Thread by @MollyMcKew

The ODNI report on foreign threats to the 2020 elections shows a serious, ongoing threat to US national security that we really aren’t talking about: the American proxies & dupes doing the Kremlin’s dirty work against America

New via @RenewGreatPower /1

greatpower.us/p/in-the-2020-…

The report covers technical interference, Russia, Iran, China, and other actors.

It also corrects (without saying so) some misrepresentations of US intelligence findings issued before the election, which attempted to play up Chinese initiatives and downplay Russian activities /2

Key takeaways—

1) Trump’s denial of 2016 Russian elex interference & refusal to act helped normalize the use of election interference by a broader range of actors who perceive there are few real costs. This is now just another tool in the toolkit. Bad news. /3

2) Russian efforts remain more expansive, daring, integrated, and better-resourced than other foreign campaigns. Russian activities in 2020 were more aggressive than previously disclosed by intelligence reports, but also far more overt. /4

3) Moscow is increasingly relying on proxies & dupes to do its heavy lifting — and finding far too many of both in the United States. This network of actors is highly integrated and self-amplifying, and has significant reach into key audiences in the United States. /5

4) The clarity of the report — which avoids naming US persons but we know — should make us question why there has been so little cost to elected Republicans, Trump appointees, R operatives, & media personalities who are identified as working with or as proxies of Russian intel /6

5) It isn’t really good news that China thinks its existing influence campaigns in the US are sufficient enough not to warrant higher-risk behaviors like election interference. We need to focus on the resources China is pouring into influence, intel gathering, & recruitment /7

6) There must be clear costs for any foreign threats to US elections. A lot of actors are trying to get in on this game, but it actually requires significant state resources and focus to make it successful — so far. This must be a target for deterrence. /8

Additional analysis of the details of the report is in the piece — but what do we do about it? Read on /9

greatpower.us/p/in-the-2020-…

First, we must be aggressive & creative in defining costs for election interference and malign influence campaigns, and ensure those issues are always on the agenda when engaging foreign powers who are using them to target Americans. /10

In a recent interview, President Biden said that Putin will pay a price for this interference. It needs to be visible if it is going to discourage other from emulating these tactics. /11

abcnews.go.com/Politics/biden…

Second, high-level strategic national security and foreign policy concepts need to be supplemented by essential personnel ASAP. To many foreign-facing posts are unmanned. /12

The Biden administration should closely coordinate messaging and responses to foreign interference and malign influence efforts so they are consistent throughout all US engagements, whether it be Russia or Iran or China or “patriotic hackers” /13

Third, foreign influence operations, particularly those by Russia & China, should be better mapped and assessed consistently by US intelligence with a whole-of-government collaborative effort, not only focusing on elections but other strategic objectives. /14

The more communication there is about these efforts to the public, especially regarding tactics and objectives, the better off we will be.

Within government, assessments should be clear about how these efforts seek to shape US policy decision-making. /15

Finally, we must consider what to do about the Kremlin shills & ghouls — particularly those with security clearances who maintain elected office and committee assignments where they can influence lawmaking and tie up legislative process /16

There are now a series of politicians who have built their domestic influence around their foreign collaborations.

And this is deeply troubling. /17

The same is true of those in the public domain. Media outlets & personalities running Kremlin narrative. Political operatives/strategists who connect all the pieces and field the campaign. The people meeting directly with Russian operatives like it was all no big deal. /18

We have seen the cost.

We need a whole-of-society resilience-building effort to limit the ability of foreign influence campaigns to pull us awry.

This must be a top priority for the new administration.  /19

greatpower.us/p/the-way-ahea…

Read more here: /20

greatpower.us/p/in-the-2020-…

And subscribe today to @RenewGreatPower to get this special St Patrick’s Day offer!

greatpower.us/e26c0342

PS the link to the ODNI report is here:

https://twitter.com/odnigov/status/1371888625613467653