1947 (when Gen Russel ..
#2dayIn1948
.. was obliged to hand in his papers simply because he had toured Kashmir). British ministers, however, came to Pakistan's rescue by re-defining the ban to permit every form of participation except actually 'taking the field.'
The nameless cabinet ..
.. was obliged to hand in his papers simply because he had toured Kashmir). British ministers, however, came to Pakistan's rescue by re-defining the ban to permit every form of participation except actually 'taking the field.'
The nameless cabinet ..
#2dayIn1948
.. minister who had proferred advance 'hints' and 'informal assurances' to Cawthorn had known what he was talking about.
.. minister who had proferred advance 'hints' and 'informal assurances' to Cawthorn had known what he was talking about.
#2dayIn1948
Attlee bent the rules in favour of Pakistan even though he was fully aware that there was no basis for Liaqat's charge against India. Nye had informed Whitehall in the most categorical terms that the Indian Army had prepared no plans for seizing Kotli.
Attlee bent the rules in favour of Pakistan even though he was fully aware that there was no basis for Liaqat's charge against India. Nye had informed Whitehall in the most categorical terms that the Indian Army had prepared no plans for seizing Kotli.
#2dayIn1948
Thus, in reply to the Pakistani PM's telegram, Attlee had stated:
'I must tell you that I myself accept the assurance of the Govt of India that it is not their intention to set in motion any major attack such as you fear ..
... I therefore beg you ..
Thus, in reply to the Pakistani PM's telegram, Attlee had stated:
'I must tell you that I myself accept the assurance of the Govt of India that it is not their intention to set in motion any major attack such as you fear ..
... I therefore beg you ..
#2dayIn1948
Yet Attlee chose to acquiesce in the Pakistani offensive despite the risk he knew it entailed of a major escalation.
Why did the British authorities take this position?
Yet Attlee chose to acquiesce in the Pakistani offensive despite the risk he knew it entailed of a major escalation.
Why did the British authorities take this position?
#2dayIn1948
A 'draft note' for Attlee prepared in the CRO provides a clue to Noel-Baker's line of argument. The draft note, produced specifically in connection with Nehru's protest, lists a number of 'relevant points' supplementing those mentioned ..
A 'draft note' for Attlee prepared in the CRO provides a clue to Noel-Baker's line of argument. The draft note, produced specifically in connection with Nehru's protest, lists a number of 'relevant points' supplementing those mentioned ..
#2dayIn1948
.. in Attlee's earlier letter of 23 Aug. It argued that the 'enforcement [of the Stand Down decision] might drive Pakistan to desperate courses.' It 'might leave the Commonwealth.' Moreover, if it suffered a serious reverse, 'an internal collapse in ..
.. in Attlee's earlier letter of 23 Aug. It argued that the 'enforcement [of the Stand Down decision] might drive Pakistan to desperate courses.' It 'might leave the Commonwealth.' Moreover, if it suffered a serious reverse, 'an internal collapse in ..
#2dayIn1948
.. Pakistan might result, producing chaos from which the communists would profit.' Finally, the 'hostility of the Muslim population of the world to the UK might be increased.'
Thus the document suggests that the CRO once again fall back on its ..
.. Pakistan might result, producing chaos from which the communists would profit.' Finally, the 'hostility of the Muslim population of the world to the UK might be increased.'
Thus the document suggests that the CRO once again fall back on its ..
#2dayIn1948
.. time-tested strategy of stoking fears that a military defeat would lead to internal chaos in Pakistan, with consequent communist gains; that a desperate Pakistan might quit the Commonwealth & turn to the Soviet Union; and that by antagonizing ..
.. time-tested strategy of stoking fears that a military defeat would lead to internal chaos in Pakistan, with consequent communist gains; that a desperate Pakistan might quit the Commonwealth & turn to the Soviet Union; and that by antagonizing ..
#2dayIn1948
.. Pakistan, Britain would undermine her own interests in the Middle East. In 1947-48 Pakistan was able to reap a rich diplomatic harvest from her perceived political and military fragility.
The events of December once more turned Nehru's ..
.. Pakistan, Britain would undermine her own interests in the Middle East. In 1947-48 Pakistan was able to reap a rich diplomatic harvest from her perceived political and military fragility.
The events of December once more turned Nehru's ..
#2dayIn1948
.. thoughts in the direction of a possible counter-offensive in the direction of Pakistan territory. 'There is always a possibility,' he wrote to Bucher at the end of the month, 'that if Pakistan is foolish enough to indulge in any attack on ..
.. thoughts in the direction of a possible counter-offensive in the direction of Pakistan territory. 'There is always a possibility,' he wrote to Bucher at the end of the month, 'that if Pakistan is foolish enough to indulge in any attack on ..
#2dayIn1948
.. us, we shall counter it even by crossing Pakistan territory towards Wazirabad or Sialkot. Whether we do so or not, it will be for us to determine at the time. But we must be in a position to do so, if necessity arises.'
Unquote.
.. us, we shall counter it even by crossing Pakistan territory towards Wazirabad or Sialkot. Whether we do so or not, it will be for us to determine at the time. But we must be in a position to do so, if necessity arises.'
Unquote.
#2dayIn1948
He had pointed out this imperative requirement one year ago but had been foiled by Mountbatten & the British service chiefs. The result had ..
He had pointed out this imperative requirement one year ago but had been foiled by Mountbatten & the British service chiefs. The result had ..
#2dayIn1948
.. been a long drawn and inconclusive war at the end of which Pakistan, confident that India would not counter-attack across the Punjab border, felt it could afford to leave its heartland without adequate defences in order to mount a threat to India ..
.. been a long drawn and inconclusive war at the end of which Pakistan, confident that India would not counter-attack across the Punjab border, felt it could afford to leave its heartland without adequate defences in order to mount a threat to India ..
#2dayIn1948
.. at a vital choke point. The strategic solution envisaged by Nehru as early as Dec 1947 could not be implemented in practice so long as a British general held the post of Indian Army's Commander-in-Chief.
.. at a vital choke point. The strategic solution envisaged by Nehru as early as Dec 1947 could not be implemented in practice so long as a British general held the post of Indian Army's Commander-in-Chief.
#2dayIn1948
The ceasefire and truce terms set out in the UNCIP resolution of 13 Aug called for the withdrawal of all Pakistani troops from Kashmir & involved atleast mild censure of Pakistan's decision to send its army into the State. The proposals were accepted ..
The ceasefire and truce terms set out in the UNCIP resolution of 13 Aug called for the withdrawal of all Pakistani troops from Kashmir & involved atleast mild censure of Pakistan's decision to send its army into the State. The proposals were accepted ..
