When it comes to legal restrictions on Holyrood's proceedings on the Scottish Government's handling of sexual harassment complaints - most of the focus has, understandably, has been on the impact of the contempt of court order on a parliamentary process which isn't privileged.
As I indicated a few weeks ago, however, perhaps the most significant legal restriction in play here isn't the order - but s.162 of the Criminal Justice and Licensing Act 2010. Here it is: legislation.gov.uk/asp/2010/13/se…
What is its significance? It says that if material is disclosed to an accused person by the Crown, they can only use or disclose that evidence for the purposes of their criminal defence and any appeals. It is a crime under s.163 to breach this. legislation.gov.uk/asp/2010/13/se…
It is this rule of law - passed when Alex Salmond was First Minister, without any exceptions or qualifications in it - which means he cannot "use or disclose" material turned over to him in the course of his criminal defence for anything else. That much is clear. But -
- you may be asking yourself, if the Crown disclosures established evidence of a wide-ranging conspiracy by some of the complainers to make false allegations of sexual assault, why on earth was this evidence not used in the High Court trial? Here we need to look at another Act.
Under the Criminal Procedure Scotland Act, there are restrictions in place about the evidence which can be led in sexual offence cases. These are in sections 274 and 275 of the 1995 Act. These applied in principle in HMA v Salmond. legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1995/46/…
These rules were introduced to try to prevent accused people instructing their lawyers to explore - amongst other things - the sexual history of people alleging they were victims of sexual offences.
The way these provisions work is that if an accused wishes to lead evidence of a restricted topic, they apply to the Court in advance for a determination. On my understanding, this happened in HMA v Salmond in respect of the evidence he told Holyrood today he cannot disclose.
As I understand it, Lady Dorrian refused to admit this evidence at a preliminary hearing before trial under the s.274 procedure. If this evidence disclosed clear evidence of a conspiracy on the part of one or more of the complainers, this is a difficult decision to understand.
If this evidence disclosed proof of a conspiracy against him, I find it strange that Alex Salmond didn't instruct his lawyers to appeal against Lady Dorrian's decision excluding the evidence before trial. Under s.74 of the 1995 Act, he had this right. legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1995/46/…
Yet no appeal was taken, the evidence wasn't explored at trial & now the ordinary application of s.162 means this evidence cannot be used for any other purpose. If this evidence is compelling, I cannot understand why Lady Dorrian's exclusion of it wasn't vigorously challenged.
Apologies for a long thread - but hopefully an insight into this wider legal context may help to make sense of the legal context within which today's evidence is (and is not) being given.
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In press reports about Salmond's scheduled appearance before Holyrood next week & written evidence, there's a lot of vague references to "legal considerations" informing what can and cannot lawfully be disclosed. For outsiders looking in, here are the most obvious limitations.
Firstly, Holyrood procedures are insulated from the law of defamation in the way publishing elsewhere or holding a press conference would not be. This is in section 41 of the Scotland Act. Parliamentary privilege in Holyrood is a pretty limited compared to Westminster.
In contrast with Westminster, Holyrood proceedings are covered by any orders made under the Contempt of Court Act 1981. One relevant order applies in this case.
Is Bonnington just going to keep churning out articles which get basic facts about the law wrong & suggest he hasn't actually read the legislation he cites? Read s.23 of the Scotland Act. The High Court has no role whatever here. legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1998/46/…) scottishlegal.com/article/alista…
Under s.23, Holyrood has the power to call witnesses on its own authority. Under s.24, a requirement is imposed when the clerk gives notice to the person or body it is imposed on. Under s.25, failure to comply is an offence. No court (nevermind the High Court) is involved.
Basic, basic stuff - the kind of elementary reading of statute any solid LLB student should manage, nevermind someone who continues to identify themselves as an "honorary former law professor."
One of the funniest cases I've ever heard of concerned a man accused of impersonating a police officer. A thread. This chap had been out for a few too many pints & decided to take a cab home. Disaster! Mid-journey, he discovers he doesn't have the cash on him to cover the fare.
So what does he do? Confesses to the driver, who punts him out on the street. Consumed by guilt about the ride he's stolen from the taxi driver, our drunken hero decides to turn himself in to the police. He seeks out the local police station - and finds it locked up tight.
This week, Holyrood finally recognised the right of prisoners serving terms of less than 12 months in jail to vote. And not before time - 15 years after the ECHR ruled the UK's blanket ban was disproportionate. In other countries this is uncontroversial. thenational.scot/news/18254991.…
Although the Government argue they've been forced by law to do this - which is substantially true - Labour and the SNP have clearly been on a bit of a political journey on this issue. Reading the official report, this didn't sound like pinching your nose & taking your medicine.
As recently as 2013, MSPs excluded all prisoners from the #indyref franchise, leading to the Moohan case in the UK Supreme Court. (The Justices, by majority, said this was lawful beause the right to vote under the ECHR doesn't extend to referendums). supremecourt.uk/cases/docs/uks…
Tend to agree with this. It is worth remembering what precisely the UK Supreme Court - as opposed to the partisan spin - decided was wrong with the original scheme, when it was challenged by the Christian Institute.
The legal challenge was mounted under Article 8 of the ECHR - the right to privacy and a family life. This is a cruicial right, but it is not an unlimited one under the Convention, for obvious reasons.
If states wish to interfere with ECHR rights of this kind, they must demonstrate 3 things. One: a legitimate aim. Two: the interference is "according to law" - has an adequate legal basis. And three: that it is "necessary in a democratic society". Which is to say: proportionate.
Several media reports from the Court of Session getting WAAAY ahead of themselves, by suggesting Lord Doherty knocked back the substance of the challenge to the lawfulness of proroguing Westminster today. Not so. This morning, he refused only to issue an interim interdict.
Headlines like "Boris Johnson can prorogue parliament, Scottish judge rules" are extremely misleading. (Though the first instance judge may well reach this conclusion next week).