Illinois makes it super easy to send FOIA requests to any municipality (just look up their FOIA officer’s email); it’s free, and they get just 5 days to respond (10 with a written extension) before you can sue and have them pay your legal costs if you win.
What I’m saying is, not a crazy project to just come up with every police officer in all of Chicagoland who took PTO during the riots in DC.
(If you’re wondering why this is interesting: the President of the Chicago FOP came out in support of the riots a couple days ago; numerous off duty police officers were reported in attendance at the riots).
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This paper is very cool: behavior oracles in interactive systems that reveal successful decryption can, with a bunch of different AEADs incl. GCM and Chapoly, discern which specific key was used in something resembling log k queries. eprint.iacr.org/2020/1491.pdf
It’s based in part on the idea of “non-committing AEADs”, which are, roughly, AEADs where the specific key used to encrypt isn’t encoded into the output. For something like GCM, this means it’s straightforward to generate K_1, K_2, and C which decrypts under K_1 and K_2.
I found Shay Gueron’s writeup on key committing AEADs to be pretty accessible (I’m just reading casually), with worked examples. eprint.iacr.org/2020/1153.pdf
Mudge is the new head of security at Twitter, which got me talking about cDc, hacking groups, cliques, and the distinctions between them. I mentioned 8lgm and TESO as examples of hacking groups best understood as hacking groups, unlike cDc.
Someone said: “never heard of them”.
This creates an opportunity for me to talk again about my favorite exploit of all time, unquestionably a part of the canon of our field.
The year is 1995 and BSD Unix runs the Internet. The most important hacking target is SunOS 4.1.3; every network you want to get on is running it somewhere, and often everywhere.
The most important SunOS security research group: 8lgm.
Kind of crazy watching the orange site, which believes I’m an NSA stooge, fall over itself arguing that publishing DKIM keys to provide deniable email would be a grave injustice, depriving “activists and historians”.
This is what happens when you have a culture that attempts to derive everything axiomatically, just moments after reading something. They forget that deniable messages are literally part of the premise of messaging cryptography. otr.cypherpunks.ca/otr-wpes.pdf
This is currently the top comment on the thread. Again: these people think I’m a shill for NSA.
Here is an argument against donating to presidential candidates, stated less glibly than I did last night.
First premise: downballot races need the money. Even small donations to House and state candidates make a difference.
Second premise: presidential candidates don’t really need your money. They won’t notice it. They’re swimming in it.
Third, and most important premise: a downballot donation helps the top of the ticket.
That is to say: every dollar you donate to JD Scholten in IA-4 is going to help Sanders, Warren, Klobes, whoever. The voters JD Scholten turns out aren’t going to vote for Trump.