#2dayIn1948
.. by India but rejected by Pakistan.
Karachi's rejection of the ceasefire terms opened the way to an intensification of the military conflict - a prospect which aroused deep apprehension in Pakistan. Thus, Pakistan was unable to accept the UNCIP ..
.. by India but rejected by Pakistan.
Karachi's rejection of the ceasefire terms opened the way to an intensification of the military conflict - a prospect which aroused deep apprehension in Pakistan. Thus, Pakistan was unable to accept the UNCIP ..
#2dayIn1948
.. proposals as well as unprepared for the consequences of rejecting them. Liaqat sought to resolve the dilemma by turning to Britain for assistance. He pinned his hopes on an unconditional ceasefire imposed by the Security Council.
This would not ..
.. proposals as well as unprepared for the consequences of rejecting them. Liaqat sought to resolve the dilemma by turning to Britain for assistance. He pinned his hopes on an unconditional ceasefire imposed by the Security Council.
This would not ..
#2dayIn1948
.. only restrain India from launching a military offensive but also obviate the necessity of accepting the UNCIP resolution.
.. only restrain India from launching a military offensive but also obviate the necessity of accepting the UNCIP resolution.
#2dayIn1948
Liaqat expected Britain to take the lead in the Security Council. As mentioned earlier, Pakistan's offer of a military pact elicited from London not only operationally valuable 'hints' and 'assurances' but also an offer to return the Kashmir ..
Liaqat expected Britain to take the lead in the Security Council. As mentioned earlier, Pakistan's offer of a military pact elicited from London not only operationally valuable 'hints' and 'assurances' but also an offer to return the Kashmir ..
#2dayIn1948
.. question to the Security Council.
British views on the latter question were elaborated at a ministerial meeting held by Attlee in early November. The ministers reached two important conclusions. First, they concluded that, in view of the ..
.. question to the Security Council.
British views on the latter question were elaborated at a ministerial meeting held by Attlee in early November. The ministers reached two important conclusions. First, they concluded that, in view of the ..
#2dayIn1948
.. 'increasingly dangerous' situation in Kashmir, the Security Council should demand an immediate and unconditional ceasefire.
.. 'increasingly dangerous' situation in Kashmir, the Security Council should demand an immediate and unconditional ceasefire.
#2dayIn1948
The ministers believed that a 'firm recommendation' by the Security Council would be accepted by both parties since 'it was clear that the General Staff of neither army wished for open war and would cooperate in applying the ceasefire arrangements.'
The ministers believed that a 'firm recommendation' by the Security Council would be accepted by both parties since 'it was clear that the General Staff of neither army wished for open war and would cooperate in applying the ceasefire arrangements.'
#2dayIn1948
Of course, on the Indian side it only meant the British C-in-C of the Indian Army, since neither the Govt of India nor the Indian generals orchestrating the campaign had any clue of these machinations.
The second conclusion was that the ..
Of course, on the Indian side it only meant the British C-in-C of the Indian Army, since neither the Govt of India nor the Indian generals orchestrating the campaign had any clue of these machinations.
The second conclusion was that the ..
#2dayIn1948
.. 'best hope for securing a final settlement ... lay in the appointment of a mediator of international reputation who could negotiate with the two govts on the spot.' Since this was at variance with both the Security Council resolution of 21 Apr ..
.. 'best hope for securing a final settlement ... lay in the appointment of a mediator of international reputation who could negotiate with the two govts on the spot.' Since this was at variance with both the Security Council resolution of 21 Apr ..
#2dayIn1948
.. as well as the UNCIP process, it would be politic to 'introduce the mediator under the guise of the Plebiscite Administrator already provided for in the resolution of Apr 21,' broadening his mandate to give him 'general discretion to mediate and ..
.. as well as the UNCIP process, it would be politic to 'introduce the mediator under the guise of the Plebiscite Administrator already provided for in the resolution of Apr 21,' broadening his mandate to give him 'general discretion to mediate and ..
#2dayIn1948
.. to adjust ... the detailed arrangements for the plebiscite.'
The British hoped that an American statesman - they suggested Gen Eisenhower - would play the role of mediator.
The British move was intended to derail the UNCIP process. The UNCIP truce ..
.. to adjust ... the detailed arrangements for the plebiscite.'
The British hoped that an American statesman - they suggested Gen Eisenhower - would play the role of mediator.
The British move was intended to derail the UNCIP process. The UNCIP truce ..
#2dayIn1948
.. terms called for the withdrawal of all Pakistani troops from Kashmir; in contrast, an unconditional ceasefire would permit Pakistan to retain its forces in the State. A 'mediator' - whom the British hoped to influence - would elaborate plebiscite ..
.. terms called for the withdrawal of all Pakistani troops from Kashmir; in contrast, an unconditional ceasefire would permit Pakistan to retain its forces in the State. A 'mediator' - whom the British hoped to influence - would elaborate plebiscite ..
#2dayIn1948
.. arrangements already rejected by India. The plan would halt the Indian military advance & impose political terms favourable to Pakistan.
What led the British to entertain the notion that a 'firm recommendation' of an unconditional ceasefire would ..
.. arrangements already rejected by India. The plan would halt the Indian military advance & impose political terms favourable to Pakistan.
What led the British to entertain the notion that a 'firm recommendation' of an unconditional ceasefire would ..
#2dayIn1948
.. be accepted by India?
The answer lies in the reference British ministers made to the attitude of India's 'General Staff,' ie Commander-in-Chief, Gen Bucher who, it may be recalled, had urged Whitehall in Sep to impose a ceasefire in view of India's planned advance.
.. be accepted by India?
The answer lies in the reference British ministers made to the attitude of India's 'General Staff,' ie Commander-in-Chief, Gen Bucher who, it may be recalled, had urged Whitehall in Sep to impose a ceasefire in view of India's planned advance.
#2dayIn1948
He had even offered to 'guarantee' India's compliance, revealing a boldness of judgement that he had scrupulously avoided in his military planning.
The British move to impose an unconditional ceasefire on India thus ..
He had even offered to 'guarantee' India's compliance, revealing a boldness of judgement that he had scrupulously avoided in his military planning.
The British move to impose an unconditional ceasefire on India thus ..
#2dayIn1948
.. originated with the proposal mooted by India's own Commander-in-Chief, without the knowledge of Govt of India!
.. originated with the proposal mooted by India's own Commander-in-Chief, without the knowledge of Govt of India!
#2dayIn1948
The British move ran into an unexpected problem. It was based on the assumption that American cooperation would be readily available, as in the past, in order to secure broad support in the Security Council.
This assumption proved to be ill-founded.
