1/7

The lesson here was always more about ordinary incompetence than debt-trap diplomacy. One of the big problems with development-country lending — and especially from inexperienced lenders — is how dangerously pro-cyclical it always is.

ft.com/content/36f5f0…
2/7

Another problem is how easy it has always seemed to countries that are first "going out" into development lending — e.g. the US in the 1920s, the USSR in the 1950s, OPEC in the 1970s, Japan in the 1980s, China in the 2000s, etc.
3/7

In the early stages of the lending, when underlying conditions were good and commodity prices rising, Chinese investors, like all of their predecessors, thought they had discovered a new, better way to invest in riskier countries — with foreign observers worriedly...
4/7

agreeing — and poured money into all sorts of projects, especially in countries in which other investors were most reluctant to invest. This seemed to reinforce underlying growth, setting off even more inflows and, invariably, unleashing large amounts of wasteful spending.
5/7

But at some point — in this case I suspect it happened with Venezuela around 2014-15 — they suddenly discovered what everyone else already knew about the difficulty of financing development projects, especially in certain political environments, and began sharply to...
6/7

pull back. This pulling back, of course, worsened underlying economic conditions even further and began to create political resentment. We seem to be at the beginning of this stage.

The best thing Beijing can do is recognize quickly that it has been caught in the same...
7/7

mess it said it would never get caught in and work to restructure and partially forgive the debt, but if historical precedents are any guide, that will probably take many more years of losses for both sides.

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More from @michaelxpettis

30 Mar
1/4

Beijing is worried enough about the net economic benefits of extending HSR that it is trying to prevent projects that give short-term boosts to local economies while worsening their debt burdens — something, I'd argue, that has been an issue for...

caixinglobal.com/2021-03-30/chi…
2/4

many years. Because an investment can only worsen the debt burden if its total cost exceeds its total economic benefits, it is clear that what worries Beijing is the HSR equivalent of "bridges to nowhere".

There has been an active debate for many years about whether...
3/4

or not China's huge HSR network is economically justified. While some might argue that this Caixin article indicates only that Beijing wants to ensure that the problem doesn't arise in the future, Chinese precedents (and those of most other countries following a similar...
Read 4 tweets
29 Mar
1/5

SASAC wants to keep the debts of local SOEs from spiraling out of control, by helping them deleverage when debt levels get too high "through measures such as restricting new investment, introducing strategic investors or converting debt into equity."

caixinglobal.com/2021-03-29/chi…
2/5

This, however, is based on a pretty fundamental misunderstanding of China's debt dynamics. Soaring debt isn't caused by careless borrowing on the part of a few undisciplined borrowers. It is a systemic problem caused by the setting of GDP growth targets that exceed the...
3/5

real underlying growth rate of the economy. As long as this continues, debt must rise faster than GDP (which will rise faster than the real economy), in which case the best regulators can do is to allocate the soaring debt burden from one sector of the economy to another.
Read 5 tweets
28 Mar
1/6

More on the consumption challenge and some other good information in this Caixin article, although like many, it confuses overall savings with the household component of savings. Among other things it points out that "China’s household...

caixinglobal.com/2021-03-26/in-…
2/6

consumption as a percentage of GDP is well below that of other countries at similar stages of development, which means there’s plenty of scope to catch up. Having fallen from 45.5% when China joined the World Trade Organization in 2001 to 34.3% in 2010, it has gradually...
3/6

recovered to 39%. Brazil’s ratio stands at 65% while India is at 60% and Russia is at 50%. The U.S., the world’s biggest economy, has a ratio of 68%."

Actually while China's household consumption recovered to 39% in 2019, I suspect it was closer to 36-37% in 2020.
Read 6 tweets
28 Mar
1/4

A few months ago I pointed out that one of the consequences of Beijing's supply-side response to Covid-19 would be a surge in the profit share of GDP, probably at the expense of the household-income share.

scmp.com/news/article/3…
2/4

This seems to be happening, although to an even greater extent than I had expected. Industrial profits in the first two months of the year surged 179% year on year and, for a more useful comparison, 72% over the same period in 2019.
3/4

Not surprisingly a disproportionate share of the increase went to the manufacturing sector. In the article below, the increase is attributed to strong external demand and more working hours, but while these might explain a small part of the nominal increase in industrial...
Read 4 tweets
26 Mar
1/8

Most economists don't understand the dynamics of debt in China because they don't think systemically about the economy (obviously I don't mean the guys at @ChinaBeigeBook, who are cited in this article and who understand Chinese debt very well).

cnb.cx/3lSbgxT
2/8

There has been much talk in the past several years about "deleveraging" and debt stabilization in China, but until now there has been neither, even in 2016. It is structurally impossible for China to stabilize the debt burden as long as Beijing insists on GDP growth...
3/8

targets that exceed the real underlying growth of the economy.

This has been the case for well over a decade, but in 2021, as I have argued since last autumn, China will almost certainly seem to "stabilize" its debt burden, but not because anything has fundamentally...
Read 8 tweets
26 Mar
1/6

Very good piece by @danielmunevar on the post-Covid-19 dynamics of developing-country debt. It uses Minsky's balance-sheet approach to understand the implications of rising debt among developing countries and the systemic impact on...

eurodad.org/2020_debt_cris…
2/6

the borrowers themselves. It also discusses the adverse systemic implications for the advanced economies.

The world "systemic" is key here. It is useless to treat the question of developing-country debt as a series of linear increments that matters mostly to the...
3/6

individual country in distress. Debt repayments always affect a country's balance of payments, which in turn must be absorbed by the rest of the world. One of the important points that Munevar makes is that while debt forbearance has a charity component, it turns out to...
Read 6 tweets

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