Goodman Group $GMG $GMG.AX is arguably one of Australia’s best managed company over the past two decades. An industrial REIT powerhouse, it is a dominant global player in warehousing and logistics that powers e-commerce. A bet against treasuries?
Let’s take a deep dive. 👇
1. Investment Thesis: A stalwart, A-grade Industrial REIT, with excellent management, a long history of growth, in a cyclically growing industry, dependable dividends / future earnings. A buy and hold for the core portfolio.
2. Personal History. I first bought GMG for split-adjusted $3.40 in Feb 2011, and then sold for $6.20 in Dec 2015 – how clever I felt at the time, making 15.5% CAGR inc. divvies. Since then the market has uncovered the true value of GMG, driving up the price…
3. … Barely has there been a good entry price bar March 2020. and if I had held until today my IRR would be ~20% CAGR over a decade. Hubris and selling Tier 1 stocks is the difference between good and great investments. Lesson learned.
4. Macro. Growing e-commerce generates significant demands for industrial warehousing and logistics. Long runway aided by as e-commerce takes market share from bricks and mortar, though this will pull back over time.
5. Business Model. Own properties often as joint ventures with the partners; develop properties often for existing customers; manage industrial real estate for partners. Simple, now overlay capital allocation / management.
6. Own Properties. 98% occupancy, low churn leases with 4.4yr, recycles assets ($2.2bn sales in 1H21), high reevaluation gains ($1.5bn), net assets of $6.30 per share. Generated historical earnings growth.
7. Developments: GMG focus on infill sites and high tech fulfilment centres; mostly JVs with customers (85% leasing rate, 15.1yrs WALE), forecast yield on cost of 6.6%; $8.4bn WIP (3yrs of completions). Huge portion of current growth engine.
8. Management: AUM grown to $48bn, with moderate co-investments and leverage. Low churn lease with +4yrs WALE and high occupancy (+98%). Fast growing area (14.6% CAGR / 5yr). Long term growth as development picks up.
9. Customers: Lead by $AMZN $DPW.DE DHL $IRM $KMB $CCL.AX $COL.AX it’s like a who’s who of e-commerce… diversified and stable Tier 1 clients, highlighting GMG’s reputation.
10. Global: Grown in Australia (still growing), but a global player with a strong presence in Asia (high growth), US (room to grow), and Europe.
Aussies that survive global competition often thrive.. a good way to think about avoiding value traps.
11. Long Term Focus: I really liked their 2020 Annual Report, reflecting from 1995 listing to 2020 today and on to the 2030 strategy.
12. A Moat? I couldn’t sleep trying to answer this question, so probably not.
Scale? Expertise? Land banks? Capital access? Maybe.
Long term contracted clients is moat-y. 🤷
13. Financials: Operating income has not grown as fast as earnings or FCF. Covid depressed development expenses artificially pushing up earnings, while reevaluations have been important medium-term contributors. Buyer be warned..
14. Yields: Dividends are 1.6%, operating earnings 3.6%, payout ratio of 45% based on midpoint estimate. EPS growth of 12%, but 5yr avg ~9%. IRR of 11.5% is *just* above my >10% hurdle, just… publish.twitter.com/?query=https%3…
15. Interest Rates: A strong inverse relationship with 10yr treasuries and REIT’s, as they essentially are seen as bond proxies. Three reasons for this:
16: Increasing rates increases expenses. GMG has moderate leverage (4.8% gearing, though 16.6% look through) increasing weighted average cost of capital (1.48% overall right now, though growing to 4% by 2030). This hits the expense line.
17: Increasing rates reduces reevaluations. Like a DCF on equities, the higher the rate used the lower the value today of net assets. This hits the asset line.
18: Increasing rates increases risk-adjusted yield. The PE ratio has to drop for yields to go up to compete with bonds – though bonds can’t grow earnings like equities, so there is still a trade off. This hits the stock price.
19. Prologis $PLD Comparison: More US, less Asia; more greenfield less infill sites; lower % of development revenue; higher yield (2.6% vs 1.6%); higher debt; Lower EV/FCF (~30 vs 25); comparable ~10% 5yr growth. PE is pretty different as Covid impacted PLD's bottom line.
20. Management: CEO Founder Greg Goodman (2% ownership) and management team have long term incentives focused on cash and operating earnings. May be the best boardroom in Australia.
Most importantly, they are adaptable visionaries…
21. Adaptability. @billbrewsterSCG and @sanjayayer discussed culture, and putting a premium on Co.’s ability to adapt. You may not know what opportunities will come up …
22. Adaptability: … but you should know who is best placed to take those opportunities. Goodman Group is that Co., growth may not be from e-commerce in 2030 but it will still be B2B, smart logistics, etc.
23. Valuation: Despite a 10% pull back, still overvalued.
The PE (20) is well above the long term average (15). At $17, I recently took a small holding position. But the real value isn’t until <$15. If I get a chance, this time I hope it will be to #neversell
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A deep dive per week is my commitment to FinTwit.
Questions and feedback always welcome. DYOR.
Disclaimer, I'm long GMG with a token ‘holding’ position.
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The global salmon industry is in turmoil as fears of contagion of the Norwegian resource tax hits the Faroe Islands.🐟
P/F Bakkafrost $BAKKA is down another 12% overnight, while the big Norwegians $MOWI $SALM $LSG continue to slide.
Let's take a look at the Faroe Islands 🧵👇
1. Yesterday I looked at Norway's resource tax and figured it was too difficult to find a good risk/reward bet. Right now the best forecasters of European monetary and fiscal policy seem to be a random number generator. Today I'm looking at Faroe Islands.
Norway produces over 50% of the world's Atlantic salmon. So this is kind of a big deal.
Unsurprisingly, the largest salmon companies in the world are also in Norway. In fact, the four largest are from Norway. This is because they have a huge cost advantage in the cold fjords which provide better growing conditions.
Delorean's $DEL $DEL.AX update to the market has left a fair bit to be desired. Engineering division has been decimated, financing remains out of reach, though retail is doing alright. Time to hit the panic button? 🚨
Let's take a closer look 🤏🧵👇
If you don't know what Delorean is, please don't @ me, just look at the original deep dive.
Clean Seas $CSS $CSS.AX FY22 results look really good. I recently spoke with Rob Gratton (CEO) and got to understand more of their business model and strategic direction.
Here's a short thread on my thoughts and why I don't hold 🤏🧵👇
The FY22 results look very strong. Volume growth (3.7kt), ~20% increase in pricing, ~37% revenue increase, 19% reduction in production costs, etc. And for the first time, profitable! 🎯
But I have mentioned before, this is really a bull-whip effect from the diabolical FY20 which saw inventory build up etc, and now being sold in FY22.
Treasury Wine Estates $TWE $TWE.AX FY22 results came out, and they're good considering the China wine-ban is still being flushed out. Total revenues down, but margins and NPAT are both up 🍷😋
Let's take a quick look 👇
You can find my original thread here where I outlined TWE as an asset play, with the hope that profits may return in due course.
To put in perspective the FY22 results, you can see here the 1H22 results were less negative than the market expected. But 2H22 has been pretty strong, which is why NPAT is up *only* 4% but almost 10% if you annualise 2H22.