The British move ran into an unexpected problem. It was based on the assumption that American cooperation would be readily available, as in the past, in order to secure broad support in the Security Council.
This assumption proved to be ill-founded.
#2dayIn1948
Huddle's prominent role in the UNCIP had given the Americans an independent perspective on the Kashmir issue and they were less willing than in the past to defer to British claims of expertise on South Asia. For Americans, Huddle's role created ..
Huddle's prominent role in the UNCIP had given the Americans an independent perspective on the Kashmir issue and they were less willing than in the past to defer to British claims of expertise on South Asia. For Americans, Huddle's role created ..
#2dayIn1948
.. a sense of involvement in the UNCIP process.
The UNCIP had resumed its labours in Paris, where the UN General Assembly was in session. After the adoption of the 13 Aug resolution setting out acceptable ceasefire and truce terms, India indicated ..
.. a sense of involvement in the UNCIP process.
The UNCIP had resumed its labours in Paris, where the UN General Assembly was in session. After the adoption of the 13 Aug resolution setting out acceptable ceasefire and truce terms, India indicated ..
#2dayIn1948
.. its willingness to discuss - though only in general terms - the arrangements for a plebiscite or an alternative method of ascertaining the wishes of the people of J&K. This enabled the UNCIP to accommodate one of Pakistan's concerns.
.. its willingness to discuss - though only in general terms - the arrangements for a plebiscite or an alternative method of ascertaining the wishes of the people of J&K. This enabled the UNCIP to accommodate one of Pakistan's concerns.
#2dayIn1948
The UNCIP was therefore engaged in formulating a supplementary resolution setting out its recommendations on a plebiscite.
The UNCIP was therefore engaged in formulating a supplementary resolution setting out its recommendations on a plebiscite.
#2dayIn1948
On 10 Nov, Cadogan, Britain's Permanent Representative at the UN, called on Secretary of State Marshal (who was in Paris for the UN General Assembly session) & presented to him the latest British proposals. Cadogan emphasised the danger of an ..
On 10 Nov, Cadogan, Britain's Permanent Representative at the UN, called on Secretary of State Marshal (who was in Paris for the UN General Assembly session) & presented to him the latest British proposals. Cadogan emphasised the danger of an ..
#2dayIn1948
.. incident which might precipitate a full-scale war between India and Pakistan. He asserted that London had reason to believe that an immediate and unconditional ceasefire order would be welcomed on a 'high political level' in both India & Pakistan.
.. incident which might precipitate a full-scale war between India and Pakistan. He asserted that London had reason to believe that an immediate and unconditional ceasefire order would be welcomed on a 'high political level' in both India & Pakistan.
#2dayIn1948
Marshall shrewdly inquired whether the interest in a ceasefire originated with the British officers serving in the two armies!
This threw the British team into confusion. Cadogan said he believed that high political leaders in both countries wanted a ..
Marshall shrewdly inquired whether the interest in a ceasefire originated with the British officers serving in the two armies!
This threw the British team into confusion. Cadogan said he believed that high political leaders in both countries wanted a ..
#2dayIn1948
.. ceasefire, but Curson, the CRO official accompanying him, stated more accurately that a ceasefire would be easier to administer due to the presence of British officers in each army.
Washington's response was conveyed to Cadogan on 13 Nov.
.. ceasefire, but Curson, the CRO official accompanying him, stated more accurately that a ceasefire would be easier to administer due to the presence of British officers in each army.
Washington's response was conveyed to Cadogan on 13 Nov.
#2dayIn1948
The US saw no necessity for an immediate ceasefire order since extensive military ops were not expected in the immediate future. Furthermore, a simple ceasefire order would imply sanctioning the presence of Pakistani troops in J&K. This would not only be ..
The US saw no necessity for an immediate ceasefire order since extensive military ops were not expected in the immediate future. Furthermore, a simple ceasefire order would imply sanctioning the presence of Pakistani troops in J&K. This would not only be ..
#2dayIn1948
.. inconsistent with the previous approach of the Security Council & the UNCIP but would also be highly unacceptably to India.
.. inconsistent with the previous approach of the Security Council & the UNCIP but would also be highly unacceptably to India.
#2dayIn1948
The British thus failed to win US support for their plan to impose an unconditional ceasefire, circumventing the UNCIP. This development was not known to Liaqat when he sounded the alarm bell on 17 Nov in his telegram to Attlee. His appeal for ..
The British thus failed to win US support for their plan to impose an unconditional ceasefire, circumventing the UNCIP. This development was not known to Liaqat when he sounded the alarm bell on 17 Nov in his telegram to Attlee. His appeal for ..
#2dayIn1948
.. intervention reflected genuine apprehension about an Indian offensive but it was also a tactical move on the diplomatic chess board. The Pakistani PM addressed a similar appeal to the UN Security Council, alleging that India intended to face ..
.. intervention reflected genuine apprehension about an Indian offensive but it was also a tactical move on the diplomatic chess board. The Pakistani PM addressed a similar appeal to the UN Security Council, alleging that India intended to face ..
#2dayIn1948
.. the UN with a military fait accompli and that unless the Security Council took immediate steps to halt the Indian offensive, Pakistan would have no option but to undertake a counter-offensive with all available resources in an attempt to prevent ..
.. the UN with a military fait accompli and that unless the Security Council took immediate steps to halt the Indian offensive, Pakistan would have no option but to undertake a counter-offensive with all available resources in an attempt to prevent ..
#2dayIn1948
.. the Indian army from overrunning the Poonch and Mirpur areas.
In keeping with the strategy he had recently concerted with Bevin and Noel-Baker, Liaqat had hoped that his allegation of an all-out Indian offensive and his appeal for an immediate ..
.. the Indian army from overrunning the Poonch and Mirpur areas.
In keeping with the strategy he had recently concerted with Bevin and Noel-Baker, Liaqat had hoped that his allegation of an all-out Indian offensive and his appeal for an immediate ..
#2dayIn1948
.. and unconditional ceasefire would trigger off action by the Security Council. He was unaware that the plan had suffered a setback in the informal Anglo-American discussions over the past few days.
Liaqat instructed his Foreign Minister to ..
.. and unconditional ceasefire would trigger off action by the Security Council. He was unaware that the plan had suffered a setback in the informal Anglo-American discussions over the past few days.
Liaqat instructed his Foreign Minister to ..
#2dayIn1948
.. transmit his appeal to the Security Council 'at once.' The astute Zafrulla, however, realised that an undisguised attempt to bypass the UNCIP would alienate it. After careful consideration, he formally delivered the PM's message to the UNCIP on ..
