Thread by @RoryCormac

Lots of recent analysis plays up the importance of exposing hostile Russian intelligence activity as a core part of the Western response.

But this is flawed because exposure isn’t enough - and can backfire

Here’s what recent research tells us ... 🧵 1/7

Exposure isn’t “a switch”. To have consequences it requires revelation too: “a collective recognition that something has happened”. See @stamp in @SecDialogue 2/7

journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.117…

@ThomasEason_ in @BritJPIR similarly tells us that exposure needs to be accompanied by politicisation to have effect.

Exposure without narrative/coverage among target audience is inconsequential. Exposure is what observers make of it 3/7

journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.117…

For @carsonaust in @IntOrgJournal acknowledgement is vital.

exposure without acknowledgement can prevent escalation but allows conflict to stay in the “backstage”.

4/7
cambridge.org/core/journals/…

Similarly, Aldrich and I argue in @IAJournal_CH that exposure won’t really deter covert ops because states exploit the ambiguity of implausible deniability

5/7

academic.oup.com/ia/article/94/…

And @JacobOt90719397 and @gametheory101 find in @ISQ_Jrnl that exposing the action of a “resolved” state can actually cause that state to double down on its hostile activity - so be careful!

6/7

academic.oup.com/isq/advance-ar…

Conclusion:

Exposure is not a panacea. It will have little effect unless accompanied by revelation / politicisation / acknowledgement

- and it could backfire

7/7