Thread by @Olivia_Gazis

Declassified US intel assessment of 2020 election shows Russia's foreign influence playbook a) was only marginally changed; b) was adopted selectively by other adversaries & challengers; c) will continue being used unless the cost/benefit calculus changes

dni.gov/files/ODNI/doc…

A few things:

The classified version of this assessment was completed and given to USG stakeholders on January 7, 2021; it draws from information made available to the IC during the Trump administration

It includes guidance on election "influence" versus "interference," two terms that had been used interchangeably and to at times confusing effect:

Its judgments on the activities of Russia, China and Iran are all presented with “high confidence”; a dissenting view on China is presented with “moderate confidence” (more on that below)

(The candidate preferences of foreign actors were the source of much pre-election controversy; top Dems said ODNI’s statements at the time created a “false sense of equivalence” among China, Russia & Iran which, they said, showed “unequal intent, motivation & capability”)

Like the 2017 ICA before it, this one makes no assessment of what effect any activities described may have had on the election outcome; in Key Judgment 1 it says there was no indication any technical aspect of the voting process was altered or manipulated by any foreign actor

Key judgment 2: As he had done in 2016 for Clinton, Putin authorized “influence operations” aimed at denigrating Biden’s candidacy while boosting Trump’s; this time the IC says a “key element” was using proxies to push unsubstantiated allegations against Biden to US entities

e.g., Ukrainian legislator Andriy Derkach was under Putin’s “purview,” and, along with Konstantin Kilimnik - whom SSCI identified as a Russian intelligence officer – “sought to use prominent US persons and media conduits to launder their narratives to US officials and audiences”

Russia’s Internet Research Agency –whose operatives were sanctioned & indicted by USG & taken offline by Cyber Command– is alive and well. The IC found it “amplified controversial domestic issues.” Moscow-linked influence actors also “generally promoted...Trump & his commentary”

The assessment says “Moscow will continue election influence efforts” because a weaker US helps Russia; because it believes US meddles similarly in Russian affairs; and because influence poses a “manageable risk” given relations are “already extremely poor”

Key Judgment 3: Iran’s Supreme Leader authorized a multi-pronged, overt/covert campaign to “intended to undercut…Trump’s reelection prospects;” Tehran “primarily relied on cyber tools…because they are low cost, deniable, scalable & do not depend on physical access to" the US

Key Judgment 4: China “did not deploy” interference or influence efforts as Beijing “probably judged risk of interference was not worth the reward”; NIO for Cyber appended a view, offered with moderate confidence, that China “did take some steps” to undermine Trump

Key Judgment 5: Other actors – including Lebanese Hizbollah, Cuba, Venezuela and unspecified cybercriminals & hacktivists – entered the fray on a smaller scale

That much of this activity was forecast before it happened and, as it was happening, entered the public domain in detailed press reports shouldn't diminish its gravity. This line from the assessment is notable:

"[A]s more foreign actors seek to exert influence over US elections, additional actors may increasingly see election-focused influence efforts as an acceptable norm of international behavior."