Thread by @simonbchen

For almost a century leading up to 1949, the US economic, social, and religious establishment made tremendous investments of personnel and funds in China, believing that it holds a vast untapped market of virtually boundless potential, whose materialization was predicated upon /1

the transformation of China as a country of democracy, individual freedom, respect for civic and legal values, high population-level attainments in education and standards of living, and amicability with US economic interests. Although this era met an untimely and sudden end /2

in 1949, the aforementioned motivations and intentions were correct and justified. A few decades later, similar investments returned, but with the risky assumption that the end-goal of market access could be achieved without all of the aforementioned predicates. This was /3

a gamble, and the current state of affairs in 2021 ultimately testify to wisdom of that gamble. What about China? On China's side, the current state of affairs is the ultimate consequence of a failed attempt at addressing the tremendous historical legacy of the tumultuous /4

era of 1927-76, from the beginning of Nationalist-communist Civil War to end of Cultural Revolution. Grappling with this legacy will be a necessary burden that China itself must eventually attempt, whether that will take decades or even a century. In the mean time, policy /5

pertaining to how Western organizations should handle their interactions with China in upcoming several decades need to consider 3 dimensions: (i) effecting change, (ii) risk management, and (iii) moral complicity. Many decisions will understandably achieve little in (i), but /6

will nevertheless greatly advance (ii) and (iii) in maintaining common Western and international interests in free and fair exchange congruent with civic and legal values. But (i) ultimately requires China's own historical soul-searching, no matter how long that will take. /end