.. transmit his appeal to the Security Council 'at once.' The astute Zafrulla, however, realised that an undisguised attempt to bypass the UNCIP would alienate it. After careful consideration, he formally delivered the PM's message to the UNCIP on ..
#2dayIn1948
.. 19 Nov, with the request that it be transmitted to the Security Council and that the UNCIP might take such urgent action as it deemed appropriate.
The UNCIP was in favour of deferring a Security Council debate lest it jeopardise its own efforts to ..
.. 19 Nov, with the request that it be transmitted to the Security Council and that the UNCIP might take such urgent action as it deemed appropriate.
The UNCIP was in favour of deferring a Security Council debate lest it jeopardise its own efforts to ..
#2dayIn1948
.. arrive at an agreement on the plebiscite terms to supplement its 13 Aug resolution on ceasefire and truce arrangements.
By mid-Nov, an indication had already been received from Pakistan that it was willing to abandon its previous insistence on ..
.. arrive at an agreement on the plebiscite terms to supplement its 13 Aug resolution on ceasefire and truce arrangements.
By mid-Nov, an indication had already been received from Pakistan that it was willing to abandon its previous insistence on ..
#2dayIn1948
.. a coalition govt in Kashmir. The UNCIP was optimistic about the prospects of a peaceful settlement provided its work was not interrupted.
On 20 Nov, the UNCIP handed over to India & Pakistan draft plebiscite suggestions as a basis for negotiations.
.. a coalition govt in Kashmir. The UNCIP was optimistic about the prospects of a peaceful settlement provided its work was not interrupted.
On 20 Nov, the UNCIP handed over to India & Pakistan draft plebiscite suggestions as a basis for negotiations.
#2dayIn1948
Loy Henderson, who had succeeded Grady as the US Ambassador in New Delhi, informed the State Dept that the assessment of his Military Attache, which coincided with information furnished to the embassy by Gen Bucher, was that Pakistan was exaggerating ..
Loy Henderson, who had succeeded Grady as the US Ambassador in New Delhi, informed the State Dept that the assessment of his Military Attache, which coincided with information furnished to the embassy by Gen Bucher, was that Pakistan was exaggerating ..
#2dayIn1948
.. the importance of local actions being carried out by the Indian Army.
Henderson's opinion was that 'it would be unfortunate to press for ceasefire order on assumption [that] India is planning a general offensive in immediate future.'
Unquote.
.. the importance of local actions being carried out by the Indian Army.
Henderson's opinion was that 'it would be unfortunate to press for ceasefire order on assumption [that] India is planning a general offensive in immediate future.'
Unquote.
#2dayIn1948
The advice received from Huddle and Henderson strengthened Washington's conviction about the inappropriateness of an unconditional ceasefire imposed by the Security Council.
On 20th Nov, Cadogan requested the US delegation to support a move to ..
The advice received from Huddle and Henderson strengthened Washington's conviction about the inappropriateness of an unconditional ceasefire imposed by the Security Council.
On 20th Nov, Cadogan requested the US delegation to support a move to ..
#2dayIn1948
.. convene an urgent meeting of the Security Council. He proposed that the same six countries which had sponsored the 21 April resolution, together with the current President of the Security Council (Argentina) should now move a resolution calling ..
.. convene an urgent meeting of the Security Council. He proposed that the same six countries which had sponsored the 21 April resolution, together with the current President of the Security Council (Argentina) should now move a resolution calling ..
#2dayIn1948
.. for an immediate and unconditional ceasefire.
Cadogan furnished a summary of High Commissioner Grafftey-Smith's cable of 19th Nov, drawing particular attention to the passage claiming that if India was not restrained, Pakistan would, in ..
.. for an immediate and unconditional ceasefire.
Cadogan furnished a summary of High Commissioner Grafftey-Smith's cable of 19th Nov, drawing particular attention to the passage claiming that if India was not restrained, Pakistan would, in ..
#2dayIn1948
.. despair, experience a 'nationwide revulsion of feeling favourable to Russia.'
Marshall was unimpressed and Cadogan was informed that the difficulties involved in an immediate ceasefire remained substantial in he absence of an overall political settlement ..
.. despair, experience a 'nationwide revulsion of feeling favourable to Russia.'
Marshall was unimpressed and Cadogan was informed that the difficulties involved in an immediate ceasefire remained substantial in he absence of an overall political settlement ..
#2dayIn1948
.. and in light of India's claim to Jammu and Kashmir. John Foster Dulles, the US delegate at the UN, complained to Washington that the 'present UK approach [to the] Kashmir problem appears extremely pro Govt of Pakistan as against middle ground which ..
.. and in light of India's claim to Jammu and Kashmir. John Foster Dulles, the US delegate at the UN, complained to Washington that the 'present UK approach [to the] Kashmir problem appears extremely pro Govt of Pakistan as against middle ground which ..
#2dayIn1948
.. we have sought to follow,'
Unquote
He urged that the US should not depart from its neutral path in seeking common ground with the British.
The UNCIP met on 22 Nov to consider what action it should take on the Pakistani complaint. It decided to ..
.. we have sought to follow,'
Unquote
He urged that the US should not depart from its neutral path in seeking common ground with the British.
The UNCIP met on 22 Nov to consider what action it should take on the Pakistani complaint. It decided to ..
#2dayIn1948
.. seek India's observations on Zafrulla's letter 'as a matter of urgency' and to address similar appeals to both India and Pakistan 'to refrain from any action which might aggravate the military and political situation and thus endanger the ..
.. seek India's observations on Zafrulla's letter 'as a matter of urgency' and to address similar appeals to both India and Pakistan 'to refrain from any action which might aggravate the military and political situation and thus endanger the ..
#2dayIn1948
.. negotiations' being concluded by the UNCIP.
The UNCIP also transmitted Zafrulla's letter to the President of the Security Council, together with a summary of the letters it had addressed to India and Pakistan.
Britain reluctantly agreed to go ..
.. negotiations' being concluded by the UNCIP.
The UNCIP also transmitted Zafrulla's letter to the President of the Security Council, together with a summary of the letters it had addressed to India and Pakistan.
Britain reluctantly agreed to go ..
#2dayIn1948
.. along with the American proposal that the Security Council should confine itself at this stage to endorsing the UNCIP actions and requesting the latter to submit a progress report and further recommendations. The British still planned to seek an ..
.. along with the American proposal that the Security Council should confine itself at this stage to endorsing the UNCIP actions and requesting the latter to submit a progress report and further recommendations. The British still planned to seek an ..
#2dayIn1948
.. unconditional ceasefire if the UNCIP failed to report progress very quickly. In this respect, their position continued to diverge from the American position but there was agreement at least on the first step. Thus, when the Security Council met ..
