Ran across an interesting study from back in 2013: Chinese researchers evaluated the "strategic position" of 131 features in the Spratly Islands. Explicitly proposed improving the "strategic position" of features through artificial construction... (1/)
(2/) Looks like the research received state funding via the 863 Program. And the authors were all affiliated with the Nanjing University Jiangsu Province Key Laboratory of Geographic Information Science and Technology.
(3/) They analyzed a bunch of different factors, ranging from "maritime military deterrence effect" to "navigation ease" to "runway construction length conditions."
(4/) The authors noted that all of the features with the highest "strategic position" scores are occupied by other countries.
(5/) To close this gap and boost the "strategic position" of China's features in the Spratlys, they proposed land reclamation and island building.
China's island building campaign started right around the time this research was published.
(6/) Impossible to say whether this particular study informed China's subsequent activities in the Spratly Islands, but it still offers an interesting look at how researchers working for the Chinese party-state or the PLA may have been evaluating the situation.
(7/) Also, here's the translated title, abstract, and so on included at the end of the article:
• • •
Missing some Tweet in this thread? You can try to
force a refresh
(2/) Thanks to China's investments in the BeiDou satellite navigation system, nearly every civilian fishing vessel operating in the South China Sea can perform a maritime surveillance role. This is because BeiDou has built-in two-way texting capabilities.
(3/) When Chinese fishermen are carrying out their normal fishing activities, if they spot a foreign vessel, they can use BeiDou to quickly report the foreign vessel to the authorities (e.g. the CCG or PLA).
(2/) First, we need to make a distinction between China's massive reclamation campaign and the minor reclamation activities of other claimants. China is the only claimant that has built artificial islands the size of Washington DC.
(3/) Moreover, the US is not imposing "sanctions" on Chinese entities. It is imposing visa restrictions and export restrictions, which are not the same thing as sanctions. This might seem pedantic, but the distinction is important (more on this later).
In my new report with @ChinaMaritime, I reveal how Sansha City has built a system of administrative control in the South China Sea (SCS) and how China is using this system to transform contested areas into de facto Chinese territory.
(2/) Sansha was created in 2012 and is headquartered on Woody Island. Its jurisdiction covers 2 million square kilometers and includes the Paracel Islands, the “Zhongsha Islands” (Macclesfield Bank and Scarborough Shoal), the Spratly Islands, and their surrounding waters.
(3/) As China’s vanguard in the SCS, Sansha is responsible for exercising administrative control, implementing military-civil fusion, and performing the work of “rights defense, stability maintenance, environmental protection, and resource development” (维权维稳保护开发).
As usual, @QuincyInst's views on the South China Sea disputes are divorced from reality. In what world should we stop exercising our freedom of navigation in exchange for "affirmations" from China that they won't interfere with our freedom of navigation? That makes no sense.
Moreover, Quincy conveniently fails to address the most pressing issue in the South China Sea: how China uses maritime law enforcement and maritime militia forces to preclude it's neighbors (including U.S. allies and partners) from operating freely within their own waters.
Simply put, you can't provide recommendations for U.S. policy in the South China Sea without addressing the problem of assertive PAFMM and CCG operations. Nothing gets solved as long as China gets to aggressively use the PAFMM and CCG without facing any consequences.
It looks like Chinese international students at @GWtweets are being required to consent to a "Data Privacy Notice for Students in China" to ensure their access to online classes. Students are raising safety concerns because of the National Security Law.
Regarding the content of the notice, students seem particularly worried about a clause that says "GW may transfer your Personal Data to its affiliates or third-party service providers inside or outside of the United States for the above purposes."
There's also a reference to Chinese law, though they stress that "we put in place robust safeguards to ensure that your privacy is protected and to ensure that our legitimate interests are not overridden by your interests or fundamental rights."
Yesterday was the seventh anniversary of the establishment of Sansha City (三沙市). In July 2012, China founded Sansha to govern the entirety of its claims in the South China Sea. What is Sansha? How has it developed over the last 7 years? Why does it matter? A thread: (1/)
Sansha is based on Woody Island (永兴岛) in the Paracel Islands. The prefecture-level city has jurisdiction over the “island-reefs and sea areas” (岛礁及其海域) of the Paracel Islands, Spratly Islands, and Zhongsha Islands (Macclesfield Bank and Scarborough Shoal). (2/)
The Chinese government announced its plans to establish Sansha City just hours after Vietnam’s National Assembly passed the Law of the Sea of Vietnam on June 21, 2012. Many observers saw Sansha as China’s response. Sansha was formally established a month later on July 24. (3/)