Sneak peek of the Taiwan war thread, based on some preliminary research...
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2/ The military outcome of Operation Taiwan is a foregone conclusion. China's biggest challenge will be managing the diplomatic fallout and popular sentiment on the island.
3/ It's uncertain whether even the US could save Taiwan. For example, a 2017 RAND study estimated the US would have to dedicate between 100% and 250% (not a typo) of the *globally available* US fighter aircraft inventory to fighting China in order to protect the island
4/ A different RAND study estimated Taiwan's air defenses would suffer 75% attrition after 2 hours of conflict. To put this into perspective, this is a faster rate of attrition than Iraq's air defense network suffered in 1991's Gulf War.
5/ The US estimates that, absent US intervention, China could wrap up major combat operations after 72 hours. Based on publicly available literature, that seems generous. China will generate 1200 sorties per day from 39 airfields in range of Taiwan.
6/ With its own air force and air defense network neutralized in the first 2 hours of combat, plus mass waves of precision-guided/loitering munitions and UAVs providing constant airborne surveillance, Taiwan will lose one battalion per hour from bombardment alone.
7/ Given that TW has 35 brigades of 3 to 5 battalions each, and strength losses of 1/3 or more render a given formation combat-ineffective, that means within 24 hours over 2/3 of TW's combat formations will be knocked out - without a single PLA soldier landing on the island.
end/ It is highly likely that, without an immediate offer from the US of unconditional military support, the island will surrender within 1-2 days of fighting. This might happen even sooner if the mainland offers attractive terms; ie regime change instead of wholesale annexation.
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1/ Been meaning to respond to this excellent comment on @notXiangyu's podcast
2/ The gist of the comment is that Intel was not a factor in lobbying for sanctions on Huawei fabbing at TSMC; Taiwan's government also didn't have mcuh to do with it; and the main driver of the sanctions was a fight around 5G, led by US competitors like Qualcomm
3/ The reality is that Qualcomm led the lobbying effort to decouple Huawei from TSMC but Intel, Apple, and several companies participated in it. Also, Tsai's regime was quietly supportive of the ban from 2018 onwards but asked the US to hold off until after the Jan 2020 elex
Fun fact: in college I RA'd for a guy who was a former member of the Bilderberg Steering Committee. One job I had was copying his paper rolodex into Outlook. When I got to George HW Bush he told me to put in Bush's golf caddy's cell phone instead of the landline.
Most of the time, people who are in that circle perform a sort of bridging function. Here, you can see attendees Kravis, Paulson, Thornton, both Greenbergs, etc mediating a discussion between Wang Qishan and US business execs trying to press China for more market opening
You should realize that this isn't just one isolated case. The China Watcher field is full of creeps and pedos - they just hush it up. @BadChinaTake Maybe you, Jessica Drun, and Claire Chu should share some of your stories. Then again, you won't, because "it might hurt the cause"
Today in China Watching logic: refusing to speak up against known abusers is a virtuous act if you're doing it to protect your selfish career prospects. Oh and if you get called out on sweeping this under the rug, you should just post private DMs and then block them
But remember this kind of logic doesn't just extend to abuse within the circle. China Watcher hero and idol Matt Pottinger supported initiatives that shielded bacha bazi practitioners when he was in Afghanistan. These accusations are not 'irresponsible', Mr. Rogin.
1/ Some Biden officials have referred to this list as an "opportunity [...] to be patient and extract concessions from China in exchange for tactical adjustments to policy"
They're just going to keep most of it and make token moves while trying to get China to make big ones
2/ This is why I think China should just refuse negotiations and go hard in the paint. No sense in starting negotiations when your opponent feels confident. Gotta soften up their political consensus first. There are a few levers China should push on:
3/ First, to raise the implicit costs of US intervention in Taiwan, update China's nuclear posture: state that any attack on Chinese territory (including Taiwan island) or on Chinese merchant shipping by the forces of a nuclear power may incur an 'unrestricted' Chinese response
Tbh, this declaration is a net plus. By standing by Pompeo's genocide declaration, Blinken just clarified China's strategic calculus by removing US ambiguity around a possible reset. China can now move on Taiwan island without any hesitation around what it might be missing out on
This makes the Operation Taiwan thread I've been working on a possibility rather than an outside conjecture. Is the US really sure it wants this? There are no good outcomes for the US out of such an op. Biden will very likely be more hated than Trump by the end of it.
China's logic is that if the US is willing to stick to its guns on a proclamation where it has very little credibility, then the rest of its China policy is going to be similarly unreasonable. In that case, there's no point in negotiating on anything