People talk about global 'influence' like its something magical, but if a country has economic power, politicians in smaller countries are going to take its side, and those people are going to rely on talking points it supplies. This is what America has, nothing else.
America's global influence works kind of like a sales organization. It has representatives all over the world, in both the public and private sector. They try to push whatever America is selling. The US media, think tanks, etc, supply the arguments or scripts they use.
The US has largely enjoyed a uncontested territory of influence since the fall of the USSR. America peddlers dominate global politics. But we already see the signs that this is changing, increasingly they're becoming more desperate and turning to more underhanded practices.
Cultural 'power' depends on this kind of influence, not vice versa. Hollywood and US brands dominate not because of their intrinsic qualities but because US dealmakers dominate. Influence will decline with relative economic power and cultural significance will decline with both.
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If you look at the US 'empire' as a network of institutions, you can understand 'democratization' and 'state-building' through this lens. The goal is to create a political environment where US-affiliated institutions can gain entry and then to ensure that they set the agenda.
Liberal democracy requires a set of private institutions to function. These present themselves as 'independent' but actually form a network centered on a handful of unaccountable elites. The US seeks to 'spread democracy' because this is the ideal for spreading US influence.
Under liberal democracy, the goal is to create a 'vibrant civil society', which is just to gain entry for and establish the dominance of institutions that will represent US interests. These are either directly owned and controlled by the US or by US-friendly local elites.
There’s essentially three categories of ‘moral code’ in modern society and each is adopted based on the adherent’s relationship to the legal system. The dominant one is essentially a set of heuristics for staying out of trouble if you’re middle-class: don’t lie, cheat, steal.
If your relationship to the legal system is dominated by being policed or experiencing the court system ‘from below’, for whatever reason, then the moral code is a set of heuristics for staying out of trouble given those circumstances: most importantly, ‘don’t snitch’.
If you’re rich and have good access to the legal system, then you don’t really need a ‘moral code’ as such, you just consult a lawyer directly. You can afford to conform to the ‘word of the law’ rather than rely on heuristics.
'Soft power' is more a matter of personnel than skill. America's 'soft power' comes from the presence of its apologists in other countries, who repeat its message, attack its enemies, etc. This has two important consequences: (1) it's adversarial; (2) it can decline rapidly.
'Soft power' is adversarial because it's about getting your view of events heard over others, but if your position becomes increasingly practically untenable (as your power declines), then your advocates increasingly just become loudmouthed liabilities.
This is why 'soft power' can decline rapidly: as other forms of (relative) power decline, your advocates around the world become liabilities to their hosts rather than assets. All that has to happen then, for a widespread collapse, is for those countries to switch personnel.
I've been saying for a long time that censorship will get stronger as US relative power declines, since the West has less overt censorship solely because it is hegemonic, and that has obviously been happening. But Western propaganda is also getting cruder for the same reason.
Since it's getting easier for other countries to tell their own stories, both because of declining US relative power and lower costs of entry, it's no longer possible for the US and allies to rely on being the world's de facto source of truth. The result is cruder narratives.
Given these dynamics, the obvious play for countries like China and Russia is to push the message that the US and its allies aren't exceptional. They aren't especially free or trustworthy. They're just regular countries. This is now difficult to counter without proving the point.
Under capitalism, society is organized into what you might call ‘consumption brigades’. These are various organized hobbies, fandoms, lifestyles, etc, that people can subscribe to. Membership of one often predicts likelihood of membership of another, forming clusters.
Consumption is highly organized under capitalism, usually at the ‘industry’ level (e.g., video games) but sometimes individual enterprises operate their own ‘consumption brigades’ (Apple, Disney-Marvel, etc). Products are often updated annually or released according to schedule.
Much attention is given to advertising, but the real work is done in the magazines, websites, YouTube channels, etc, that serve each consumption brigade. The ‘informed‘ consumer regularly gorges himself on such materials in order to know what purchases he should be making.
The most important question in economics is why the nation-state isn’t just organized as one big, administered enterprise (i.e., a form of state socialism). The usual answers take ‘the market’ to be normative and talk about ‘inefficiencies’, but this is misguided.
You can flip the issue around and avoid taking ‘the market’ as the default: every economy would be one big, administered enterprise; the convoluted structure we call the ‘market economy’ appears due to ‘state intervention’; specifically laws of property, trust, etc.
The ‘varieties of capitalism’ are actually varieties of (state) socialism. Different countries have more or less convoluted administrative structures (i.e., further from default managerialism) depending the degree to which policy has been informed by the discipline of economics.