I rarely read pieces that too-eagerly disparage "pundits", and this doesn't disappoint. The author argues that because exports often don't vary inversely with currencies, this proves that the exchange rate doesn't matter much to the balance of trade.
Nonsense. The exchange rate matters a great deal, but it is not the only thing that matters. So do interest rates, the distribution of income, implicit or explicit manufacturing subsidies, and a whole range of other supply-side policies. When a stronger currency is...
3/4
accompanied for example by greater manufacturing subsidies or repressed interest rates, the resulting expansionary impact of the latter on the trade balance can easily overcome the contractionary impact of the exchange rate. That is why I have been arguing for nearly...
4/4
a year that because China was responding to Covid-19 with supply-side policies while much of the rest of the world focused in demand-side boosts, we would see both a strengthening RMB and a growing Chinese trade surplus.
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The good news is that regulators continue to warn urgently about financial risks facing China. On Tuesday, according to Caixin, Liu Guiping, PBoC deputy governor, wrote in a PBoC publication that "Financial risks have been piling up in...
China for a long time, creating a grim challenge to financial stability, adding that there are still vulnerabilities in the system. Current regulations regarding risks are scattered among separate laws, loaded down with abstract principles, and implemented...
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by different government departments, Liu said. He called for setting up 'capital pools' to deal with risks, improving the 'loss-sharing mechanism,' and breaking the implicit guaranteed payment."
I think BCA is right to suggest an increase in expected volatility in Chinese stocks. The PBoC and the regulators are already worried about rising financial fragility within China and are especially worried about the potential impact of...
Biden's – fully justified, in my opinion – $1.9 trillion stimulus package in accelerating inflows into the Chinese economy, through both the trade account and the financial account. Beijing is starting to realize how destabilizing capital flows can be, and why...
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internationalizing the RMB brings huge risks.
What makes it worse is that it isn't clear how Beijing can respond. "Tightening" will only work if they give up stabilizing the currency, but if they do, it would mean a strengthening of the RMB, something that I think...
Caixin provides here some very useful charts on China’s financial balance sheet. At the end of last year, total financial assets were RMB 353 trillion, or 348% of GDP, with total bank assets equal to 90.5% of total financial assets and total bank...
bank loans equal to just under half of total financial assets (172.6 trillion), or 170% of GDP.
We have no idea how much of these total financial assets should properly be classified as NPLs, but it is worth noting that in the early 2000s, when banking assets were...
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roughly 120% of GDP, and other financial assets almost non-existent, Chinese estimates of the share of real NPLs ranged from 10% to 44%, with most analysts in the 20-30% range. See, for example, core.ac.uk/download/pdf/2… and www8.gsb.columbia.edu/apec/sites/ape….
I think this is an interesting set of comments by Sheng Songcheng, both for what it gets right and what I think it gets wrong. He’s right that monetary policies that attempt to curb asset bubbles can cause them to deflate quickly and disruptively.
“Tightening monetary policy cannot effectively prevent asset bubbles,” he says “but will puncture the bubbles and bring huge economic losses.”
I agree, although I also think that puncturing bubbles doesn’t bring new economic losses so much as force the recognition...
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of existing losses, or as John Mills explained as far back as 1868 “Panics do not destroy capital; they merely reveal the extent to which it has been previously destroyed by its betrayal into hopelessly unproductive works.”
Interesting article about yet another attempt by regulators to stabilize real estate prices. Will these new policies to limit participation to the largest real-estate developers make a difference? Perhaps, if soaring prices are mainly the...
consequences of their own speculative behavior. But if soaring prices are mainly caused by the speculative behavior of end buyers – and I think they almost certainly are – these new policies will mainly increase the profitability of approved real estate developers.
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And what about the smaller real-estate developers, most of whom have already proven themselves remarkably adept at skipping around regulatory constraints and have strong local political connections? Will they bow out of the business gracefully, or take to manufacturing...
Jayati Ghosh (@Jayati1609) is absolutely right in this paper to criticize credit-rating agencies for reinforcing volatility in speculative markets and, in so doing, further undermining the very behavior that can lead to economic recovery.
Perhaps because they are paid by issuers, or because they are under constant pressure to anticipate market behavior even when these are clearly in speculative modes, credit-rating agencies have become highly pro-cyclical mechanisms that support prices on the way up and...
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push them down sharply when they fall. Pro-cyclical mechanisms in speculative markets always worsen the function of markets as systems for value discovery and efficient capital allocation.
This isn't the case in well-functioning capital markets in which prices are mainly...