Every policy person I know who thinks about health insurance is on board with "smart defaults."
I see the primary problems as political (concerning carriers more than individuals) and logistical (including legal questions), not broader public opinion.
Even with soft-defaults, like indicating that a certain plan is someone's probable "best" option, will get pushback from carriers.
That's because if these nudges worked well—and my prior is that they would—they'd have considerable influence over market share.
I'm not merely speculating here: the Obama administration tried to do an extremely weak version of these nudges, prioritizing standardized "Simple Choice" plans on HealthCare.gov.
I'm a little more out of my depth on the legal concerns (not a lawyer), but this is something I've discussed with policymakers on the ground.
The issue seems to be enrolling people into plans where they have a financial obligation to an insurer could generate lawsuits.
Even if those lawsuits don't have merit, they would be a nuisance to manage. One thought is to just auto-enroll people who qualify for zero-premium plans, but subsidy eligibility is volatile, so the financial obligation could manifest later, and create the same problem.
And then there are the logistical issues of just knowing how much subsidy a person qualifies for, given the byzantine nature of the ACA regs. That's not a small hurdle to overcome.
I absolutely think that this is the direction that policy should go in the current context—and it may be more feasible to do by regulation than a lot of other things that would improve coverage rates.
But auto-enrollment won't be an easy lift. No policy worth doing ever is.
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I hadn't read last week's Lancet paper on M4A, but thought I would today since Bernie cites it in his newish-mostly-old set of pay-fors. thelancet.com/journals/lance…
Now that I've read it, I wonder—quite sincerely—how this article got past peer review.
The thing that jumped out to me most glaringly was the stipulation that utilization will ONLY increase among the 24% of Americans who are currently uninsured or underinsured (the yellow box has the underinsurance criteria from the cited Commonwealth Fund)
The implication here is that going from modest cost-sharing to zero cost-sharing will have no impact on utilization. None.
This is not a tenable assumption. The RAND HIE is dated, but it's not obsolete—it's backed up by a whole canon of health economics research now.
Risk adjustment is necessary in a market-based insurance system because some plans—maybe because of benefit design, maybe by chance—are going to attract sicker (more expensive) beneficiaries, and shouldn't be punished for that. Punishment encourages cream skimming.
"The Secretary never adequately considered whether Kentucky HEALTH would in fact help the state furnish medical assistance to its citizens, a central objective of Medicaid." ecf.dcd.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/show_p…
"The Secretary never provided a bottom-line estimate of how many people would lose Medicaid with Kentucky HEALTH in place. This oversight is glaring, especially given that the risk of lost coverage was 'factually substantiated in the record.'"
Guys, Judge Boasberg is extremely not impressed: "For starters, the Secretary never once mentions the estimated 95,000 people who would lose coverage, which gives the Court little reason to think that he seriously grappled with the bottomline impact on healthcare."