Thread by @mike_mazza

In my latest for @globaltaiwan, I tackle @mikepompeo's controversial nullification of the Taiwan contact guidelines. There are two contexts in which to assess the decision, which lead to dueling assessments of the policy move. Join me on my journey. aei.org/articles/asses…

Context 1: Pompeo has future political ambitions. He never fully subscribed to the view that, as chief diplomat, he should refrain from engaging in domestic politics. He showed disregard for traditional strictures on the secretary of state's conduct and comportment.

That is why it is so hard to believe that future political considerations were not at least partly responsible for Pompeo's flurry of late-in-the-game policy announcements.

In this light, his elimination of the Taiwan guidelines looks like little more than an effort to enhance his tough-on-China bona fides.

In a recent analysis for @ForeignPolicy, @jessicadrun rightly points to the problematic use of Taiwan as a "card to play" against China. But what is arguably more troubling is the use of Taiwan as a card to play against Democrats. cc: @BeijingPalmer foreignpolicy.com/2021/01/13/tai…

@jessicadrun writes:

Should Pompeo, in abolishing the guidelines, bequeath a partisan split over Taiwan policy, neither American nor Taiwanese interests will be served. But is that risk as great as Drunk suggests? There is good reason to think not.

Enter Context 2: the evolution of Taiwan policy recent years. Pompeo's presidential ambitions may taint the nullification of the Taiwan contact guidelines, but their nullification was arguably good policy.

Writing in a previous GTB issue about the Taiwan Assurance Act, which became law as part of last year's omnibus spending bill, I described why the guidelines were so problematic. globaltaiwan.org/2019/03/vol-4-…

The TAA, which requires the secretary of state to conduct a review of the guidelines within six months, passed with bipartisan support. The act unambiguously describes the sense of Congress as favoring a loosening of restrictions on diplomatic engagement with Taiwan.

Mainstream Dems in Congress and in the new administration may reasonably be dismayed by the manner, timing, and context of the contact guidelines announcement, but their policy preferences on this issue are likely to remain largely aligned with those of mainstream Republicans.

What’s more, the Biden team may welcome the move, even if only cautiously. The Biden transition team was not known for leaks to the press, but it is notable that there was not a hint of displeasure publicly aired in the days following Pompeo’s announcement.

@jessicadrun defensibly accuses Trump’s State Department “of attempting to bind the next administration’s hands on Taiwan policy, otherwise setting up incoming leadership to easy criticisms of inaction.”

Pompeo’s motivations aside, incoming officials may take a more sanguine view of his decision. The six-month policy review mandated by the TAA would have been a point of prolonged friction in US-PRC relations, w/ Beijing attempting to use available leverage to affect its outcome.

But the Pompeo announcement has reduced the review's import. @SecBlinken did say that “we’re going to take a hard look” at the decision, but also that he wants to be sure “we’re acting pursuant to the mandate in the [TAA] that looks at creating more space for contacts.”

Blinken and his team may well welcome the opportunity Pompeo has provided to regularize diplomatic interactions with Taiwanese counterparts and to do so without having to themselves make fraught decisions about the prior guidelines.

The timing of the guidelines’ nullification wasn't ideal. If Trump admin officials believed discarding them was the correct move, that policy should have been adopted sooner, when the admin would have been well-prepared for Chinese blowback directed at either DC or Taipei.

Alternatively, it would have been better for the Biden admin to make this decision on its own—doing so would have made for a far more potent demonstration of US backbone and would have reinforced bipartisan consensus on Taiwan policy rather than risk weakening it as Pompeo did.

But despite the ill timing and the wretched context—the waning days of an administration only reluctantly cooperating in the presidential transition and beset by insurrection in the capital city—discarding overly restrictive limitations on bilateral engagement is a good policy.

It's a policy that Congress has, in bipartisan fashion, already approved & that Taiwan’s leaders, by all indications, genuinely support. The Biden admin needn't applaud Pompeo for taking this step how and when he did. But the new admin can and should make the most of it.