Thread by @RALee85

This is a misreading of Russian use-of-force decision-making. Domestic opinion influences how and when Russia goes to war, but Putin's approval rating has never been the primary driver. The conflicts with Georgia, Ukraine, and Syria were all driven by more proximate causes.

The 2008 war began when Georgia decided to retake South Ossetia. Russia did a variety of things that led to this, but Saakashvili chose the timing (Putin was in China at the Olympics and the Ru MoD's Main Operational Directorate was moving buildings and was between leaders). 2/

Russia intervened in Ukraine when Yanukovych's position became untenable, and they attempted to salvage something from a foreign policy disaster. That was the cause, not the economic situation in Russia or domestic discontent. 3/

That led to a boost in Putin's approval rating, but that doesn't mean that all wars, particularly ones that are less clearly related to Russian national security, have the same effect. Russia's intervention in Syria has never been that popular, though it isn't unpopular either.4/

Russia intervened in Syria when the Assad regime was getting close to collapsing. There were other factors as well, like breaking out of international isolation and stopping another "Libya" in the region, but the Assad regime's weakness was why Russia intervened when it did. 5/

The Syrian war didn't have the same effect on Putin's approval rating as did the return of Crimea, which is uniquely culturally/historically resonant for Russia. There is also a growing realization that foreign adventurism is achieving diminishing returns for Putin's approval. 6/

Putin demonstrated that Russia is back as a serious global player. That helped his popularity but now domestic issues are more important for his approval rating than foreign policy successes (though a serious failure could be big). And there are no more Crimeas to return. 7/

And the Russian government either lied or has refused to confirm all of the losses of Russian servicemen in the Donbas and Syria, which demonstrates concern about the domestic political implications of these conflicts. 8/

On top of that the Russian military is fairly stretched right now. Russia has had to recently reinforce its forces in NE Syria, Idlib is still a problem, and Russia has to keep a large reserve near the Donbas in case Kyiv attempts to retake the region. A new war wouldn't help. 9/

So there is little reason to suspect a new war would help Putin's approval rating, and would instead be more likely to hurt his popularity. Not to mention, Russian defense spending is declining and Putin knows that he needs to direct more funds to domestic priorities. 10/

I'm not saying that Russia won't become involved in a new war, but Moscow will likely only do so in response to events out of its control somewhere vital to Russian national security. It would be defensive from Russia's perspective and not driven by his approval rating. 11/

I should add, it isn't just that article. Tom Friedman's column yesterday made a similar point about Russia possibly seizing part of the Baltics for domestic political reasons. The evidence from the Putin era simply does not support this suggestion. 12/
nytimes.com/2021/02/02/opi…