It is right to ask *why* industries like fishing have declined. The problem is the blithe assumption that the answer must always be "because of the EU". The problems facing the UK fishing industry long predate EU membership, and will not be magically solved by Brexit. [THREAD]
1. Fishing had been declining for much of the twentieth century. The number of UK fishermen more than halved in mid-century: from nearly 48,000 in 1938 to 21,000 in 1970. By 1970 - the year *before* the UK signed the Treaty of Accession - fishing made up less than 0.1% of UK GDP.
2. That decline had many causes. A century of over-fishing had left stocks dangerously depleted. Younger generations were moving out, in search of safer and better-paid work inland. And the "Cod Wars" with Iceland (1958-76) triggered the collapse of the Atlantic trawler fleet.
3. The "Cod Wars", in which Iceland expelled GB trawlers from its waters, were a grim reminder (a) that other states have sovereignty too & (b) that power-politics still exist outside the EU. For Cold-War reasons, the US backed Iceland. The UK had to fold. theconversation.com/fish-fights-br…
3. The "Cod Wars", in which Iceland expelled GB trawlers from its waters, were a grim reminder (a) that other states have sovereignty too & (b) that power-politics still exist outside the EU. For Cold-War reasons, the US backed Iceland. The UK had to fold. theconversation.com/fish-fights-br…
4. There were other challenges, too. In the early 1970s, Norway & Iceland were dumping large quantities of frozen fish on the British market, driving down prices for domestic suppliers. The fishing fleet badly needed investment for modernisation but was struggling to raise funds.
5. EEC membership did not solve all the problems facing British fishing, but nor did it create them. Before 1970, a sovereign UK government had proven singularly unwilling - perhaps unable - to arrest the collapse of an industry that an official described as "economic peanuts".
6. It was the UK government that made fishing quotas more easily tradeable in the 1990s, accelerating their sale to overseas fleets. The number of UK fishermen declined from 20,000 in 1994 to c.12,000. Landings by the home fleet fell from 726,000 tonnes to 391,000.
7. In fishing, as in much else, blaming the EU became a substitute for serious thought about what kind of fishing industry we want, how much we're willing to pay for it, how we balance it against other interests & how we manage stocks, as oceans warm & great-power rivalry hots up
8. The challenges facing the UK fishing industry did not begin with the EU & will not be solved magically by leaving. The UK failed to address those problems before 1970. It will fail again, unless it stops blaming the EU bogeyman for much longer & deeper problems of policy. ENDS
PS: If you're interested in the history of the "Cod Wars" - and who isn't? - the President of Iceland, Guðni Thorlacius Jóhannesson, wrote a PhD on the subject at @QMHistory. The full text is available here: qmro.qmul.ac.uk/xmlui/handle/1…
4. There were other challenges, too. In the early 1970s, Norway & Iceland were dumping large quantities of frozen fish on the British market, driving down prices for domestic suppliers. The fishing fleet badly needed investment for modernisation but was struggling to raise funds.
5. EEC membership did not solve all the problems facing British fishing, but nor did it create them. Before 1970, a sovereign UK government had proven singularly unwilling - perhaps unable - to arrest the collapse of an industry that an official described as "economic peanuts".
6. It was the UK government that made fishing quotas more easily tradeable in the 1990s, accelerating their sale to overseas fleets. The number of UK fishermen declined from 20,000 in 1994 to c.12,000. Landings by the home fleet fell from 726,000 tonnes to 391,000.
7. In fishing, as in much else, blaming the EU became a substitute for serious thought about what kind of fishing industry we want, how much we're willing to pay for it, how we balance it against other interests & how we manage stocks, as oceans warm & great-power rivalry hots up
8. The challenges facing the UK fishing industry did not begin with the EU & will not be solved magically by leaving. The UK failed to address those problems before 1970. It will fail again, unless it stops blaming the EU bogeyman for much longer & deeper problems of policy. ENDS
PS: If you're interested in the history of the "Cod Wars" - and who isn't? - the President of Iceland, Guðni Thorlacius Jóhannesson, wrote a PhD on the subject at @QMHistory. The full text is available here: qmro.qmul.ac.uk/xmlui/handle/1…
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The 1970s was a decade of serious anxiety about food supplies. Norman Tebbit, of all people, urged the government to consider rationing basic foodstuffs. That played a significant role in the decision to join the EEC, and raises some important questions today. [THREAD]
2. The UK has not been able to feed itself since the early C19th. Even for an industrial economy, it is unusually dependent on imported food. And by the 1970s, a mixture of bad harvests, population growth, inflation & the collapse of Commonwealth agreements was starting to bite.
