#Zyxel announced CVE-2020-29583 fixing a backdoor admin account which gave attackers root on affected devices via SSH or web interface
If you want to examine the firmware you need to run a #known_plaintext_attack against an encrypted zip
Sounds hard; don't worry I got you... 👇
Zyxel have actually removed the backdoored firmware versions from their portal; but you can still grab the latest version or earlier versions for further inspection.
Now, unzip the contents and you should have something like this
Running file on the .bin file suggests this is a zip archive, but if you attempt to unzip it from the command line, you'll see errors, as it's password protected
Let's flip to Windows and browse the archive using 7-Zip. We don't know the password to extract the zip, but we can see the file names, folder structure and file size
Browse through the folders and you'll find system-default.conf in the following location
Run the bash script in the same directory as the firmware .bin file, feed it the name of the firmware (not the full filename of the bin) and it will crack the zip in about 20 seconds.
You'll then have a cracked .zip file in your current directory
Ta-daaaa!
You'll want to pay attention to the file compress .img, this likely uses squashfs and therefore you can install squashfs using homebrew, and then run unsquashfs on the .img
#SUPERNOVA#SolarWinds malware is actually pretty boring. So boring in fact, I made a video.
Thread 👇
Adversaries have injected a call to a method called DynamicRun() into the existing LogoImageHandler class. An existing method, ProcessRequest() has been trojan'ed to accept 4 GET parameters passed to the Orion web API
These GET parameters are designed to contain
"code" - a blob of C# code which is then compiled
"clazz" - the name of a class which is to be instantiated
"method" - the name of a method to call within the clazz
"args" - supplied to the aforementioned method
#SolarWinds#SUNBURST malware checks for a long list of security processes and services running on the endpoint to try and evade detection. It does this by hashing the lowercase process name and comparing it against hardcoded values. Thread 👇
The hashing function isn't one I'm familiar with, FNV1A, but seems pretty straight forward to understand
FireEye did a great job in brute-forcing many of the hardcoded hashes and identified a big list of security tools that the malware is checking for