Supreme Court rules 5-3 in Torres v. Madrid that “application of physical force to the body of a person with intent to restrain is a seizure, even if the force does not succeed in subduing the person.” SupremeCourt.gov/opinions/20pdf…#n
An expected result, although a closer vote than I expected, based on the argument. More tweet commentary soon.
A few quick thoughts now. First, this seems like a really narrow ruling. It's always been clear that "application of physical force to the body of a person with intent to restrain" is a seizure when the police succeed in stopping the person, temporarily, and that's most cases.
Torres now adds that this is true even if the person is not subdued, which was suggested in dicta in Hodari D but now becomes a holding. I don't know how often this happens, but now that issue is settled.
Anything touching on the law of police shooting is important. But this seems like a narrow and specific set of facts, and the rule doesn't seem to have many broader implications. So the case seems very narrow in that sense.
If anything, it's noteworthy that so much of the writing is about the common law, and *not* the practical implication that one would have to guess was driving at least some of the Justices: Do victims of police shooting have a potential 4A remedy under 1983 if they don't stop?
Roberts doesn't go into that and Sotomayor doesn't write separately on it, perhaps reflecting the close vote: 5-3. Maybe they don't want to alienate a 5th vote by going into that? Hard to know.
For 4th Amendment nerds, there are some interesting sub-plots.
First, it's surprising to see a 5-3 case for a civil plaintiff with Kavanaugh in the majority and Gorsuch in dissent. I would have guessed the opposite. That's worth watching.
Second, for those of us interested in the subjective/objective question in 4A law, the majority's objective intent test is interesting. There's a subjective test, but you measure subjective intent objectively, the court says.
The Court has used this idea before, but it struck me as really a subjective test, just with a patina of objectivity b/c they thought 4A law is supposed to be objective. More on this issue in my recent article: texaslawreview.org/the-questionab…
Finally, there's lots of interesting stuff about the role of common law in the case, although I'm going to save that part for later: I want to mull it over more before writing on it. But some of the debate was previewed here, FWIW: reason.com/volokh/2020/02…
That's it for now...
• • •
Missing some Tweet in this thread? You can try to
force a refresh
Here's thread on today's oral argument in Caniglia v. Strom, on the community caretaking exception. Thread will be thoughts on the argument, not an overview of the case, which others have done.
First up, Roberts questioning counsel for petitioner, the plaintiff in the civil case. Roberts starts with what I think is plaintiff's hardest hypo: what about wellness checks on seniors who haven't been heard from? Not a surprising question.
If I understood P's argument, their position is that you can't search to do a wellness check, but eventually, after a few days, there will be probable cause to get a warrant to search for a missing person.
I don't have a clear view of how Carp should apply to pole cameras -- hard Q, I think -- but I thought DOJ's arg should have been simpler than it was. Best arg for DOJ, I think, is "Carpenter is about an REP in the whole of a person's movements, and a pole camera doesn't move."
From the govt's perspective, that's your limiting principle in a pole camera case, I think: Carpenter is only about the whole of movements, and it doesn't apply to a camera fixed on one place. (May or may not persuade a particular court, but I think it's the govt's best arg.)
Fascinating 4th Am case now pending before the Wisc SCT, State v. Burch.
Thread.
In 2016, D allowed Police Dept 1 to download contents of his phone in a crim case. Govt copied entire phone, kept copy. Later, D is a suspect in unrelated homicide investigated by Police Dept 2.
Police Dept 2 got the copy still held by Police Dept 1 and searched it for evidence of the homicide w/o a warrant. The search showed that D had a gmail account, and the police then obtained D's gmail account records. They showed his phone was at the murder location and time.
Merits 4A question is mostly about the scope of consent: Do you interpret the consent given at the 1st stage to permit the holding on to the data and giving it to diff police dept for a different crime?
The issue in the case is the extent of the community caretaking exception of Cady. But there are a bunch of possible exceptions to the warrant requirement possibly in play, and the case seems just as much about which exceptions should fit which hypos than whether one does.
For any given set of Justices, there will be an overall amount of warrant-exception-ness they'll see as reasonable. I assume that amount is largely fixed given the Court's membership. If that's right, the issue w/the scope of any one exception is as much scope of the others.
This is from a pending bill creating a new federal felony. Any thoughts on what it means to have "reckless disregard for . . . the reasonable expectation of [an] individual that [a] depiction [of that person] would remain private"? amendments-rules.house.gov/amendments/SPE…
Is that supposed to mean that the individual (a) has that belief, (b) the individual's belief is reasonable, and (c) the defendant is reckless w/r/t the fact that the belief exists?
Similarly, do you interpret "reckless disregard for . . the lack of consent of the individual to the distribution" as requiring (a) lack of consent, and (b) a reckless mens rea w/r/t/ to the fact of the lack of consent?
My sense is that it's not uncommon, at U.S. universities, for faculty salaries to be determined less by a professor's perceived excellence or prominence than on whether a big raise was once considered needed to keep that prof when a competitor school came along.
The two will be correlated, in that on average you would expect competitors to try to hire a school's best profs. But there's a lot of noise in that signal, ranging from profs who turn down outside inquiries to those who may pursue them mostly to get retention raises.