This could be a big deal, although it has some potential downsides. "U.S. Says China’s Repression of Uighurs Is ‘Genocide’" nytimes.com/2021/01/19/us/…
A US govt legal designation of something as a "genocide" has traditionally been a difficult bureaucratic and legal task. See, e.g., the fight over the 2004 US designation of Sudan's actions in Darfur as "genocide" theatlantic.com/international/…
The Clinton Administration in 1994 appeared to have barred the use of genocide w/r/t Sudan for legal and policy reasons. The Bush Admin did quite a lot of fact finding and legal analysis, and was still not sure the evidence was strong enough.
They ended up announcing the designation, but there was a huge internal fight about it. I imagine a similar internal battle within the Trump Admin went on.
I am not an expert on the law of genocide, but I would imagine the problem here is specific intent. We know the re-education camps and forced labor, etc. is happening. But is it specifically intended to eliminate all Uighurs or Uighur culture? Or is it counter-terrorism?
Sadly, even if the effect is to essentially eliminate Uighur culture/people, that does not necessarily establish an intent to do so, as a legal matter. The ICJ in the Serbia/Croatia cases refused to find genocide due to lack of specific intent. news.un.org/en/story/2015/…
These legal issues, among other things, counsel for prudence in deploying the "g" word. The danger is that the US will make this designation, but other states and/or intl organs will not go along, making this look like a US-China dispute.
Having said all this, I am open to the likelihood that the Chinese govt really is committing genocide against the Uighurs. But we need to have the best evidence possible to make this claim, and (ideally) a broader intl consensus. I am not sure we are there yet.
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This is quite a speech on Taiwan by @USAsiaPacific
Chief Stilwell. It says almost everything Taipei would want the US to say: E.g.: China is the problem, not Taiwan; Taiwan needs more international room. US will keep selling arms to Taiwan. state.gov/The-United-Sta…
@USAsiaPacific It declassifies cables related to the 1982 "Six Assurance" given by the US to Taiwan, and reaffirms US commitment to those assurances. The Assurances run from the US to Taiwan, but were meant to clarify the limits of what the US would do w/r/t Taiwan when negotiating with China.
@USAsiaPacific To the extent there was any ambiguity on the US position on Taiwan's sovereignty, this speech clarifies that "The U.S. takes no position on sovereignty over Taiwan." which directly contradicts China's claim that the whole world (incl the US) agrees that Taiwan is part of China.
Here is @RepTedYoho's "Taiwan Invasion Prevention Act", which would authorize US military force in the event China uses force against Taiwan. yoho.house.gov/sites/yoho.hou…
@RepTedYoho The key language in the bill is similar to other congressional authorizations for the use of force, like the famous Sept. 11 AUMF. This bill's language is similarly broad, but does impose some conditions on when the President can use force to defend Taiwan.
@RepTedYoho POTUS can use force if 1) China attacks Taiwan's military; 2) China attacks territory under Taiwan's 'effective juris'; 3) China endangers lives of TW civilians or military.
I know yet another sanctions bill against China is no longer big news, but the "HK Autonomy Act" (which passed the Senate today) has some potentially new sanctions over HK. toomey.senate.gov/files/document…
Under existing US law, @potus CAN sanction individuals over violations of HKers human rights, and he can also withdraw HK's special status under US law for trade and other intl purposes. But all is left to @potus' discretion. But the new HK Autonomy Act is MANDATORY.
Moreover, unlike the existing US laws which focus on HK or CN govt officials, the new HK Autonomy Act seems to require sanctions on "foreign financial institutions" that "knowingly that knowingly conducts a significant transaction with" a sanctioned HK or CN govt official.
Chinese FM Wang Yi’s speech on multilateralism at the #MSC2020 hasn’t gotten that much attention (it is full of bland CCPisms like ("5000 years of civilization!" and "socialism w/ Chinese characteristics"). (Short thread) 1/12
But I think it deserves more attention as a statement of how the Chinese govt would like to shape the global narrative about how it approaches intl institutions and intl law. 2/12
First, Wang frames China-West relations as a problem of prejudice toward China’s attempt to assert its “right of development.” It then blends China’s “cultural traditions” with the “socialism” and then (of course) the leadership of the CCP. 3/12
@TheJusticeDept@Huawei RICO is typically used against organized crime syndicates (like the Mafia). And it is really, really complicated and hard to prove. cc: @Popehat (Is it RICO this time?)
@TheJusticeDept@Huawei@Popehat Unlike the case agt the PLA hackers, @huawei will fight this case in US court (with its top notch US lawyers) and make @TheJusticeDept prove its case beyond a reasonable doubt. I hope DOJ is ready for what will be an epic legal battle.
Iran has pledged to respect "transit passage" of UNCLOS states in the Strait of Hormuz. The UK is a UNCLOS state, so I am not sure what Iran's legal justification would be here.
To be clear, Iran has signed UNCLOS, but it has not ratified it. Still, it has not withdrawn its signature, and still has a general obligation not to undermine the treaty's object and purpose. So it needs to provide a legal basis for its action.
The UK made its legal position on the tanker seized in Gibraltar pretty clear. The tanker was passing in UK territorial waters and it was headed to Syria in violation of EU sanctions on shipments to the Syrian govt. This is a reasonable legal position. theguardian.com/world/2019/jul…