New working paper! Consider the decision problem, "For this choice rule, does there exist a strategy-proof mechanism?" This is an easy problem; by the revelation principle, we just need to check that the direct mechanism is IC, which takes linear time. (thread) #EconTwitter
Now consider the problem, "For this choice rule, does there exist an obviously strategy-proof (OSP) mechanism?" OSP depends on the extensive form, so the class of candidate mechanisms is combinatorially complex.
A prior result establishes that, if such a mechanism exists, it can be verified in polynomial time. (So the decision problem is in the complexity class NP.) But can we decide the problem quickly? A brute force search through all the mechanisms would take exponential time.
We provide a polynomial-time algorithm that, given a choice rule, determines whether there exists an OSP mechanism. It also constructs that mechanism, if it exists! This implies that the decision problem is in P.
This is joint work with Louis Golowich, a Harvard undergraduate math/CS major, who deserves the lion's share of the credit.

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@ATabarrok proposes that "the NYTimes should bet a portion of Silver’s salary, at the odds implied by Silver’s model, randomly choosing which side of the bet to take, only revealing to Silver the bet and its outcome after the election is over". 2/N
He writes, "A blind trust bet creates incentives for Silver to be disinterested in the outcome but very interested in the accuracy of the forecast." Is this true? 3/N
Experimental #EconTwitter, here's an open question about mechanism design that lab experiments could answer. There's been an explosion in formal standards for what counts as a 'simple' mechanism. Do these in fact predict subject behavior? (1/N)
My JMP gave some evidence that one of these concepts (OSP) has some empirical support in auctions. It predicts, for instance, that subjects will make mistakes in second-price auctions but not in ascending auctions. But what about other settings? (3/N)
One reason why grad students find it tough to do economic theory: It takes courage to make wrong guesses. For (most) problem sets, you know ahead of time that your target theorem is true and provable. For real research, you have to guess. (1/N)
Most theorems worth proving are ex ante implausible. If your guesses often turn out right, you should aim higher. You need the emotional fortitude to make conjectures and work under uncertainty, knowing that most conjectures are wrong. (2/N)
Crucially, you often only discover whether a model is fruitful by working on the model - which means making guesses and trying to prove them or find counterexamples. Even wrong conjectures can be productive! (3/N)