A few key points made in the ODNI.
1. "People linked to Russian intelligence," although unnamed here, laundered influence narratives by getting them covered in U.S. outlets and regurgitated by "prominent US individuals," including Trump affiliates.
1. "People linked to Russian intelligence," although unnamed here, laundered influence narratives by getting them covered in U.S. outlets and regurgitated by "prominent US individuals," including Trump affiliates.
2. The election infrastructure targeting was on a much smaller scale than in 2016 and appears to have been intent on data-harvesting, not rigging results (a hard thing to do).
3. This is awkwardly worded because it can be read that Kilimnik is "connected" to the FSB; he's almost certainly GRU given his background.
4. No surprise here.
Today might be a good day to re-up this piece: newlinesmag.com/reportage/you-…
We have some open source examples of how influence narratives were laundered through Western sources -- in this case, unwitting ones. Remember PeaceData, the fake news site Prigozhin's IRA created? It hired American freelancers to write for it: nytimes.com/2020/09/01/tec…
Prigozhin's network also created a right-wing counterpart fake news site called the Newsroom for American and European Based Citizens. Lot of cross-posting, some original commissions: reuters.com/article/usa-el…
And the GRU even manufactured a fake news website of its own -- in English. When caught, it wrote a self-parody essay about being a GRU spy, which wasn't half-bad!
https://twitter.com/michaeldweiss/status/1293555213857632256
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