A Little GameStop/Robinhood Perspective: A number of hedge funds got the $GME trade very wrong on a risk/reward basis(I know the feeling), and attracted the interest of smart retail investors. They spread the word via social media, and the stock skyrocketed.
(2) The affected hedge funds were run over, but few noticed that other big hedge funds made as much, or more, than the retail investors. Ok, some lost big, some won big. Happens all the time. Then things got weird...
(3) As the stock went higher and higher, retail investors began to believe that the hedge funds that were short could never cover because the short interest was 140% of the shares outstanding. Yet the stock was trading more than 100% of its shares outstanding EVERY DAY.
(4) As this story circulated, $GME stock went parabolic and other stocks with high short interest also went up in sympathy. But so many retail investors began to buy these stocks on margin, that the online brokers began having regulatory/clearinghouse capital issues today.
(5) These brokerages(but not others) began to restrict trading in the volatile stocks per their customer agreements, so as to not violate their regulatory capital limits...and all hell broke loose.
(6) Retail traders were outraged that they were not allowed to buy more of a stock that was up 20X over the past three months. That somehow the Wall St “Elites” were preventing them from profiting even more, so as to protect hedge funds(many of whom were long) and short-sellers.
(7) And as a result, politicians joined the fray, decrying the regulatory system(!) that they would normally defend, so as to curry favor with the aggrieved investor class that had already made a killing in a very smart trade.
(8) A regulatory system that did exactly what it should have done, for a set of undercapitalized brokerages, so as to prevent their collapse(we’ll see what happens) in an extreme set of market circumstances.
(9) So just what is all the outrage about? The shorts/HF’s lost, retail (and HF’s!) won, and we all learned about the risks of the no cost online brokerage model. But I am hard-pressed to see why making a lot of $ in a heavily-shorted set of stocks is a national crisis.

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More from @WallStCynic

8 Oct 20
Spin(off) vs Reality: This thread will explore how $IBM’s new CEO, Arvin’s Krishna, has crossed the strategic Rubicon in reverse, from Rome back to Gaul.
(2) Here is the problem that Krishna inherited. A highly profitable non-growth business, turned into a shrinking low-return business under Ginni Rometty. She tried to mask the secular decline by aggressive financial engineering. Image
(3) How much financial engineering? A lot. $IBM’s actual economic earnings (operating income + IP royalties - interest - taxes @ 21%) are now running 40% below “adjusted earnings”. $IBM’s true EPS will be closer to $6 per share in 2020, not $11. Image
Read 10 tweets
1 Oct 20
You People Have Lost Your Damn Minds Dept: All gambling revenues(casino, online, sports, pari-mutuel, Native American, etc.) in the USA will probably be less than $80B in 2020, growing 2% per year. Sports betting(less than $2B) is about 2% of the total.
(2) William Hill, the dominant UK online and sports betting platform is being bought for 2x revenue, and has 15% EBITDA margins.
(3) In 2016 the total UK sports betting “handle” (online and on-premise) was $12.3B, or less than 0.5% of GDP, and has NOT been growing. The same figure would be a handle of less than $100B in the US.
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28 Sep 20
There seems to be a lot of confusion over what the @nytimes story on Trump’s taxes tells us about his actual net assets/businesses. And how it’s normal to show losses for tax reporting purposes in the commercial real estate industry.
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(3)Depreciation allowance for commercial RE currently is 39 yrs, or 2.5% of cost per yr. Given Trump Tower is probably fully depreciated, and golf course land and land improvements cannot be depreciated(per IRS), I am guessing Trump’s annual depreciation expense is at most $20M. Image
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5 Jul 20
This is stunning new reporting on Wirecard from the @FT. KPMG has an appendix to its April report showing that Wirecard’s core operations were loss-making. All of their “profits” were coming from the Asian TPA business.
(2)This raises so many new questions...Why did Wirecard and/or KPMG not disclose this very material finding in April? This allegation was raised by @FD in 2019, and Braun denied it. Which means by April the Supervisory Board had to know their CEO was lying about material facts.
(3) The German authorities should be taking Eichelmann’s passport at this point, too. He is also now a flight risk.
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13 May 20
Tomorrow Wirecard ($WDI GY) is going to release preliminary 1Q 2020 results, having not released 4Q 2019 financial statements. In over 40 years of investing I cannot ever recall a similar situation. Their auditor, E&Y has not yet signed-off on the 2019 audit. #Unprecedented
Wirecard, as promised, released “preliminary” 1Q numbers (revenues and EBITDA) this morning. The absurdity of this situation beggars belief. A company cannot prepare current financial statements without previous balance sheets, etc. That’s a fact. GY
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20 Apr 20
This CEO is speaking the same corporate gibberish as Ginni Rometty did.
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(3) For the LTM, operating income has dropped to $8,318MM. Current annualized interest is $1,300. At a 21% tax rate, LTM pro forma net income would be $5,540MM, or about $6.20 per share. That is a far cry from $10-12!
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