.. unconditional ceasefire if the UNCIP failed to report progress very quickly. In this respect, their position continued to diverge from the American position but there was agreement at least on the first step. Thus, when the Security Council met ..
#2dayIn1948
.. on 25 Nov, the US and UK delegates took a similar line in support of the UNCIP and this found strong support among other members.
For the last time, Britain & the US had found common ground on the latter's terms.
Thus, by the last week of Nov, Britain ..
.. on 25 Nov, the US and UK delegates took a similar line in support of the UNCIP and this found strong support among other members.
For the last time, Britain & the US had found common ground on the latter's terms.
Thus, by the last week of Nov, Britain ..
#2dayIn1948
.. had to abandon the attempt to marginalise the UNCIP process through an unconditional ceasefire imposed by the Security Council. It now threw its weight behind the UNCIP's search for a speedy resolution, pinning its hopes on the early ..
.. had to abandon the attempt to marginalise the UNCIP process through an unconditional ceasefire imposed by the Security Council. It now threw its weight behind the UNCIP's search for a speedy resolution, pinning its hopes on the early ..
#2dayIn1948
.. appointment of an American Plebiscite Administrator authorised to work out the important details of the plebiscite arrangements.
Mention may also be made here of a development which helped stimulate British support for an early UNCIP success.
.. appointment of an American Plebiscite Administrator authorised to work out the important details of the plebiscite arrangements.
Mention may also be made here of a development which helped stimulate British support for an early UNCIP success.
#2dayIn1948
On 05 Dec, the Govt of India announced that Gen Cariappa would take over as the Commander-in-Chief of the army in succession to Gen Bucher. Nye spelt out the implications of this decision in a top secret cable to London.
'The major consideration is ..
On 05 Dec, the Govt of India announced that Gen Cariappa would take over as the Commander-in-Chief of the army in succession to Gen Bucher. Nye spelt out the implications of this decision in a top secret cable to London.
'The major consideration is ..
#2dayIn1948
.. the effect this appointment may have on the Indian Govt's Kashmir policy. Bucher has not only been ready to receive advice, he has consistently sought it and his influence, which has been considerable, has undoubtedly been an accommodating one.
.. the effect this appointment may have on the Indian Govt's Kashmir policy. Bucher has not only been ready to receive advice, he has consistently sought it and his influence, which has been considerable, has undoubtedly been an accommodating one.
#2dayIn1948
He has consistently opposed all proposals likely to widen the existing breach between the two Dominions and has done so with some success ... I think it unlikely that he [Cariappa] will seek my advice ... Our influence in military circles will ..
He has consistently opposed all proposals likely to widen the existing breach between the two Dominions and has done so with some success ... I think it unlikely that he [Cariappa] will seek my advice ... Our influence in military circles will ..
#2dayIn1948
.. therefore, diminish and disappear altogether.
In brief, his appointment makes the finding of a political solution to the Kashmir problem even more urgent.'
Unquote.
.. therefore, diminish and disappear altogether.
In brief, his appointment makes the finding of a political solution to the Kashmir problem even more urgent.'
Unquote.
#2dayIn1948
Here we have the British ambassador, on record, admitting that his govt had been actively meddling in, and sabotaging, the affairs of warfighting by a newly independent India, utilizing Gen Bucher ..
Here we have the British ambassador, on record, admitting that his govt had been actively meddling in, and sabotaging, the affairs of warfighting by a newly independent India, utilizing Gen Bucher ..
#2dayIn1948
.. as also his predecessor, Gen Lockart, to backstab their Prime Minister, Jawaharlal Nehru, towards furthering British agenda.
.. as also his predecessor, Gen Lockart, to backstab their Prime Minister, Jawaharlal Nehru, towards furthering British agenda.
#2dayIn1948
The UNCIP finalised its supplementary proposals on 11 Dec. These proposals reaffirmed the earlier UNCIP resolution and provided for a plebiscite after the ceasefire and truce terms of the 13 Aug resolution had been implemented.
The UNCIP finalised its supplementary proposals on 11 Dec. These proposals reaffirmed the earlier UNCIP resolution and provided for a plebiscite after the ceasefire and truce terms of the 13 Aug resolution had been implemented.
#2dayIn1948
They also envisaged the appointment of a Plebiscite Administrator by the Jammu and Kashmir Govt to be nominated by the UN Secretary General; the determination of the final disposition of Indian and State armed forces by the Commission and the ..
They also envisaged the appointment of a Plebiscite Administrator by the Jammu and Kashmir Govt to be nominated by the UN Secretary General; the determination of the final disposition of Indian and State armed forces by the Commission and the ..
#2dayIn1948
.. Plebiscite Administrator, in consultation with the Govt of India and with due regard to the security of the state and freedom of the plebiscite; and the determination by the Commission and the Plebiscite Administrator of the disposal of ..
.. Plebiscite Administrator, in consultation with the Govt of India and with due regard to the security of the state and freedom of the plebiscite; and the determination by the Commission and the Plebiscite Administrator of the disposal of ..
#2dayIn1948
.. troops in the territory vacated by the tribesmen and other Pakistani nationals, in consultation with the local authorities.
.. troops in the territory vacated by the tribesmen and other Pakistani nationals, in consultation with the local authorities.
#2dayIn1948
Pakistan's concerns were accommodated to the extent that the proposals dealt with plebiscite terms. Indian concerns were met to the extent that the plebiscite terms were only outlined in very general terms and in the exclusion of any suggestion for ..
Pakistan's concerns were accommodated to the extent that the proposals dealt with plebiscite terms. Indian concerns were met to the extent that the plebiscite terms were only outlined in very general terms and in the exclusion of any suggestion for ..
#2dayIn1948
.. reconstituting the State Government or for subordinating it to a UN authority.
.. reconstituting the State Government or for subordinating it to a UN authority.
#2dayIn1948
Pakistan's expectations had been raised to great heights by Noel-Baker's manoeuvres in the Security Council culminating in the 21 April resolution. The UNCIP resolution of 13 August was a major setback to its ambitions and it sought to marginalize ..
Pakistan's expectations had been raised to great heights by Noel-Baker's manoeuvres in the Security Council culminating in the 21 April resolution. The UNCIP resolution of 13 August was a major setback to its ambitions and it sought to marginalize ..
#2dayIn1948
.. its significance by returning the Kashmir issue to the Security Council. These hopes faded with the failure of the Anglo - Pakistan move to obtain an unconditional ceasefire imposed by the UN Security Council.
Pakistan was left with no ..
.. its significance by returning the Kashmir issue to the Security Council. These hopes faded with the failure of the Anglo - Pakistan move to obtain an unconditional ceasefire imposed by the UN Security Council.
