From all I know and have heard about @GavinBarwell he is a decent and honourable person, so I'm casting no aspersions on his integrity at all, but I really struggle to understand this analysis. Short thread: 1/7
If TM's deal had passed with Labour support in the teeth of ferocious ERG & DUP opposition, what Govt could actually have enacted it? May would surely have been deposed within days by a VONC (Opposition parties + ERG, DUP) and a GNU under Corbyn was a non-starter. 2/7
So, presumably, a GE with Tories led by who? May on the manifesto of her deal that half her MPs had rejected? Johnson (if, somehow, there'd been time to get a new leader) on a renegotiate platform? Where does that go in terms of May's deal? 3/7
And, anyway, May's WA didn't avoid a sea border, that's the whole reason why the DUP opposed it. Gavin B says elsewhere that she'd committed to common rule book, but that could only be agreed in the future terms deal, not the WA, and ... 4/7
... ERG would never have allowed that, even if TM survived. So, really, and those who know my work will know I chronicled all the twists and turns, I think this emergent idea that in 2018 there was a way out of TM's 2017 red lines and ERG extremism ... 5/7
... if only Lab/ remainers had acted differently doesn't fit the record. The chance for compromise, if it existed, was in the first weeks of May's premiership in 2016 to construct a national consultation. It might have failed, but it wasn't tried, and by 2018 it was too late 6/7
There are persistent misunderstandings about what 'Canada-style' means. For the UK, at first blush, the stress is on 'Canada', though in fact the UK ask goes well beyond CETA so that's disingenuous. 1/5
Whereas for EU the stress is on 'style' i.e. that this would be in the category of an FTA relationship, rather than SM membership (that's what the Barnier staircase meant). But Canada is geographically distant, does far less trade with the EU and is far less integrated. 2/5
In short, UK isn't really like Canada (history, geography, economy). And, anyway, there are all the non-trade things. So, actually, both UK & EU accept their deal can't just be CETA. 3/5
This was exactly my very tentative thought. Suppose it DOES have that effect, and suppose the SA regime was 'robust' enough to satisfy EU. If so, there's potentially a ladder to climb down, taken in conjunction with ... 1/4
. If all this was acceptable to EU (I know, big 'if') then potentially the NIP could be adapted *by agreement* & the SA obstacle to an FTA removed 2/4
BJ then presents to ERG & country that this is a great victory (removing the 'poison pill'), created by being 'tough', and deriving in the *first* instance from the unilateral decisions of the 'sovereign UK', to which the EU has 'bowed'. Then rush it all through. 3/4
I've just read @DenisMacShane's excellent Brexiternity and strongly recommend it (disclosure: publishers sent me a freebie, but I hope no one thinks I can be bought - for the price of a book, anyway): bloomsbury.com/uk/brexiternit…. There are now a few great books on Brexit ... 1/7
Brexit: What the Hell Happens Now by @IanDunt was one of the first (2016) and is still well worth reading (there's a revised 2019 edition): canburypress.com/products/brexi… 2/7
A highly revealing comment, not least for showing the complete refusal of Brexiters to take any responsibility whatsoever for what they have done. The current mess is, of course, everyone *else's* fault. But more specifically 1/5
Having told us for decades that the EU was a malign body, they now claim that their 'plan' was entirely dependent on EU goodwill; and having claimed that the UK 'held all the cards' they now talk of 'EU bullying' as if it were the stronger party. 2/5
It neglects the fact that, far from sabotage, May's government has sought to implement to the letter the hard Brexiters' agenda (no SM/CU) and that the main opposition to her deal comes from ERG Brexiters rather than remainers (and 'Jezza' is certainly not one of those). 3/5
The Michael Howard interview on @BBCr4today was littered with other problems, including: a) imagining 'no deal' as, in fact, an ad hoc deal that EU could agree to without any of the features that they need from *any* deal. 1/4
b) Imagining unilateral abandonment of *import* checks - which would anyway create massive risk of smuggling and contaminated/ unsafe products - to be a solution to queues caused by checks on *exports*. 2/4
c) Imagining that the Barnier 'offer' of a Canada-style deal would obviate need for the NI backstop to which Howard objects (indeed Howard didn't mention NI at all). 3/4
As with all such forecasts, the assumptions and caveats matter. This one is admirably clear about them and I’ve picked out some of the most obviously important ones in this thread. 1/9
“Our study does not consider the one-time costs faced by government and business of adjusting to Brexit, nor does the model capture the sector-specific impact on deeply integrated UK-EU supply chains, such as on the automotive sector, which is likely to be negative.” [= big]. 2/9
“... the EU would treat the UK no worse than any other important trade partner with which it does not have a trade agreement in place. Our assumption is that the UK would be treated like the USA …” [US-EU have no FTA but 130+ 'micro-agreements' that wd need renegotiating]. 3/9