I have to say that I am somewhat conflicted on the subject of Russia sanctions. 👇🏿
On the one hand, we know (from ample historical experience) that they do not reverse bad behaviour in the short- to medium- term. On the other hand, in the long term they create a moral framework that makes it possible to tell what bad behaviour actually is.
This actually does help reverse bad behaviour in the long term, since the sanctioned party - for all of its protests - perfectly understands 'who's been naughty', and ultimately seeks to reengage on more acceptable terms. (Case study: Gorbachev).
On the one hand, sanctions tend to worsen the overall relationship, making confrontation more likely. On the other hand, they may also help deter the sanctioned party from making further missteps. While confrontation is easily visible, the deterrent potential remains unknown.
On the one hand, sanctions seemingly frame Russia's opposition as Western lackeys. On the other hand, the regime does not need sanctions to frame the opposition as subservient to the West - it has long been doing it anyway.
On the one hand, sanctions lead to accusations of double standards (since there always others out there that are worse who remain unsanctioned). On the other hand, inconsistent resolve is arguably better than consistent cowardice.
If you are going to start punishing bullies, might as well start with the big kid on the block, especially if that kid has particularly malign influence in the broader region (case study: Belarus).
On the one hand, we are not perfect ourselves - why not start with ourselves instead of sanctioning others? This one is the most difficult of all. I don't quite know how to answer this. Let me try the following:
Drawing red lines externally helps maintain them internally. In this sense, condemning illegal usurpation of power, or violation of human rights in Russia goes some way towards establishing who we are here in Europe.
Sanctions in this sense are not about Russia - they are about ourselves, our values, and our identity.
Discuss.
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Did a lecture today on Stalin and the origins of the Cold War. Here's the difficulty I face as a historian. There's evidence that would suggest that Stalin was *not* single-handedly responsible for the Cold War - that both sides were responsible. Let's just say there's evidence.
But Stalin was such a hideous character that I genuinely struggle to exonerate him. Because of what I know about Stalin outside of this particular context, I am strongly inclined to condemn him in other - in all - contexts.
I was thinking about this today in connection with my take on Putin and Putinism. I recognise that there's evidence (especially going back to the 1990s) that suggests that the West was partially responsible for where we are today with Russia (took two to tango).
A very interesting exchange between the Czechoslovaks and the Soviets in 1965, which shows how Moscow's allies were able to manipulate the Soviets. 1965 was a disastrous year for Czechoslovak agriculture, which Novotny and co (not unexpectedly) blamed on bad weather.
As a result, Czechoslovakia literally ran out of bread. In Sept. 1965 Novotny turned to the Soviet comrades to supply grain but was told that because of bad weather (what else) in the USSR, the Soviet Union was also running short, and had to buy grain in the West.
As a result, the Soviets were able to provide just 400K tons (in place of the promised 800K). After Novotny returned to Prague, he continued to pressure Brezhnev to deliver more grain, hinting that failure to do so might lead to "political concessions" to the United States.
And maybe the last series of remarks on Russia's "divorce" from Europe. Europe should exercise strategic patience. The reality is - however the Russian Eurosceptics try to frame it - quality of life across much of Europe is incomparably better than in Russia.
The possibilities for personal growth, self-actualisation - are all incomparably better. Personal freedoms are much wider than in Russia. Legal protections of individual rights are much stronger. Personal incomes are generally much higher.
Moreover, Putinism is a barren idea. It has nothing to offer to the world, except for the dubious freedom of venting one's racism or homophobia (but it comes with a price of having to keep your mouth shut on Putin's transgressions and of having to join Russia's WWII cult).
Comparisons are being drawn between potential escalation of sanctions against Russia and, say, sanctions against Iran that failed to change Tehran's behaviour and, if anything, had a rally-around-the-flag effect. This is not a particularly valid comparison.
First of all, it is a lot easier to present sanctions against Iran as "unjust." After all, why should Iran be denied a nuclear bomb when others have it? (The same, by the way, applies to North Korea). But in Russia's case we are dealing with something else entirely.
Sanctions are being proposed to penalise Russia for the use of chemical weapons against its own opposition activists; the narrative of "injustice" falls flat here. True, the domestic audiences will still be presented with the familiar line of "the West is trying to keep us down."
On the question of Russia sanctions - and putting on my historian's hat - the following two considerations come to mind. 1) In the short term, sanctions can and do result in a dramatic worsening of relations; 2) in the longer term, they can be useful in changing behaviour. 👇🏿
Let's consider the following interesting example. In 1979 the Soviet leadership considered whether or not to invade Afghanistan. In March 1979, they firmly decided against it, and one of the reasons put forward - I'd argue the crucial reason - was that it would ruin detente.
Of course, by then detente was already on life support but the prospect of a superpower summit (took place in Vienna later that year), plus expectations of breakthroughs in arms control, helped steer the discussion towards non-intervention.
politico.eu/article/estoni…. "When we impose sanctions, some ask after six months, ‘Have they worked?’ And if they haven’t, ‘Remove them because they don’t work.’ But actually it is a longer process."
I'd have to agree with @kajakallas here. Not only is this a longer process - sometimes stretching decades - but the effectiveness of sanctions is often under-appreciated because of the mistaken view that their aim is to reverse bad behaviour.
Often, the aim is to deter the sanctioned party from further missteps (in which case, the effectiveness is hard to prove because one would have to demonstrate that actions that did not take place did not take place *because* of sanctions).