3. In 1974, for example, Caribbean sugar imports dropped by a third, as producers abandoned Commonwealth trade agreements and sold to more lucrative markets elsewhere. Supermarkets introduced informal rationing, and consumer organisations urged the public to stop buying sugar.
The Brexit negotiations have been such a disaster because Britain never had a serious debate about what it most wanted to achieve. Instead, ministers spent years pretending no trade-offs were necessary. We could have everything we wanted, if we only had the courage to believe.
Ministers boasted, repeatedly, that we could have unlimited sovereignty, frictionless trade, full access to the Single Market & "the exact same benefits" as the CU. Compromise was not a way to achieve the things we most valued, but a surrender of our ability to have it all.
As Ben Jackson wrote in 2019, Conservatives have drawn a dangerous lesson from the Thatcher years. "Compromise" and "negotiation" are dismissed as signs of weakness, not as a way to achieve the most advantageous outcome in a world we do not control. onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/full/10.11…
It doesn't speak well of our democracy that the most important question in British politics depends entirely on the decision of one man. If Johnson agrees a deal, it happens. If he doesn't, tough. MPs, ministers, the public are all just bystanders, waiting to hear what he decides
As @stephenkb explains in this thread, a trade deal does not need parliamentary approval. If a deal requires changes in domestic law, Parliament may have to vote on those changes - but even there the votes can (and will) be carefully limited.
Concentrating power in the hands of the PM isn't just undemocratic. As @DavidHenigUK points out, it has shut down any serious discussion about what a trade deal *should* do. We've abandoned policy debate for punditry, trying to guess what Johnson might do.
This is a brilliant article by @rafaelbehr on why we may be looking in the wrong direction for the dangers to liberal democracy. In looking back to old & familiar dangers, we may miss the new forces that are eating at the foundations of our democracy.[1/5] prospectmagazine.co.uk/magazine/you-h…
As @rafaelbehr argues, what "really challenges the stability of democracy" is not a specific ideology, but a "digital infrastructure" that "facilitates polarisation, sorting people into irreconcilable tribes & spinning them off towards the most extreme iteration of any opinion".
What drives Trump, Johnson & co is not some highly disciplined, common purpose, akin to fascism, but the destruction of any possibility of a common purpose beyond self-gratification. Their lack of seriousness is not a lucky glitch, but intrinsic to the phenomenon they represent.
Was Brexit a product of "imperial nostalgia"? In a new article - currently on free access in the Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History - I argue that it was not. Here's a summary of what it does (and doesn't) argue. [THREAD] tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.10…
1. Britain's European debate has always been closely interwoven with the histories of empire. Membership raised hard questions about Britain's place in the world, its "natural" markets/allies, & its relations with its former colonies, all of which were soaked in the imperial past
2. Since 2016, it has become common to argue that "imperial nostalgia" drove the Leave vote. You'll find this argument in the British and international press and in a lot of academic commentary. But it obscures more than it reveals about the relationship between Brexit & Empire.
"The Brexiteers’ definition of sovereignty has always been the core of the problem. It is the greatest failure of the Remain campaign that they scarcely engaged in, let alone won, this battle". blogs.lse.ac.uk/brexit/2020/11…
This was not a mistake made by Remainers in the 1975 referendum. Pro-Europeans made a compelling argument that, in a modern, globalised world, sovereignty could *only* be defended by pooling decision-making across national borders.
As Margaret Thatcher told voters in 1975, the idea that Britain could "regain complete national sovereignty" by withdrawing from the EEC was "an illusion". "Our lives would be increasingly influenced by the EEC, yet we would have no say in decisions which would vitally affect us"