We're deploying vaccines like we do annual flu shots rather than the mass vaccinations done in Africa & Asia where millions are vaccinated in weeks
Years ago, Joe Rhatigan & I studied these campaigns. They offer several lessons that can inform what we need in the US now
THREAD
1/ Be proactive
Instead of passively waiting for people to come get vaccinated, we need to search them out & go to where they are & keep following up until they opt out or are vaccinated
We should be rolling out the vaccine like we do the Census, even going door-to-door
2/ Remove barriers & be redundant
In each community, have multiple ways to get vaccinated including CVS/Walgreens, pop-up sites & near high-throughput places people have to to go like grocery stores
Make some venues 24/7 so people can get vaccinated anytime that works for them
3/ Microplanning
In mass vaccination campaigns, each locality developed detailed community-by-community plans for getting each eligible person vaccinated
We need similarly granular plans for how each & every person will be reached & ways to monitor location-specific coverage
4/ Community engagement
As we're already seeing, getting buy-in is not as simple as mass media messaging
We need systematic community-by-community efforts to inform, engage, address concerns & cultivate trust. This can't be haphazard & needs to be done with rigor & resources
5/ Leverage skills
We're in an emergency & we need all hands on deck
Millions have skills that can help expand vaccination. Volunteers can organize lists, conduct community engagement or even be trained to administer vaccines under the supervision of nurses
6/ Logistics, logistics, logistics
Mass vaccination campaigns invested in transport, storage etc to get things done without hiccups & lapses
We need federal funding & partnerships with relevant companies to make the distribution, tracking, storage etc of vaccines seamless
If mass vaccination campaigns were able to vaccinate thousands of people within weeks including in some of the poorest & toughest places in the world (including warzones), we can do much better than we are now in the US
This is an emergency; every delay means more cases & lives
In 2014, I was on a 'task force' convened by Guinea's President to forge a nat'l Ebola response
Cases were spiking, it was a polarizing election year &, though many efforts were happening, there was no overall strategy or unified response
Here's how we set up the response
1/15
The first step was to establish a clear chain-of-command leadership structure under the National Ebola Coordination Cell with Dr Sakoba Keita as its head
All partners (eg, WHO, MSF, other ministries) & all response activities had to go through the Cell
2/15
We then created an overarching national strategy that included all interventions (eg, testing, contact tracing)
This wasn't just a laundry list of things that could help but aimed to spell out the combo of measures needed to actually reach zero within a defined timeframe
(2/3) #1 can be achieved by merging best practices that thus far happen in isolation into integrated systems that leverage technological- connectivity, AI, automation- tools to orchestrate/facilitate high-quality replicable execution at scale
(3/3) #2 is less of a technical & logistical challenge than a human, social & political one & therefore much more complicated to find a clear path towards achieving but achieve it we must
(1/5) To put Trump being started on dexamethasone in perspective, we do it for patients when they become hypoxic
Some patients I've had are on remdesivir/dexa like Trump is now & only require a touch of oxygen (eg, 2L) for a day or two & then come off it.
(2/5) Even when on oxygen, they may look, feel, talk etc. like they're fine & you wouldn't know they were hypoxic unless you took off the oxygen & saw their O2 saturation
(3/5)Others on remdesivir/dexa end up as sick as anyone can be including on a ventilator, paralytics, etc & either pass away or recover after a prolonged & arduous course
Bottom line: there's huge variation which makes it tough to pinpoint where someone might be on that spectrum
(1/4) Other than the experimental antibodies, Trump has gotten what - remdesivir, dexamethasone - we give to our Covid patients with hypoxia
(2/4) From the way questions were answered, the fact that dex was started (which can have side effects including confusion) & he was on supplemental O2 suggests to me that his O2 may have been lower than they are letting on
Supplemental O2 usually isn't given unless O2 sat <90%
(3/4) With Covid19 & pneumonias in general, you typically don't get 'transient' drops in O2 as much as persistent (& potentially progressive) hypoxia lasting for at least hours
Transient drops usually happen from mucous plugs or aspiration
1/ A hang-up on rapid tests that I've heard is that it'll be difficult for health depts to track results
Decentralized screening makes that difficult but stopping spread should be the overwhelming priority; monitoring indirectly helps stop spread but is a secondary consideration
2/ We shouldn't hold up something that can stop transmission because it will be harder to monitor or collect data on
The current counterfactual is that we're missing most infections anyway & neither stopping onward transmission from them or getting any data on them
3/ What's generally been missing from the rapid testing discussion are counterfactuals
Anyone can point out issues that arise if using them but that is meaningless without considering what is happening w/o them & thoughtfully strategizing on how to address potential downsides
2/ There was a lag between determining a need & getting it established so the best we could do was use modeling to start deployment &, if transmission shifted & changed, we revised our models & adjusted our projections & plans
3/ In many instances, we were part of the way towards establishing a testing or treatment site when transmission shifted differently & they were no longer needed at the place we planned but required elsewhere