"Given what we’ve been through over the past year, you’d imagine that governments are already working to tighten up international regulation of pathogens." This is a big issue that ain't getting the kind of attention it deserves. washingtonpost.com/opinions/2021/…
"You might assume there’s an international organization filled with well-educated bureaucrats and scientists in Brussels or Geneva that is busy conducting rigorous spot checks of virus research labs to ensure they’re up to code."
"But it turns out the real story isn’t comforting at all...When it comes to studying, tampering with or producing new viruses, the international system is the Wild West."
"It’s high time we put a sheriff in charge.
One person who has thought a lot about who that sheriff might be is @FilippaLentzos, a senior lecturer in science and international security at King’s College London...And what she has to say isn’t reassuring."
"There are no international regulations [on those labs]. There’s no set international law that they have to follow. There's nobody checking what they're doing. There are no inspectors, no regulators. There's none of that.”
“You cannot track them because there’s not even an official international list of global BSL-4 labs,” she explains.
"Lentzos is working on a project to create a comprehensive list, the first step in pushing for greater oversight. But her list keeps getting longer."
"Lentzos has therefore advocated for a series of reforms to govern labs that work on dangerous pathogens with pandemic potential." kcl.ac.uk/news/act-now-t…
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So just to be clear: the road to the mine, where SARS-CoV-2's closest relative was collected, has been blocked. Surveillance cameras are all over the place, and people have been arrested for getting close to the mine.
"We need to see biological hazards as an existential threat to the 21st century in the same way that atomic science was to the 20th century” ft.com/content/e625f1…
"While chemical facilities are closely monitored by the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, there is no such designated body to police biological labs."
"The biological weapons convention says you should adhere to these rules, you should follow these guidelines and if there's an accident, you should report it, but people have only paid lip service to that”
Dangerous Practices of Sovereign Science: "Little has been done to alter a pattern in which scientists decide for themselves what risky research is warranted, and confront controversy only after the work is done and disseminated." somatosphere.net/forumpost/dang…
“When outsiders have raised concerns, scientific experts have tended to dismiss them as expressions of ignorance. Ambivalence from within science tends to be suppressed lest it imply to outsiders that science cannot adequately regulate itself.”
"Was the virus that has wrecked such damage on humanity brought into being upon a laboratory bench? The simple fact of the matter is, the established norms of international scientific make this scenario plausible."
In 2019, EcoHealth Alliance, for the first time, made a wire transfer of $195K to the Institute of Microbiology, CAS.
It's the same institute which was leading the CAS Special Project "Pathogen Host Adaptation and Immune Intervention". ecohealthalliance.org/wp-content/upl…
"To the puzzlement of some overseas experts, China’s authorities seemingly failed to follow up with this testing in supply routes (for animals sold in Wuhan market) leading back to farms and animal breeders in certain regions of the country."
"I was a bit surprised that this work that you would expect to be done hasn’t been done" said @YanzhongHuang.
Daniel Lucey of Georgetown University in Washington said it was “frankly implausible” that such testing had not been done.
What more surprising is why some experts still believe the wet market theory holds up, when the earliest cases weren't even directly linked to the market, and China CDC itself abandoned the market origin theory.