Pakistan was left with no ..
#2dayIn1948
.. option but to seek the most favourable interpretation it could get of the UNCIP terms. The only other alternative was to prolong a war in which India would have the upper hand in the final analysis.
For India too the options were limited.
.. option but to seek the most favourable interpretation it could get of the UNCIP terms. The only other alternative was to prolong a war in which India would have the upper hand in the final analysis.
For India too the options were limited.
#2dayIn1948
A quick and decisive military solution required an incursion into Pakistani territory. Nehru's efforts to draw up plans for such an operation had been thwarted by Mountbatten and the Commander-in-Chief at the end of 1947.
A quick and decisive military solution required an incursion into Pakistani territory. Nehru's efforts to draw up plans for such an operation had been thwarted by Mountbatten and the Commander-in-Chief at the end of 1947.
#2dayIn1948
More recently, in October 1948, Nehru had asked Gen Bucher, his Commander-in-Chief, to prepare an appreciation of an operation to rid Kashmir of the invaders but had been advised that the objective was unattainable, assuming that the war was not to be carried into ..
More recently, in October 1948, Nehru had asked Gen Bucher, his Commander-in-Chief, to prepare an appreciation of an operation to rid Kashmir of the invaders but had been advised that the objective was unattainable, assuming that the war was not to be carried into ..
#2dayIn1948
.. Pakistani territory. The British Commander-in-Chief of the Indian Army maintained that a military stalemate was unavoidable except for some limited offensive operations.
Nehru therefore came to believe that 'while gradual success would come to ..
.. Pakistani territory. The British Commander-in-Chief of the Indian Army maintained that a military stalemate was unavoidable except for some limited offensive operations.
Nehru therefore came to believe that 'while gradual success would come to ..
#2dayIn1948
.. us, no quick or effective decision was likely. We might carry on the war in Kashmir itself, for a considerable time, gaining some successes and advancing our fronts, but this would be a long drawn-out affair, and would not put an end to the ..
.. us, no quick or effective decision was likely. We might carry on the war in Kashmir itself, for a considerable time, gaining some successes and advancing our fronts, but this would be a long drawn-out affair, and would not put an end to the ..
#2dayIn1948
.. conflict or the problem.' Moreover, 'there was always the question of what foreign powers might do either in interfering or in aiding Pakistan in other ways.'
Unquote.
.. conflict or the problem.' Moreover, 'there was always the question of what foreign powers might do either in interfering or in aiding Pakistan in other ways.'
Unquote.
#2dayIn1948
Attlee's messages and British moves in the UN Security Council provided ample grounds for concern.
Attlee's messages and British moves in the UN Security Council provided ample grounds for concern.
#2dayIn1948
The choice before India in December 1948 was between carrying on a desultory war or accepting a ceasefire which met India's minimum terms. In these circumstances India, like Pakistan, sought to obtain the best possible ..
The choice before India in December 1948 was between carrying on a desultory war or accepting a ceasefire which met India's minimum terms. In these circumstances India, like Pakistan, sought to obtain the best possible ..
#2dayIn1948
.. terms by seeking favourable clarifications and interpretations of the UNCIP proposals. This diplomatic exercise proceeded side by side with military operations in December.
.. terms by seeking favourable clarifications and interpretations of the UNCIP proposals. This diplomatic exercise proceeded side by side with military operations in December.
#2dayIn1948
India's initial reaction to the UNCIP proposals was cool. It made it clear that the process of rejection of the Commission's proposals by Pakistan and the adoption of a responsible attitude by India could not continue indefinitely and that there ..
India's initial reaction to the UNCIP proposals was cool. It made it clear that the process of rejection of the Commission's proposals by Pakistan and the adoption of a responsible attitude by India could not continue indefinitely and that there ..
#2dayIn1948
.. was a limit to India's spirit of conciliation. India received assurances from the UNCIP on some important questions. For New Delhi, the 13 August resolution was of primary importance since it implicitly recognised the legal basis of India's ..
.. was a limit to India's spirit of conciliation. India received assurances from the UNCIP on some important questions. For New Delhi, the 13 August resolution was of primary importance since it implicitly recognised the legal basis of India's ..
#2dayIn1948
.. presence in Kashmir, in contrast to that of Pakistan.
The UNCIP agreed with India's view that it could not be bound by the agreement if Pakistan failed to fully implement its obligations under the 13 August resolution. New Delhi was also assured ..
.. presence in Kashmir, in contrast to that of Pakistan.
The UNCIP agreed with India's view that it could not be bound by the agreement if Pakistan failed to fully implement its obligations under the 13 August resolution. New Delhi was also assured ..
#2dayIn1948
.. that there would be large scale disarming of the 'Azad Kashmir' forces.
.. that there would be large scale disarming of the 'Azad Kashmir' forces.
#2dayIn1948
In response to India's request for an assurance that methods other than plebiscite were not being ruled out, the UNCIP stated that the possibility of a plebiscite should first be explored but, if the Plebiscite Administrator were to find the method ..
In response to India's request for an assurance that methods other than plebiscite were not being ruled out, the UNCIP stated that the possibility of a plebiscite should first be explored but, if the Plebiscite Administrator were to find the method ..
#2dayIn1948
.. impracticable, other methods could be considered for ascertaining the wishes of the people of Jammu and Kashmir.
Pakistan, in turn, was assured that a Plebiscite ..
.. impracticable, other methods could be considered for ascertaining the wishes of the people of Jammu and Kashmir.
Pakistan, in turn, was assured that a Plebiscite ..
#2dayIn1948
.. Administrator would be appointed at an early date, though it was made clear that discussion of the details of the plebiscite arrangements would commence only after the truce agreement had been signed and the UNCIP was satisfied about ..
.. Administrator would be appointed at an early date, though it was made clear that discussion of the details of the plebiscite arrangements would commence only after the truce agreement had been signed and the UNCIP was satisfied about ..
#2dayIn1948
.. progress in implementation of the 13 August resolution.
In light of the assurances offered by the UNCIP, India accepted the supplementary proposals on 23 December and Pakistan followed suit two days later. India viewed the supplementary proposals ..
.. progress in implementation of the 13 August resolution.
In light of the assurances offered by the UNCIP, India accepted the supplementary proposals on 23 December and Pakistan followed suit two days later. India viewed the supplementary proposals ..
#2dayIn1948
.. as amounting only to a general statement of principles, leaving details of the plebiscite to be discussed after Parts I and II of the 13 August resolution had been implemented.
Pakistan, on the other hand, maintained that the ..
