One of the most common questions we get around EIP-1559 is how predictable the price of getting into the next block will be. Or in other words, how often will you able to pay the current basefee + minimum tip compared to the system degrading to today’s first-price auction (FPA)?
First, a quick excursion: Why do blockchains need to put a price on scarce resources anyway? 1) To maximize user welfare (allocate resources to those who gets the most utility from them) 2) To minimize the social cost txns have on other nodes
To cap the social cost, Ethereum currently puts a hard gas limit of 12.5m on blocks. As of right now, the marginal price of each unit of gas is around 120 Gwei. In other words, at a marginal price of 120 Gwei, there is 12.5m gas worth of demand to transact.
EIP-1559 *effectively* removes the current fixed cap on quantity and instead fixes the price of transacting. That price—the basefee—updates automatically to target the same 12.5m quantity of gas consumed as today.
There is still a hard cap set as 2x the current gas target (so 25m gas), but this cap—called the gas limit, same as today—now only exists to prevent DoS attacks on nodes.
One consequence of this change is that blocks will almost never be full. The only time where this doesn’t hold is when demand to transact at the current price rises very fast to exceed the new maximum of 2 * the gas target (currently 25m gas).
When that happens, the system degrades to the first-price auction we know today. But with every consecutive block mined, basefee will rapidly rise until the point where demand is once again below 25m gas. (Actually, it will keep rising until demand is exacly 12.5m gas)
So this shows it can only happen temporarily at the transition from normal demand -> burst demand. It’s not possible to know how common FPAs will be in the future, but our intuition is “very rare”. Most likely sub 5% of all blocks, and probably more like sub 1%.
This means that 95-99%+ of the time, users will simply be able to pay the quoted price and reliably get their transaction mined in the next block.
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It is absolutely mental how many famous Bitcoin evangelists reject coordination problems as a concept. Why? If they admitted that coordination problems exist, they'd also validate their possible solutions, e.g. a central government, or above that, an international order.
However, that thinking is incredibly short-sighted. It's possible to admit that coordination problems exist AND that we need better solutions than central parties. Bitcoin itself is such a solution. But that opens another can of worms...
If they admitted that a rule-based system, enforced by cryptography and economic incentives, are a useful to solution to anything else than digital gold, they'd risk also validating Defi and at least a few other altcoins... oops
"It seems to me that Bitcoin has succeeded in crossing the line from being a highly speculative idea that could well not be around in short order to probably being around and probably having some value in the future." (p1)
Dalio challenges the idea that Bitcoin is as scarce as people think, since there is an unlimited number of "Bitcoin-like assets". More innovative coins can probably carve out their own demand, and arguably we are already seeing that today. (p1)
Though Dalio knows about the ability to hold coins in cold storage, he's still concerned about the ability to shield them against cyber attacks and hold them securely. He warns that increasing digitization also increases systemic risk. (p2)
Most people in crypto are used to thinking about inflation as a purely social or monetary design choice. But a cryptocurrency's inflation rate is also a lever to shift the volatility of demand between having a predictable cost for users OR a predictable level of security.
In the future, inflation in Bitcoin will go to zero, and miners are paid only with transaction fees. Since demand is uncertain, the size of the miner reward (and hence network security) is unpredictable.
In Ethereum, validators are paid primarily with inflation, establishing a predictable floor for security. Inflation can be offset by deflation from burning transaction fees. But demand to transact is once again uncertain, making the total inflation rate is unpredictable.
Fixed supply of shares is a really dumb concept for pseudo-equity. Projects need to be able to mint more shares if they want to invest in growth, as well as buy back shares if they think they are underpriced.
That said, it's not necessarily the right thing to do for Yearn. As I've said many times before, my biggest problem with the project (and reason I sold) is that I don't see enough urgency to build vaults and strategies that users actually want.
Diluting existing equity holders would likely exacerbate the problem as it makes generating cashflows even less urgent.
2) Lots of people were speculating what it means for two protocols (such as Yearn X Cream) to "merge"/partner with each other. This is an unexpected advantage as Yearn vaults will be able to borrow for free.
3) Being whitelisted is a big advantage so maybe to qualify and align incentives future candidates will have to hold CREAM tokens in their treasury.
This is gonna be my last comment on ETH2 staking. Since many ppl have attacked me after projecting a position that I never actually argued for (incl. some nasty PMs - tyvm) I will clarify what I do and don't think:
1) I *don't* think locking ETH in the deposit contract necessarily constitutes a sale. I won‘t be shocked if the IRS argues that it does. But I sure as hell would first try to convince them of the opposite
2) There will be two versions of ETH on most exchanges (ETH + stakedETH, ETH2, beaconETH, whatever you want to call it). There will be many versions of ETH in the market as a whole.
3) If you receive such a liquid staking token, that is most likely a tax event.