One thing that merits reflection when looking at the situation at the border is whether the Trump policy regime would have permanently deterred migrants from arriving at the border. And this is where the EU-Turkey deal, which sought to slow migration to Europe, is instructional
The plan slowed down migration to the EU. However, its viability came into question in 2020 as the terms of the deal weren't being implemented - including issues over payments to Turkey to support it - which created significant frustrations for Turkey reuters.com/article/us-syr…
Migrants also began making their way to Europe, albeit through dangerous routes through the Mediterranean rather than the land route. In response, EU member states like Italy and Greece began taking hardline measures against the docking of these boats ecfr.eu/special/mappin…
The reliance on other countries to serve as interdiction states to stop migration and closing off asylum access does not permanently deter immigration. Instead, it prompts individuals to take dangerous routes and remains at the mercy of partner countries to maintain these regimes
Now a second Trump term could have seen him reject effort of MX and the CentAm countries to cancel the ACAs, MPP, or refuse Title 42 expulsions. But Mexico's law that prohibits detention for child and family migrants would have been an opening salvo against Title 42 expulsions
And it's an open question whether the current situation in CentAm would have led more people to find increasingly more dangerous routes to the US, including evading CBP officers like migrants did from the 70s to mid-2010s or looking at sea routes to enter nytimes.com/2021/02/03/mag…
Either way, the EU case shows that endless deterrence is not effective long-term governance. You need a comprehensive regional plan that creates positive and negative incentives to manage migration. The Biden admin gets this, but we'll see if they can implement this vision soon
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One thing that strikes me in these op-eds is their retconning of the history of 45's border policies. Rather than implementing a clear policy vision, the admin threw policies restricting asylum access against the wall hoping they would survive lawsuits politico.com/news/magazine/…
I spoke with someone at PRM while writing about the ACAs and they said that my analysis assumed that the admin crafted the policy through a careful process, which stood at odds with the reality it simply was looking for any route to produce policies that restricted asylum
However, Lowry's piece present 45's border policies as a coherent set of policies, which is deeply misleading when criticizing a new admin with a clear policy vision for managing migration in the region and an understanding of the measures needed to address the current challenges
It's good that @MichelleObama noted the impact of ZTP, but the public discourse around the admin's border policy needs to catch up with its evolution since June 2018. Here's every policy that I've written about at @BPC_Bipartisan so folks at home can keep track of these changes
Let's start with my September 2019 overview of what the Trump admin had implemented through that month since the end of ZTP. This included MPP, the Asylum Bans, and Metering, and ending Flores bipartisanpolicy.org/blog/the-trump…
But MPP merited a much deeper dive, so I decided to look at publicly available data - including ones from @TRACReports who has been invaluable here - to see how the program expanded significantly in 2019 bipartisanpolicy.org/blog/the-end-o…
I've been thinking about why these issues haven't produced a winder backlash and have 2 theories. First, most Americans do not interact with the immigration system - including the adjudicative parts - in the same manner as they do with the health care, education, and tax ones
As a thought exercise, imagine if the financial problems plaguing USCIS hit the IRS. There's no doubt that the public and Congress would push to address the issue and examine why the agency went into deep debt because it would impact a broader swath of the American public
Given that the Americans who interact with the immigration system like spouses and employers form a small group, USCIS' financial woes have a limited impact on the public. As a result, it's harder to get the public to care about this issue, especially in the midst of the pandemic
This memo makes it a lot harder for children to access citizenship through the derivation process by limiting residency to time spent in the U.S. in a dwelling, a population that includes children residing abroad with parents who are U.S. gov't or armed forces employees
The memo accomplishes this goal in three ways. First it applies the INA’s definition of residency for naturalization, which is an individual’s dwelling, to the process of granting non-citizen children access to citizenship through derivation
Second, it applies this residency definition to the derivation requirement that “the child is residing in the United States in the legal and physical custody of the U.S. citizenship parent.” Residing now refers back to the definition of residence, namely an individual’s dwelling