Here are links to documents that I obtained from my public records request to the Texas Secretary of State. The documents slam ES&S’s hash validation security protocols. You should read for yourself. First up: Texas examiner Brian Mechler’s report. 1/ drive.google.com/file/d/1u5RM5P…
2/ Letter dated 9/24/20 to ES&S from Keith Ingram, the director of elections for the Texas secretary of state, advising that “our examiner noted that this issue could create a potential security vulnerability as a proper software validation cld not occur.” drive.google.com/file/d/1oDq5-y…
Texas examiner calling ES&S’s protocol a “gift wrapped opportunity to an insider threat, however unlikely...[A]n insider now knows...which file is not being inspected. It’s similar to a bank robber knowing that the camera covering teller #3 is broken.” 3/ drive.google.com/file/d/1Yr5bs9… 
SOS lawyer to ES&S: “Essentially what you’ve told us" is that TX customers "received software..that failed...hash validation..." You "did not inform our office," which is "very concerning & raises doubts about our ability to trust ur team to report & address these issues..." 4/
6/ When the ES&S representative (Parmer) tried to tell the Texas SOS's Legal Director (Adkins) that its voting-software didn't really "fail" hash validation testing, it did not go over well. You should read for yourself. drive.google.com/file/d/1uYuJvU…
10/1/20 letter from the EAC to officials in 18 states re: its investigation of ES&S's uncertified software installation method & related hash testing failure. Neither @EACgov nor the Texas SOS published this. I obtained via a TX public records request. 7/ drive.google.com/file/d/11BFFOo…
Alarmingly, @EACgov has yet to produce a single document in response to my public records request sent in January. Nor will it give an ETA. Nor would it comment for my @whowhatwhy story re: these documents. 8/ whowhatwhy.org/2021/03/08/ele…
November 10, 2020 email from Adkins (Texas SOS lawyer) to TX examiner indicating that ES&S may not have disclosed all systems impacted by its hash-validation fail. The Texas SOS & ES&S declined multiple requests for comment. 9/ drive.google.com/file/d/1wElBD_…
"Meanwhile, Texas AG Ken Paxton has expressed no concern about his state’s use of ES&S systems despite having publicly assailed Dominion Voting — ES&S’s main competitor — in an effort to help Donald Trump’s so-called “Stop the Steal” campaign." 10/ whowhatwhy.org/2021/03/08/ele…
"That campaign relied, in part, on an error-riddled affidavit by discredited 'expert' Russ Ramsland re: election results produced by Dominion Voting in Michigan."
"But during an interview last October, it was ES&S that Ramsland accused of manipulating elections in Texas." 11/
"But during an interview last October, it was ES&S that Ramsland accused of manipulating elections in Texas." 11/
"In 2019, Ramsland said he’d had 'a couple of meetings with the [Texas] AG’s office,' but 'one of their guys was the very guy that certified these people as being safe. So he is … very conflicted right off the bat. He’s gotta protect his reputation.'" 12/
"In Arizona, the GOP now wants Ramsland to forensically analyze Dominion Voting machines in Maricopa County, but has made no such demand regarding ES&S machines, which are used in other Arizona counties." 13/
I did a public records request to the Texas AG's office for all records regarding the meetings that Ramsland claims to have had with that office. Curiously, they claimed that no records exist. 14/
There's a video of the Aug. 2020 exam where Texas examiners first learned that ES&S was using an uncertified software installation method and that this method resulted in a hash-validation failure. ES&S and the Texas SOS have objected to producing it. Paxton will decide. 15/
Here is the Texas Secretary of State's BS objection to producing the video of that August 2020 examination where they caught ES&S using an uncertified software installation method. The public deserves to know what exactly occurred and what ES&S said. 16/ drive.google.com/file/d/1s408q6…
I submitted a response pointing out that their objections are late (they pretend the request is recent, but the video was encompassed by my December request) and that the asserted need to redact passwords doesn't justify withholding the whole video. 17/
We shall see. 18/
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