1/4 The fact that 🇨🇳China is preparing 17+1 online summit confirms my thesis about the role of the format in 🇨🇳China's foreign policy presented in the @NBRnews report edited by @RollandNadege
2/4 👉🇨🇳 portrays the 17+1 formula as a useful political tool for projecting power (including through agenda-setting), promoting its values and norms, and safeguarding its core interests.
3/4 👉Via the format, 🇨🇳Beijing is trying to create a circle of political friends that are indispensable in the 🇨🇳China-led process of reforming the global order
4/4 👉Although 🇨🇳 extensive attempts in offering CEE various enticements have produced few tangible results, the 17+1 still serves as a useful political mechanism that might be activated and deactivated when 🇨🇳 decides to do so, depending on its current political interests
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2/7 👉We should have first discussed 🇪🇺 political goals toward 🇨🇳, thereby searching for a democratic consensus on this issue. On this basis, we could have renewed the EC’s mandate to negotiate #CAI
3/7 👉An agreement was signed and the lack of a democratic consensus in relation to EU strategy toward China means that she will be the subject of political dispute in Europe, both in member states and in the European Parliament.
1/10
Why concluding promptly (👉this year) the 🇪🇺-🇨🇳 Comprehensive Agreement on Investment (#CAI) is not a good idea
Two main arguments
1)📍 it goes against the latest EU's sharpen China policy 👉 "Strategic Outlook", outcomes of the latest EU-China summits, etc.
2/10
2)📍& it gives China a win when it comes to the PRC's goal of preventing/undermining close transatlantic copperation on China (as the #CAI negotiations might be finalised before Biden's inauguration)
3/10
Bearing in mind the aforementioned arguments:
📍EU should stick to its own words that
a) is committed to the substance of specific arrangements of #CAI that increase market access, not to the timing of the deal’s conclusion 👉the latter is being pushed by China