1/6: THREAD ... Some of my recent work on the future of Taiwan's economic competitiveness ... Five easy pieces:
2/6: Taiwan’s innovation advantage is in danger of eroding. My dive into why it needs a revitalized and broadened strategy, more diverse investments in human capital and next-generation industries, and forward-looking partnerships, not least with the U.S.: carnegieendowment.org/2020/01/29/ass…
3/6: Taiwan needs to look not just to the energy it needs right now but also to the energy it will need 10-20 years from now if it is to power its future. My study of two paradigmatic transformation that are especially relevant to Taiwan’s energy future: carnegieendowment.org/2020/04/27/ove…
4/6: My look with Barbara Weisel at some trade policy options for Taipei and Washington. A bilateral trade pact would be welcome, but laying the groundwork will take time and the two sides risk losing momentum. So we propose a faster and broader approach: carnegieendowment.org/2021/03/04/dee…
5/6: Its international space is squeezed. But I argue with
@MikeNelson that Taiwan can shape standard setting because private sector– and engineer-led groups do the real work that shapes the business environment and determines which technologies prevail: carnegieendowment.org/2021/03/09/how…
6/6: Data: If Taiwan can position itself as a trusted manager of sensitive, high-quality healthcare data, it could attract clinical trials from global pharmaceutical companies as therapies currently in the pipeline are brought to market: foreignpolicy.com/2020/06/01/tai…

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More from @EvanFeigenbaum

15 Nov 20
1: Long thread follows … A lot of the commentary on RCEP today, some of which disses it as a minimalist trade deal, misses the point. If you’re American, you can’t just look at it while ignoring the larger context of 25 years of change in Asia.
2. The problem, especially for the American strategic class (of which I am a card-carrying member), is threefold:
3: The first strategic problem is that American power in this region has been premised on both security and economic pillars ...
Read 28 tweets
20 Aug 19
1/6: Thanks, and agree 100%, so it's not a rejoinder but a fact. Sadly, the US doesn't coordinate that especially well anymore. More important, I've argued over many years that the US seems oblivious to longer-term structural changes, in Asia especially, altering the landscape.
2/6: From 2011 (before the Belt and Road existed or Xi Jinping had yet taken power): Some of the writing of a more integrated Asia was already on the wall. I explored why the US had lost the plot in this essay, "Why America No Longer Gets Asia" in @TWQgw: csis-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/le…
@TWQgw 3/6: From 2009: Two decades of post-Asian Financial Crisis ideas threatened to marginalize the US (or alter its role without major adaptations from Washington). I explored with @Rmanning4 in this @CFR_org monograph on "The United States in the New Asia": cfr.org/asia-and-pacif…
Read 6 tweets
18 Aug 19
1. Thread ... I want to make a small China/FDI and Belt and Road comment, prompted by reading a few more pieces that dismiss the significance of the thing on grounds that China's pledges "don't add up" and its pledge numbers are "fake." This is a caveat from anecdotal experience.
2: In many places of the place where China Inc. or Chinese entities invest, I don’t think aggregate capital flows are a sufficient measure for understanding impact, real or prospective.
3: There are plenty of countries where the numbers aren’t large—and are often (much) smaller than advertised by the propaganda organs— but where China is either one of a very few outside investors or where global capital flows simply haven’t had an especially meaningful impact.
Read 12 tweets
23 Jul 19
1: A long thread from me on US-China relations and local realities. This terrific and timely @nytimes article on Chinese investment in the US captures something crucial. For years, trade was contentious, investment less so. But that has changed utterly. nyti.ms/2JHLpar
2: Trade was contentious because it fueled an intuitive sense among some Americans that US-China interaction had become unbalanced. You can hear this in much of President Trump's rhetoric about unfair trade at his rallies. He also deployed it to effect in his run for President.
3: But investment *used* to be less contentious because it could mean jobs in the US, not China, jobs for Americans, not for Chinese. Put bluntly, it appeared to be a vote of confidence in America and in the US economy. Invest here, some said, and you "pay America a compliment."
Read 23 tweets
15 Jun 19
1. Thread: Some recent articles highlight Qian Xuesen, the Chinese rocket pioneer who everyone tends to bring up when they wish to reference how past US policies of pressure/expulsion led to deportations/emigration of US-trained or US-based experts who then built China's science.
2: Qian wasn't alone, so it's worth noting how many of China's strategic weapons science and engineering pioneers returned there from the United States.
3: Or they returned to China from education, study, research, or service in Europe, often in the mid-to-late 1940s and before the Chinese Communist Party took power. Much of China's post-1949 science and engineering relied on prior interchange with the United States and Europe.
Read 15 tweets
2 Feb 19
1: And these countries often leverage major power competition to their own advantage, which is something that is too often ignored because of the presumption that they have no agency.
2: The thing is, it's important to consider the circumstances — developmental and political — that face them, not us.
3: My experience, especially around China’s periphery, is that almost no policymakers find all aspects of “our” model or the “Chinese” model, such as it is, 100% appealing, 100% the right “fit” to their circumstances, or 100% applicable to the actual challenges they face.
Read 10 tweets

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