Why I think $ANGI could be a $70bn+ company in 10 years (vs. ~$7.5bn today). Long thread below 👇
In short, it's fixed price, fixed price, fixed price.
1/ First, some context.
Angi is the clear leader in home services. Nobody else is even close. And it’s a really hard market to get into - you have to (1) onboard hundreds of thousands of SPs, many of whom are not very tech-savvy and (2) build demand from millions of customers
2/ Reminds me of $SFIX in some ways - massive TAM and they are the clear leader, but it’s super hard to get the details right & experience to be great - which means they've penetrated TAM slower than expected.
At the same time, it's really hard for new entrants to come in.
3/ My bet is that over the next decade, Angi will be able to fix some of its supply-side issues (primarily w/ fixed price), which will enable it to penetrate much more of its TAM.
This will create a massive business.
3/ Let's put some numbers to this bull case, starting w/ traditional biz.
Say GTV from trad. expands from $20bn to $25bn over next decade (2.5% CAGR), take rate improves to 10%, and EBITDA margin expands to 35% like they’ve guided.
That’s $2.5bn in net revs and $875m in EBITDA.
4/ Now onto fixed price (FP).
In the bull case, let’s say that FP grows like a weed and matches traditional in size, all within the next decade (it is a materially better experience for customers and SPs, after all). That’s $25bn in GTV.
5/ FP’s take rate is “several times” traditional - let’s say it is 18% vs. current ~6.5%. That’s $4.5bn in net revs.
Since take rate is much higher, let’s say 50% EBITDA margin on net revs is possible at-scale. That’s $2.25bn in EBITDA.
6/ Together, that’s $3.1bn in EBITDA and $50bn in GTV in a decade.
Remember, TAM is $400bn+ - so there would still be a ton of growth left. If ANGI can get that far, they have a good shot at capturing some of the remaining TAM, so a 20x EBITDA multiple would be deserved.
7/ That's a $62bn EV. Add in FCF generated in interim and you get to a $70bn+ valuation in a decade - almost a 10x from current levels.
8/ But FP is not the only way to win.
Maybe traditional re-accelerates like they say it will w/ the larger sales force. Maybe payments work. Maybe subscriptions work. All are possibilities.
9/ What I like about Angi is that it is an asymmetric bet. There are multiple ways to win - the largest is FP, but there are others too.
10/ But what are the risks?
11/
1) Angi team fails to execute on the FP opportunity.
Investors are rightfully worried b/c execution has been Angi's biggest issue.
At the same time, the previous team scaled FP from 0 to $160m in 1.5 years, during a global pandemic. They clearly did something right.
12/ And as I’ve explained in a previous thread, I’m even more optimistic on the new team led by Oisin. They’ve re-org’d the biz to focus on FP & are more scrappy and entrepreneurial.
Glenn (IAC CFO) also recently sounded v. optimistic.
13/
2) FP cannibalizes traditional biz.
This will probably happen to some degree. Don’t see how it wouldn’t, given FP is a better experience. Good thing is that FP’s profitability will be a lot higher than traditional, so even cannibalization is a net positive for the biz.
14/ Say FP totally cannibalizes traditional, so that FP does $30bn in GTV and traditional does 0.
If FP’s take rate on GTV is 18% and EBITDA margin on net revs is 50%, that’s $2.7bn in EBITDA from FP alone. Clearly, investment would still work out.
15/
3) Google/FB will kill Angi.
This is a super operationally intensive biz. It’s not like G Flights vs. $EXPE where Google can just grab flight data from scraping/airline APIs.
To get SPs on the platform, you literally have to call them, one by one. Most are not tech savvy
16/ This kind of operational intensity is not in Google’s DNA. I worked there, and I can tell you that nobody there wants to spend their time calling plumbers to convince them to join a platform.
I can't think of one operationally intensive biz that Google/FB have succeeded in.
17/ Plus, even if they did, my projections are that Angi is a high $XXbn company in a decade - not enough to move the needle for Google.
18/
4) People will just do this offline to avoid Angi’s take.
This ties w/ execution risk - key will be making product so seamless that SPs & customers would rather just pay the take than deal w/ phone tag and hassle. As w/ execution risk, I'm optimistic on Oisin & team.
19/ Overall, I like the risk-reward on Angi over the next decade. Heads, I make 10x or more. Tails, I lose 1x.
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$GDS reported earnings last night. It’s the leading carrier-neutral data center operator in China, and it’s a company I follow pretty closely. My takeaways from earnings, both the good and bad 👇
1/ First, a bit about the company: GDS operates in T1 cities in China (mainly, Beijing, Shanghai, Shenzhen, Guangzhou) where land & power for DCs within 100km of city center is very scarce.
2/ GDS customers (like BABA, Tencent, etc.) really want DCs near cities, since latency w/ end users is better.
Yesterday, I bought $DGNS (Dragoneer’s 2nd SPAC) and $AGCB (Altimeter’s 2nd SPAC) at $10.65. Seemed pretty asymmetric at that price. 👇
Max downside is $0.65 per share (assuming you hold until deal announcement/SPAC expiry).
Upside is essentially a call option on tech froth or a good deal announcement.
On tech froth, Altimeter/Dragoneer SPACs have traded at $15+ pre-deal. That’s pure speculation, but if that happens again, the upside on the SPAC is almost 7x the downside.
The more I think about it, the more I think $ANGI mgmt is totally sandbagging their guidance for the size of fixed price (FP) in the future.
In other words, I think FP will be much bigger than they’re saying it’s going to be. Read why below:👇
1/ On the latest earnings call, CEO Brandon Ridenour guided towards FP being about half the overall business by revenue, 5-7 years from now.
2/ The thing is, FP is accounted for on a gross revenue basis while the traditional business is on a net revenue basis - so them being the same size by revenue would imply the traditional business being much bigger in terms of gross transaction value (GTV) over the platform.
I’ve been spending a lot of time learning about the online gambling space lately. To understand online gambling, though, I had to understand the "land-based" gambling ecosystem first.
There are many players - so explainer thread below👇
1/ There are two types of companies in gambling: B2C and B2B. B2C actually interface with end customers (gamblers). B2B provide products + services to B2C companies.
2/ We’ll start with B2C companies. In industry parlance, they're called "operators."
They are responsible for marketing to end customers, and in the offline world, actually operating the casinos, betting shops, racetracks, etc.
Why I think $JD is a $700bn+ company in 10 years (vs. <$150bn today).👇
This is a long thread and maybe not as exciting as watching $GME, but I think it'll be worth your time :)
1/ Chinese retail sales in 2020 were RMB ~40tn. 25% online = RMB ~10tn online sales. Let's say in 2030 total retail sales are RMB 70tn (inline w/ GDP growth) and online penetration is 50% = RMB 35tn online sales. That's 13% e-com mkt. size CAGR over next decade.
2/ JD's e-com mkt. share is ~20% today. What will their share be in 10 years?
1/ In his interview with @goodinvestingc, @CliffordSosin gives the best articulation of the 15-year investment case for $CVNA that I have seen. I'll summarize his argument for how $CVNA could be a $800B+ company in 15 years: 👇
2/ There are currently ~25m <10 yr-old used cars sold in US per year. Add in Canada + economic growth over time and you get to ~33m <10 yr-old cars/year in 2035. This is Carvana's TAM.
3/ Let's say $CVNA can get 1/3rd share. Seems high right? Well, across other industries, the leading retailer averages out to 1/3rd share. It's taken longer in autos since it's historically been such a fragmented + local business. 1/3rd share = 11m cars/year.