While I've long argued that the Trump administration’s approach to trade did more economic harm than good, I read the USCBC research report and I am very skeptical about its methodology. It seems to consist mainly of measuring the positive...
impact on direct employment of each component of trade, while ignoring the indirect components. This is a problem when most of both the positive and negative impacts of trade are mainly indirect, affecting the economy primarily in the way they...
change investment and/or savings in the economy, and yet these show up nowhere.
For example their analysis would not be able to distinguish between the employment impact of tariffs on the deficits the US ran in the 19th Century, when foreign capital inflows boosted US...
4/14
investment, and the deficits the US runs today, when their impact is to reduce savings. These are very different kinds of deficits, but the way job losses associated with tariffs are computed for the latter would result in the same job losses for the former. We know...
5/14
from basic accounting identities that net capital inflows can by definition result in either higher investment or lower savings. Tariffs on American trade deficits that boost investment cannot possibly affect employment in the same way as tariffs on American trade...
6/14
deficits that repress savings, and yet I see nothing in their methodology that differentiates between them. Trade theory tells us that trade deficits can be positive for developing countries whose high investment needs exceed domestic savings, whereas mature, advanced...
7/14
economies aren't supposed to be able to run large, persistent deficits. Again, an approach that cannot distinguish between these two very different conditions has a serious problem.
The same problem emerges when their analysis assumes that the employment impact of...
8/14
Chinese investment in the US is mainly equal to the number of jobs in Chinese-owned businesses. This can only be true in an economy with very high costs of capital and huge unemployed labor and resources, which clearly hasn’t been the case for the US in the past four years.
9/14
By the way, by focusing on the direct employment impact of each component of trade (imports, exports, and profits on investment) their analysis also seems unable to distinguish between the job impact of foreign trade on countries running large surpluses versus those...
10/14
running large deficits, even though we know that countries that run large surpluses do so in order to generate jobs that cannot be met serving domestic demand. An approach that assumes you cannot boost employment by reducing imports is something that Beijing would find...
11/14
pretty surprising, and yet that is what their analysis implies.
It is not that the analysis ignores the negative aspects of imports altogether, but rather that it focuses only on direct job losses and it seems to assume that the impact of imports on increasing real...
12/14
household income exceeds their impact on direct job losses, while ignoring the ways in which imports can repress wages or raise indirect unemployment, along with the indirect job losses caused by this suppression of wages. In nearly every country that runs large...
13/14
persistent surpluses, the household share of GDP is lower than that of its peers and trade partners, and yet this analysis seems to deny that countries can increase international competitiveness by directly or indirectly reducing the wage share of production.
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The idea that trade deficits are always bad or always good is just ideology. Deficits can boost growth in some conditions and suppress it in others. At the very least an analysis of the impact of trade must be able to distinguish between the two sets of conditions.
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It is a little frustrating to see the response many analysts had to the GDP growth data Chinese released today. These numbers aren’t especially good, and they certainly shouldn’t have been surprising. Back in April and May, when most analysts...
were projecting negative or barely positive GDP growth for China in 2020 (the OECD, for example, expected China’s GDP to contract by 3.7%), I insisted that GDP growth for 2020 would be positive, and probably between 2% and 3%.
Today, it was reported as 2.3%. How did...
3/16
I know? Because I knew that while most of the healthy sources of Chinese growth would contract (except for exports, which would expand given Beijing’s intense supply-side response to the impact of Covid-19), Beijing was going to respond to a significant...
The first of these two articles – both published last week in SCMP – suggests that the PBoC wants to tighten credit and stabilize the debt burden, even if that means restraining GDP growth, while the second cites a senior PBoC official who...
assures us that the PBoC will remain accommodative to "maintain necessary support for economic recovery", which Beijing seems to define as many years of at least 5% growth.
It seems every week we get the same conflicting signals from...
the PBoC, in which at one time they prioritize financial stability and at another they promise economic stability. While these can in theory be compatible aims, I am pretty sure that the PBoC knows that growth in China can only be maintained with a rapid rise in debt.
An important point over which Chen Yulu is right to worry. The US-China trade relationship is a kind of machine that converts US consumption into Chinese savings, which in turn are likely to fuel more liquidity bubbles and speculative capital flows.
This wouldn't be the first time something like this will have happened. The three biggest trade surpluses of the past 100 years were the American surplus of the 1920s, the Japanese surplus of the 1980s, and China's more recently. I don't think it is at all a...
3/5
coincidence that the first two were associated with devastating asset bubbles, mainly in the surplus countries but also to a lesser extent in the big deficit countries.
The mechanism is complex, but there is likely to be a big difference between China's allowing inflows...
According to this article, "The private sector is likely to increasingly take the lead from the public sector in spurring China’s economic growth. Infrastructure investment was a key driver of China’s growth last year, supported by strong fiscal...
stimulus. But increasingly, private-sector consumption and investment will play a more important role."
I think it would be far more accurate to say that the private sector is only temporarily likely to take the lead from the public sector as we see a partial reversal of...
3/4
the huge relative increase in the role of the public sector in 2020 (accounting, along with real estate development, for more than 100% of last year's GDP growth). This will happen mainly because, as the article notes, consumers will probably spend some of last year's...
The biggest cost to the US economy is when workers are willing but unable to find productive jobs. That is why a major economic stimulus can bring short-term growth to the US economy without worsening the long-term debt burden. But unless...
a substantial part of domestic demand is prevented from leaking abroad too easily, the US will bear the full cost of the stimulus while sharing the growth benefits with countries that are less aggressive in paying for domestic stimulus programs, especially with countries...
3/5
like China that have responded to the collapse in domestic and foreign demand mainly by supporting domestic production.
A US stimulus that doesn't cause the trade deficit to explode, in other words, will be far more effective than one that does. This is true not just...
Interesting article. Beijing can talk all it likes about the need to stabilize credit growth, and it will even seem to be successful in the first half of 2021, but inly because of a one-off surge in consumption caused by a partial reversal of the...
drop in consumption in 2020. This will allow Beijing to pressure state-owned firms to pay down debt, and maybe even to permit the occasional default. Unfortunately, however, even this "stabilizing" of credit will not be enough to make up for the big jump in credit in 2020.
3/4
Once the one-off benefit of a sharp consumption recovery wears off, sometime in the first half of 2021 (assuming no resurgence of Covid-19), it will again become impossible for Beijing to stabilize credit growth in any of the next few years as long as it...