These (by @hayward_katy and @NashSGC) have set me thinking about Brexit and the NI Protocol in a new way.
The EU has had to be, and will continue to be, *reactive* in the Brexit process. And it is difficult to assess how to react when faced with the UK Govt. THREAD 1/11
The EU has had to be, and will continue to be, *reactive* in the Brexit process. And it is difficult to assess how to react when faced with the UK Govt. THREAD 1/11
https://twitter.com/syrpis/status/1367797075027574786
The EU's first choice would (I think) have been that the UK did not choose to leave the EU, but rather worked within EU structures. But, it was the UK's sovereign choice to leave, and choose to leave it did. 2/
The question was then how to manage the process of Brexit. The integrity of the single market, and the protection of the GFA, quickly emerged as the EU's primary aims. 3/
The EU knew that there were a range of choices available to the UK (staircases etc).
The easiest path to 'de-dramatisation' was via continuing membership of the single market and customs union. But, the UK chose not to take that path. 4/
The easiest path to 'de-dramatisation' was via continuing membership of the single market and customs union. But, the UK chose not to take that path. 4/
With the UK outside the single market, it was inevitable that there would be borders between the UK and the EU. The EU (and Ireland and the UK) were all determined that there should be no hard border across Ireland. 5/
The various backstop proposals were attempts to manage this. May's deal created (some) UK/EU alignment. That was rejected by Johnson, whose deal created NI/EU alignment. 6/
The NI Protocol avoids a hard border in Ireland, and protects the integrity of the single market.
Crucially, it does so by creating obligations *for the UK* to increase the border checks between GB and NI. 7/
Crucially, it does so by creating obligations *for the UK* to increase the border checks between GB and NI. 7/
This was all agreed over a year ago. The difficult compromises involve in reaching agreement were acknowledged on all sides.
But, it is obvious that the UK is not ready. It has not fulfilled its side of the bargain. 8/
But, it is obvious that the UK is not ready. It has not fulfilled its side of the bargain. 8/
Once again, the EU faces a choice about how to react.
Not for the first time, it is seeing evidence that the UK Govt is not to be trusted. 9/
Not for the first time, it is seeing evidence that the UK Govt is not to be trusted. 9/
It is quite predictable that the crisis will deepen. Or that today's problems will be eased, only for others to surface in the coming weeks and months.
*If* the UK continues not to comply with the NI Protocol, the EU will face difficult choices. 10/
*If* the UK continues not to comply with the NI Protocol, the EU will face difficult choices. 10/
Quite simply, absent the cooperation of the UK, it is not at all easy to see how the EU's aims (re the integrity of the single market and no hard border in Ireland) can both be met. 11/11
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