.. as amounting only to a general statement of principles, leaving details of the plebiscite to be discussed after Parts I and II of the 13 August resolution had been implemented.
Pakistan, on the other hand, maintained that the ..
#2dayIn1948
.. implementation of the plebiscite agreements would proceed simultaneously with the implementation of the earlier resolution, inasmuch as the appointment of the Plebiscite Administrator was not contingent on prior fulfilment of Parts I and II of the ..
.. implementation of the plebiscite agreements would proceed simultaneously with the implementation of the earlier resolution, inasmuch as the appointment of the Plebiscite Administrator was not contingent on prior fulfilment of Parts I and II of the ..
#2dayIn1948
.. 13 August resolution.
Thus, by 25 December, the UNCIP's mediatory efforts had resulted in an agreement between India and Pakistan. The promulgation of a ceasefire in terms of agreement was now only a matter of time. However, the events of the ..
.. 13 August resolution.
Thus, by 25 December, the UNCIP's mediatory efforts had resulted in an agreement between India and Pakistan. The promulgation of a ceasefire in terms of agreement was now only a matter of time. However, the events of the ..
#2dayIn1948
.. past fortnight had shown how relatively minor moves on the battle front could lead to sudden escalation. Wishing to avoid possible complications, British High Commissioner to India, Gen Nye suggested to Air Marshal Elmhirst, who at the time was ..
.. past fortnight had shown how relatively minor moves on the battle front could lead to sudden escalation. Wishing to avoid possible complications, British High Commissioner to India, Gen Nye suggested to Air Marshal Elmhirst, who at the time was ..
#2dayIn1948
.. Chairman of the Chiefs of Staff Committee, that India should take the initiative in proposing that a ceasefire take effect immediately, in anticipation of the formal adoption of the UNCIP resolution. The service chiefs agreed to make a ..
.. Chairman of the Chiefs of Staff Committee, that India should take the initiative in proposing that a ceasefire take effect immediately, in anticipation of the formal adoption of the UNCIP resolution. The service chiefs agreed to make a ..
#2dayIn1948
.. recommendation to Nehru.
On 30 December, the Indian PM authorised Gen Bucher to convey a ceasefire proposal to Gen Gracey in Pakistan.
On the afternoon of 31 December, warning orders were sent out from the Army HQ that a ceasefire was in the ..
.. recommendation to Nehru.
On 30 December, the Indian PM authorised Gen Bucher to convey a ceasefire proposal to Gen Gracey in Pakistan.
On the afternoon of 31 December, warning orders were sent out from the Army HQ that a ceasefire was in the ..
#2dayIn1948
.. offing. This was later followed by executive orders, ordering a ceasefire on all fronts with effect from midnight.
.. offing. This was later followed by executive orders, ordering a ceasefire on all fronts with effect from midnight.
#2dayIn1948
This heralded the closing of curtains on the first, the longest, and in a sense, still continuing war of the newly independent Nation of India and its army that was itself still emerging from the trauma of partition, when it was thrust to fight the ..
This heralded the closing of curtains on the first, the longest, and in a sense, still continuing war of the newly independent Nation of India and its army that was itself still emerging from the trauma of partition, when it was thrust to fight the ..
#2dayIn1948
.. very same brothers that had fought together in the recently concluded WW2 and the many campaigns on behalf of the British crown before and even after that.
The large scale operations in Jammu and Kashmir were planned, directed and conducted ..
.. very same brothers that had fought together in the recently concluded WW2 and the many campaigns on behalf of the British crown before and even after that.
The large scale operations in Jammu and Kashmir were planned, directed and conducted ..
#2dayIn1948
.. almost entirely by Indian officers. The few British officers still holding some senior appointments in India gave some advice and assistance only in the first few months of the operations, whereafter they played neutral at best and actively ..
.. almost entirely by Indian officers. The few British officers still holding some senior appointments in India gave some advice and assistance only in the first few months of the operations, whereafter they played neutral at best and actively ..
#2dayIn1948
.. sabotaged Indian interests at worst.
The Indian officers, of whom Lt Gen Cariappa was the senior most, had till then little experience in the higher planning and conduct of war. It is a remarkable evidence of their high calibre and professional ..
.. sabotaged Indian interests at worst.
The Indian officers, of whom Lt Gen Cariappa was the senior most, had till then little experience in the higher planning and conduct of war. It is a remarkable evidence of their high calibre and professional ..
#2dayIn1948
.. competence that they managed so well the long campaign which took place in exceptionally difficult circumstances.
.. competence that they managed so well the long campaign which took place in exceptionally difficult circumstances.
#2dayIn1948
There had been no previous planning at all for any military action in Jammu and Kashmir. The first troops were flown to Srinagar with practically no time for planning and preparation. The liberation of the Valley in early November 1947, was a ..
There had been no previous planning at all for any military action in Jammu and Kashmir. The first troops were flown to Srinagar with practically no time for planning and preparation. The liberation of the Valley in early November 1947, was a ..
#2dayIn1948
.. splendid feat of arms by 161 Brigade fighting against the hordes of raiders, equally aided by the delay imposed by the gallant Brigadier Rajinder Singh, MVC (Posth).
This single brigade then managed to hold its own throughout the long ..
.. splendid feat of arms by 161 Brigade fighting against the hordes of raiders, equally aided by the delay imposed by the gallant Brigadier Rajinder Singh, MVC (Posth).
This single brigade then managed to hold its own throughout the long ..
#2dayIn1948
.. winter of 1947-48 when its only line of communication was blocked by snow. Large areas in the Tithwal, Naushera and Rajauri sectors were liberated from the invaders, and were held against repeated, heavy attacks by vastly superior numbers ..
.. winter of 1947-48 when its only line of communication was blocked by snow. Large areas in the Tithwal, Naushera and Rajauri sectors were liberated from the invaders, and were held against repeated, heavy attacks by vastly superior numbers ..
#2dayIn1948
.. of the enemy. Naturally, the Indian Army also suffered setbacks, minor and major, at several places such a Jhangar, Pandu, Kargil and Skardu.
But the situation was fully restored at Kargil and Jhangar. The long siege of Poonch was finally broken ..
.. of the enemy. Naturally, the Indian Army also suffered setbacks, minor and major, at several places such a Jhangar, Pandu, Kargil and Skardu.
But the situation was fully restored at Kargil and Jhangar. The long siege of Poonch was finally broken ..
#2dayIn1948
.. and Gurez and Dras were successfully recaptured against tremendous odds. The army earned five Param Vir Chakras, 47 Maha Vir Chakras and not less than 284 Vir Chakras, including three twin awards of the Vir Chakra during the epic campaign.
