There’s essentially three categories of ‘moral code’ in modern society and each is adopted based on the adherent’s relationship to the legal system. The dominant one is essentially a set of heuristics for staying out of trouble if you’re middle-class: don’t lie, cheat, steal.
If your relationship to the legal system is dominated by being policed or experiencing the court system ‘from below’, for whatever reason, then the moral code is a set of heuristics for staying out of trouble given those circumstances: most importantly, ‘don’t snitch’.
If you’re rich and have good access to the legal system, then you don’t really need a ‘moral code’ as such, you just consult a lawyer directly. You can afford to conform to the ‘word of the law’ rather than rely on heuristics.
They’re also learned in different ways: the ‘middle-class moral code’ is learned primarily through media representations of justice, the ‘code of the street’ through word of mouth (and sometime ritual), and the ‘way of the wealthy’ through professional consultation.
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'Soft power' is more a matter of personnel than skill. America's 'soft power' comes from the presence of its apologists in other countries, who repeat its message, attack its enemies, etc. This has two important consequences: (1) it's adversarial; (2) it can decline rapidly.
'Soft power' is adversarial because it's about getting your view of events heard over others, but if your position becomes increasingly practically untenable (as your power declines), then your advocates increasingly just become loudmouthed liabilities.
This is why 'soft power' can decline rapidly: as other forms of (relative) power decline, your advocates around the world become liabilities to their hosts rather than assets. All that has to happen then, for a widespread collapse, is for those countries to switch personnel.
I've been saying for a long time that censorship will get stronger as US relative power declines, since the West has less overt censorship solely because it is hegemonic, and that has obviously been happening. But Western propaganda is also getting cruder for the same reason.
Since it's getting easier for other countries to tell their own stories, both because of declining US relative power and lower costs of entry, it's no longer possible for the US and allies to rely on being the world's de facto source of truth. The result is cruder narratives.
Given these dynamics, the obvious play for countries like China and Russia is to push the message that the US and its allies aren't exceptional. They aren't especially free or trustworthy. They're just regular countries. This is now difficult to counter without proving the point.
Under capitalism, society is organized into what you might call ‘consumption brigades’. These are various organized hobbies, fandoms, lifestyles, etc, that people can subscribe to. Membership of one often predicts likelihood of membership of another, forming clusters.
Consumption is highly organized under capitalism, usually at the ‘industry’ level (e.g., video games) but sometimes individual enterprises operate their own ‘consumption brigades’ (Apple, Disney-Marvel, etc). Products are often updated annually or released according to schedule.
Much attention is given to advertising, but the real work is done in the magazines, websites, YouTube channels, etc, that serve each consumption brigade. The ‘informed‘ consumer regularly gorges himself on such materials in order to know what purchases he should be making.
The most important question in economics is why the nation-state isn’t just organized as one big, administered enterprise (i.e., a form of state socialism). The usual answers take ‘the market’ to be normative and talk about ‘inefficiencies’, but this is misguided.
You can flip the issue around and avoid taking ‘the market’ as the default: every economy would be one big, administered enterprise; the convoluted structure we call the ‘market economy’ appears due to ‘state intervention’; specifically laws of property, trust, etc.
The ‘varieties of capitalism’ are actually varieties of (state) socialism. Different countries have more or less convoluted administrative structures (i.e., further from default managerialism) depending the degree to which policy has been informed by the discipline of economics.
The idea that America ‘has no culture’ and that it’s culture is merely the result of commercialism or naturally-occurring hedonism is employed to mask the sheer quantity of violence and coercion it has taken to spread that culture worldwide.
The presence of American culture is often taken to be the mark of freedom in other countries. “Before the authoritarians came, people were listening to American music and wearing American style dress and observing American mores.“ Because what else would free people do?
‘Freedom‘, then, merely means creating the kind of environment where American corporations and media can dominate. Free trade, free markets, the free press, etc, are all legal constructs that favor large American incumbents over local suppliers of goods and services.
Academia in the liberal West is controlled by appeals to ‘agency’, ‘pluralism’, and ‘political relevance’. These are every bit as dogmatic as the ideological demands placed on academia by ‘authoritarian’ societies. ‘Academic freedom’ is the project of imposing them.
The concepts used to control discourse, to ensure its liberal content - that it must make space for agency, pluralism, and political relevance - are also realized within the academy itself, so that the academy is expected to exemplify these concepts, rendering them incontestable.
This is the circularity of ‘academic freedom’. It is defined as the academy exemplifying liberal values, which ultimately amounts to it enforcing liberal ideology on its members. This is no different from the academy enforcing any other ideology, it just has better branding.