The constant denials of funding requests during the Interwar Years left the @USArmy at levels far below those authorized by the National Defense Act of 1920.
The Army was prevented from research and development efforts that could create new weapons and equipment. It was also prevented from acquiring materiel that would be urgently needed in the event of war and mobilization.
As a consequence, in late 1939, when war was erupting in Europe, the US Army faced an accumulated deficit that General George C. Marshall estimated at $700-million, and much of this would require a minimum of 18 months to turn money into the necessary materiel.
By 1941, the House Committee on Appropriations suggested that Marshall had failed to see emergency on the horizon and thus failed to conduct reconnaissance surveys in advance, which were now being hastily conducted and costing significant amounts of money.
Marshall disagreed and said the problem was actually the “political processes of the government” that controls War Department procedures.
The committee asked Marshall why they had not previously received requests for funds for these reconnaissance surveys.
Marshall replied:
“I would say very much for the same reason that we did not come to your committee with formal recommendations for adequate ammunition.” 👀
“I wanted about $150-mill. worth of ammunition… for the spring of 1939…. But I did not present the request to this committee. I also wanted about $300-mill. for ordnance at that particular time... $110-million was provided, including $37-million for ammunition.”
The year prior, Marshall had said the problem was less a matter of the question “what should be done?” and more a matter of timing, when considering what one might be permitted to do.
The motivation for rearming the US Army was ultimately going to have to come from the White House.
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In 1929, President Herbert Hoover had the War Department conduct an investigation to determine which of its needs and methods should “reconsider our whole army program” and this led to a 165-page report. But before the report was completed, the stock market crashed.
Any hope of increasing Army spending was doomed for the foreseeable future.
Military history is often (mistakenly) considered to be just about wars. And when we talk of @USArmy history, many think we mean just in the context of war. When the Army is engaged in battles.
But the Army exists between wars.
And during peacetime, between wars, the Army trains and maintains, advances and evolves, all to ensure a sufficient state of readiness should an emergency need arise.
The first time the @USArmy General Staff devised a plan for assembling or mobilizing the Army during peacetime was in 1923.
This plan called for 6 field armies with an initial total of 400,000 men on the first day of mobilization (M-Day). And this would increase in the first 4 months to 1.3-million men, and then steadily increase every month thereafter.
There were approximately 20 years between the end of World War I and the beginning of World War II.
During this “Interwar" period the United States engaged in serious efforts to address military shortcomings, especially in materiel, for the first time ever during peacetime.
During the Interwar Years, the @USArmy was inadequately funded, resulting in most units being skeletonized. There was almost no improvement in Army readiness during those 20 years.
Only periodic maneuvers (exercises) were held with the Regular Army and the Army National Guard, and these maneuvers were more like “play-acting” between notional forces. They were mostly ineffective and not meeting their intended purpose. @USNationalGuard