.. and Gurez and Dras were successfully recaptured against tremendous odds. The army earned five Param Vir Chakras, 47 Maha Vir Chakras and not less than 284 Vir Chakras, including three twin awards of the Vir Chakra during the epic campaign.
#2dayIn1948
During the long campaign, the Indian Army lost 76 officers, 31 JCOs and 996 Other Ranks killed, making a total of 1103 fatal casualties. The wounded totalled 3152, including 81 officers and 107 JCOs.
During the long campaign, the Indian Army lost 76 officers, 31 JCOs and 996 Other Ranks killed, making a total of 1103 fatal casualties. The wounded totalled 3152, including 81 officers and 107 JCOs.
#2dayIn1948
The ratio of officer to men casualties was extremely high, given that the officers led from the front .. something that continues to this day, amply substantiated by the casualty figures in the 1999 Kargil War.
The ratio of officer to men casualties was extremely high, given that the officers led from the front .. something that continues to this day, amply substantiated by the casualty figures in the 1999 Kargil War.
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Apart from these casualties, the J&K State Forces too lost no less than 1990 all ranks killed, died subsequently of battlefield injuries, or missing presumed killed.
Apart from these casualties, the J&K State Forces too lost no less than 1990 all ranks killed, died subsequently of battlefield injuries, or missing presumed killed.
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The small RIAF lost a total of 9 officers and 23 Other Ranks who laid down their lives for the Nation during these operations.
Enemy casualties were significantly higher.
The small RIAF lost a total of 9 officers and 23 Other Ranks who laid down their lives for the Nation during these operations.
Enemy casualties were significantly higher.
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The gallantry and skill of all ranks of the Indian Army are amply borne out in the foregoing account of these operations. But the exploits and the vital role of the Royal Indian Air Force too deserve special mention here.
The gallantry and skill of all ranks of the Indian Army are amply borne out in the foregoing account of these operations. But the exploits and the vital role of the Royal Indian Air Force too deserve special mention here.
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Its contribution to the success of the J&K operations cannot be over emphasised, and it was the one weapon to which the enemy had no answer, as the Pakistan Air Force wisely desisted from joining the fray.
Only the impromptu air lift to Srinagar in ..
Its contribution to the success of the J&K operations cannot be over emphasised, and it was the one weapon to which the enemy had no answer, as the Pakistan Air Force wisely desisted from joining the fray.
Only the impromptu air lift to Srinagar in ..
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.. October 1947, saved the Kashmir Valley. A hundred planes landed every day on the improvised airfield at Srinagar, bringing in troops, ammunition and supplies and evacuating casualties and refugees. The RIAF and civilian pilots of these Dakotas ..
.. October 1947, saved the Kashmir Valley. A hundred planes landed every day on the improvised airfield at Srinagar, bringing in troops, ammunition and supplies and evacuating casualties and refugees. The RIAF and civilian pilots of these Dakotas ..
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.. defied the mountains, the weather, and fatigue, to continue the airlift until they had ensured that the Valley was saved.
Leh and the entire Ladakh region was saved by Air Commodore 'Baba' Mehar Singh and his gallant boys; Mehar Singh himself ..
.. defied the mountains, the weather, and fatigue, to continue the airlift until they had ensured that the Valley was saved.
Leh and the entire Ladakh region was saved by Air Commodore 'Baba' Mehar Singh and his gallant boys; Mehar Singh himself ..
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.. landing the first Dakota at the hastily prepared and untested airstrip at Leh. Flt Lt DE Pushong similarly landed the first Dakota at Poonch, and made almost a hundred landings thereafter, bringing in, often under shelling, the urgently needed ..
.. landing the first Dakota at the hastily prepared and untested airstrip at Leh. Flt Lt DE Pushong similarly landed the first Dakota at Poonch, and made almost a hundred landings thereafter, bringing in, often under shelling, the urgently needed ..
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.. 25-Pounder guns and essential supplies. Sqn Ldr VP Hegde, Flt Lt LS Grewal and Flt Lt DN Ghadiok were among the many other transport pilots who supplied the hard- pressed garrisons in Poonch, Tithwal, Dras, Kargil, Leh etc in innumerable sorties, in spite ..
.. 25-Pounder guns and essential supplies. Sqn Ldr VP Hegde, Flt Lt LS Grewal and Flt Lt DN Ghadiok were among the many other transport pilots who supplied the hard- pressed garrisons in Poonch, Tithwal, Dras, Kargil, Leh etc in innumerable sorties, in spite ..
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.. of getting hit many times by enemy ground fire.
They all received the Vir Chakra for their skill, dedication and gallantry.
In the close support role, intrepid fighter pilots like Sqn Ldr D Subbia and Sqn Ldr RS Kayayaniwala accurately ..
.. of getting hit many times by enemy ground fire.
They all received the Vir Chakra for their skill, dedication and gallantry.
In the close support role, intrepid fighter pilots like Sqn Ldr D Subbia and Sqn Ldr RS Kayayaniwala accurately ..
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.. attacked enemy positions at Gurez, ZojiLa, Pindras, Rajauri etc, earning Vir Chakras. One can well imagine the skill and courage required to hit pin-point targets among the high hills and deep valleys, in face of heavy machine gun fire.
.. attacked enemy positions at Gurez, ZojiLa, Pindras, Rajauri etc, earning Vir Chakras. One can well imagine the skill and courage required to hit pin-point targets among the high hills and deep valleys, in face of heavy machine gun fire.
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In total, the RIAF earned four MVCs and 28 VrCs during the course of these ops.
Thus in the very first military campaign forced on India after independence and partition, its totally unprepared armed forces and many civilians gave an account of ..
In total, the RIAF earned four MVCs and 28 VrCs during the course of these ops.
Thus in the very first military campaign forced on India after independence and partition, its totally unprepared armed forces and many civilians gave an account of ..
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.. themselves of which any Nation would feel proud. The good old sword, the world saw, was still not rusted.
.. themselves of which any Nation would feel proud. The good old sword, the world saw, was still not rusted.
#2dayIn1948
As of now, the new year ushered in a 'climate of peace' for carrying out negotiations to settle the Kashmir problem peacefully.
As of now, the new year ushered in a 'climate of peace' for carrying out negotiations to settle the Kashmir problem peacefully.
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These negotiations would finally culminate on 29 July 1949 in Karachi.
These negotiations would finally culminate on 29 July 1949 in Karachi.
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For now, however, the ceasefire came into effect one minute before the midnight of 1 January 1949.
The guns finally fell silent.
For now, however, the ceasefire came into effect one minute before the midnight of 1 January 1949.
The guns finally fell silent.
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Thus concluded.
Thus concluded.
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