Thread by @LawDavF

Thread on UK nuclear weapons policy. Be patient. Quite long.

The statement in the review on UK nuclear policy is the most comprehensive for some time, although it requires careful reading. It largely reaffirms existing policy. 1/

Most important announcement is the increase in the nuclear stockpile from 180 to no more than 260 warheads. The number derives from the maximum that can be deployed if two subs are on patrol. 16 missiles per boat; 8 warheads per missile; two boats on patrol. 16 x 8 x 2 = 256. 2/

Until 1998 UK kept stockpile a secret. Indeed after his announcement later on says UK will ‘no longer give public figures for our operational stockpile, deployed warhead or deployed missile numbers.’ So most of the time deployed numbers will be well short of this maximum. 3/

If there will be more than one of the new Dreadnought Class subs on patrol more often, post 2030, this will be as important an increase in capability as extra warheads. 4/

Points out that still lowest stockpile of any declared nuclear state and that others increasing their numbers. But given the devastation individual weapons can cause still not clear why would need more warheads. 5/

Best explanation lies in reference to other states (ie Russia) having ‘warfighting’ nuclear systems integrated ‘into their military strategies and doctrines and into their political rhetoric to seek to coerce others.’ 6/

The implication is larger stockpile is to have capacity so that Trident can be counter to both Russian short-range systems for use on European battlefield as well as longer-range missiles that threaten homelands. 7/

Such scenarios are speculative to say the least, but this is a way of stressing UK nuclear commitment to European and not just national security. 8/

This is strongly underlined in review, and potentially of relevance in debates, such as that encouraged by President Macron, to greater European strategic autonomy. The review contains a positive reference to cooperation with France. 9/

The review makes a virtue of deliberately ambiguity ‘about precisely when, how and at what scale we would contemplate the use of nuclear weapons’. 10/

It refers to possible need to respond to ‘weapons of mass destruction, such as chemical and biological capabilities, or emerging technologies that could have a comparable impact’. /11

At same time says it would only use nuclear weapons ‘only in extreme circumstances of self-defence, including the defence of our NATO Allies.’ So that implies that these other threats could be as extreme as nuclear threats, which currently seems unlikely. /12

Still leaves hanging the problem of extended deterrence. This is difficult enough for US but possibly even greater for UK. Would the UK retaliate if nuclear strike against, say a Baltic state? Would it retaliate of the impact came from biological weapons or cyberattacks? /13

You can see why easier to stick with ambiguity because clarity would not necessarily be reassuring to allies. /14

Warhead increase will be criticised with ref to Art VI of Non-Proliferation Treaty which requires negotiations on arms control and disarmament measures. This is ‘good faith’ provision. As review notes other nuclear powers are also increasing their arsenals.

Review endorses ‘the long-term goal of a world without nuclear weapons. We continue to work for the preservation and strengthening of effective arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation measures’. /16

It adds ‘there is no credible alternative route to nuclear disarmament.’ This presumably is the way to dismiss the current efforts to get states to sign up to the ‘Treaty on the prohibition of nuclear weapons.’/17

No reference to the demise of the Intermediate Nuclear Forces Treaty. Presumably in a new multilateral forum UK and France will be drawn in (and extra warheads give some scope for later reductions?). But this is not discussed. /18

Important and sensible reference at end to need to work on reducing risk of nuclear conflict and enhancing mutual trust and security, reducing risk of misinterpretation and miscalculation./19

‘The UK takes its responsibilities as a nuclear weapon state seriously and will continue to encourage other states to do likewise.’ This will cover ensuring security of stockpiles and reliable command and control procedures, and crisis management measures./END