For non-custodial stablecoins, it's more complex. Where they rely on central governors, they may have fiduciary risks. But where non-custodial stablecoins aim to align incentives of agents decentrally and remove custodial and fiduciary points, then the risks are very different
Non-custodial risks are more like blockchain and market manipulations, which are issues outside of any given stablecoin. Makes more sense to pursue such manipulators for attacks, hacks, frauds as opposed to the smart contract coder (unless they're the same!)
An analogy: when Libor is manipulated, you pursue the manipulators, not whoever came up with the Libor calculation that allowed manipulation! This is where better definition of manipulation and scope might be useful--and what forward-thinking regulation ought to be discussing?
Manipulations may be hard to enforce directly owing to the the anonymous environment, but they aren't (currently) hard to track owing to the open data structure. As with crypto hacking and scams, they can be enforced at the crypto-fiat point of exchange
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Finally caught up on crypto twitter 😅 A few thoughts on this AMM debate:
1) The math itself seems plausible based on volatility harvesting results (though I haven't checked the details). The interpretation is a little optimistic though imo. 1/7
2) Kelly criterion (max E[log V]) makes sense in context of an entire portfolio and effectively heavily penalizes possibilities of portfolio wipeouts. But when only modeling a component of a portfolio, it makes less sense. 2/7
To illustrate, a Kelly optimal portfolio could very well be: keep x% in safe assets w/ the rest spread over very risky bets. You wouldn't want to Kelly maximize each of the very risky bets. In effect, the safe x% removes the heavily penalized wipeout possibilities itself. 3/7
#CropRotation: Since the new governance change, the most profitable $COMP farming is now to borrow and re-deposit #Dai. With multiple layers of borrow-redeposit, you can get >40% yield still. The $BAT positions have massively unwound (w/o incident!) and replaced by Dai
As with $BAT before, this leads to concerns about deleveraging effects. Demand for Dai is high with price close to $1.02 and Dai interest rates are already low. Dai issuance is struggling to keep up with COMP farming demand in this otherwise 'normal' time