Let's imagine that elections use all the security measures security people have been advocating: risk-limiting audits, paper ballots, etc. Would people trust the elections more?
Jack would argue no. Most people don't understand this stuff and most of the claims people are making can't be disproven. And are massively bogus already.
Georgia did a full recount on paper ballots and it very much didn't stop people from doubting the election!
Are election security results in vain? The point of election security is to convince the loser they lost.
No! Have to focus on the whole stack, from election infrastructure to campaigns to people and mis/dis-informaton
One takeaway from the talk: the parts of the stack must work in tandem. Can't fight misinformation in a vacuum, but must build on other election security measures.
The voting process
* significant advances in recent years (e.g. paper ballots, risk-limiting audits, end-to-end verifiability)
* research needed in integrating these technologies
* expanding to mail-in voting?
But there's also internet voting
* we can't do it securely today [oh no voatz reference]
* we have to combat malware, authentication etc.
* if we could solve them, that would be great. But in the meantime voting has to be successful for everyone
* can improve accessibility through things like getting ballot online, filling it out, then returning through the mail
Election support systems
* less researched. Probably because they look boring
* Voter registration databases aren't working. Russians breached at least 2 states, targeted all 50 states
* little to no public scrutiny of these systems
* election night reporting -- this is a picture of one where there was a bug in reporting. [It was fixed but freaked a lot of people out]
A lot of the trouble with the security of election support systems is not that we don't know how to do it -- it's that we have to do it
Campaign security
* biggest unknown (see Sunny Consolvo's talk!)
* we must view campaign security as non-partisan and increase resources and services available
Public confidence
* major damage from domestic actors
* widespread mis/dis-information
* technical election security measures helps to debunk rumours floating around
Let's fix election support systems!
* Much of this is applying security things we already know
[ Note: a lot of organizations have this problem 😭 ]
* engage in public research. Have a vuln disclosure policy so people can confidently help
Election security is a problem that can only be solved by working together: elections officials, security people, everyone
[end of talk]
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Next up at #enigma2021, Alex Gaynor from @LazyFishBarrel (satirical security company) will be talking about "QUANTIFYING MEMORY UNSAFETY AND REACTIONS TO IT"
Look for places where there are a lot of security issues being handled one-off rather than fixing the underlying issue
We tried to fix credential phishing mostly by telling people to be smarter, rather than fixing the root cause: people being able to use phished credential.
Zoom's launched end-to-end encryption 5 months after the white paper was published
* prevents eavesdroppers between users who are speaking to each other
* protection against compromised servers
Last talk at #enigma2021 today is @iMeluny speaking about "DA DA: WHAT SHARK CONSERVATION TEACHES US ABOUT EMOTIONALITY AND EFFECTIVE COMMUNICATION STRATEGIES FOR SECURITY AND PRIVACY"
I dreamt of being a shark scientist and worked my ass off to get a scholarship to one of the top programs. My career took a loop, but to this day I find lessons from sharks for security and privacy.
Lessons:
Incidents are emotional
* Risks will never be zero
* Public is ill-informed and fear is common
* science-based policy is not the norn