Thread: I have great respect for @dandolfa. But I think that here he, like many other proponents of CBDC, too readily assumes that it can be viewed as a "public option," that is, something costless to a public that doesn't have to use it if it doesn't wish to.
That perspective is misleading for several reasons. First, and most obviously, it overlooks the fact that CBCD is seen by many of its advocates as a substitute for official paper currency, not a supplement to it. Rogoff famously views it so. amazon.com/Curse-Cash-Lar…
So do many central bankers who view the switch as a means for assisting negative interest rate policy, among other things.theblockcrypto.com/post/84516/deu…
Of course there's much to be said in favor of dispensing with paper money, the "horse and buggy" of modern payment systems. Still, eliminating the paper option would not be costless. Nor would criminals alone bear the costs: cato.org/sites/cato.org…
Second, when government agencies choose to enter the market as providers of any new sort of good or service, they often drive private suppliers out, either by expressly outlawing competition, or by "tilting the playing field" in their own favor.
This tendency is to evident in history to need much proof here. One need only consider the case of paper currency itself, of which the Fed has long enjoyed a monopoly it secured thanks to laws prohibiting most alternatives.
(Nor is it true that paper currency is a "public good" or "natural monopoly," or that outlawing private paper currencies, in the U.S. or elsewhere, was in the public interest. That's a long discussion, but start here: onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.111…)
Digital currency is likewise neither a public good nor a natural monopoly. (Note that "public good" doesn't mean "anything the government chooses to supply.)
Even when rival payments-media suppliers aren't deliberately forced out of business, they face an uphill battle in directly competing with a central bank. The Fed, for example, regulates many private payments-media suppliers. It is no fun competing with one's regulator!
Nor are explicit regulations needed to slant the playing field. For example, the Fed can smother a would-be rival just by denying it a "Master Account," which it can do for any reason it likes--or none at all!
Thanks to its hefty seiniorage earnings and its being exempt from antitrust laws, the Fed can also make use of cross subsidies to underprice private market providers. It's doing just that with its "FedNow" real-time retail payments system.
Although the 1980 Monetary Control Act calls for the Fed to price its services in a manner that recovers costs "over the long," so as to compete fairly, in the case of FedNow, which is to be completed in 2023 or 2024, the Fed is playing loose and fast with the law.
In fact, the Fed admits that it "has not yet determined the final fee structure for the FedNow Service." So how can it possibly know when it will recover its costs? In fact, it is virtually certain that to compete with private-rival RTP, it will have to operate at a loss.
That is it will take so long to recover its costs that it will have a negative net present value at going rates. No private enterprise could afford it. In the same way, private rivals may find themselves unable to profitably compete with the Fed in the digital currency market.
Shorter-run waste is the least of the potentially adverse consequences of such a lack of private-market competition. The real danger is lack of currency-market innovation going forward. Think again about our horse-and-buggy paper currency. Why do we still have it?
Could it be that we do because central banks and government mints (our coins are even more old-fashioned!) monopolized the market for hand-to-hand currency long ago, and have only recently faced competition from nonbank fintechs?
Could it be that, if we grant them monopolies, intentionally or otherwise, of digital currency today, two centuries from now we will be wondering why we still rely on ca. 2020 digital currency technology?
So CBDC "option" isn't a free lunch: it isn't just an extra menu item consumers can choose, or not, the presence of which can't possibly make them worse off. It is an option we should consider only with due attention to its potential, non-trivial immediate and long-run costs.
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Apologies for that inapt link. This one is more appropriate: engage.hoganlovells.com/knowledgeservi…

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More from @GeorgeSelgin

2 Apr
My first, and most complete effort to explain why a stable NGDP path is better than a stable P path is here: amazon.com/Less-Than-Zero…
Don't let the title mislead you: when I write it in the 90s I was responding to the then-popular Monetarist ideal of a stable price level. So I compared it to a policy that had NGDP grow steadily with weighted factor input. That would mean deflation roughly = -TFP growth rate.
Read 10 tweets
1 Apr
Some fun facts you probably didn't know about the gold standard:

(1) It's heyday was the the middle ages:
(2) It was abolished by the Federal Reserve Act:
Read 12 tweets
28 Mar
Sometimes I welcome a tweet despite heartily disagreeing with it. This one serves the very useful purpose of exemplifying just where many bitcoiners' understanding of monetary economics goes awry.
Basically, whether an asset serves *any* of the three listed "monetary" roles has NOTHING to do with its market value. I repeat: Nothing; nada, zilch, diddly-squat.
Of course, an asset has to retain or gain value over time to be a decent store of value. But an asset can achieve an arbitrarily high value yet fail to meet this requirement. That's as obvious as saying that, no matter how high it's price gets, it might yet fall.
Read 8 tweets
27 Mar
Especially in its post-1970s US revival, Austrian economics has been identified with free-market ideology. This identification explains both its popular success and its poor reception by the academy and among professional economists generally.
It also explains why self-styled "Austrian economists" are now a dime a dozen. To successfully market oneself as such among the booboisee, one need only denounce the Fed and gov't generally, and sing the praises of AU or BTC; no need to know much economics, Austrian or otherwise.
The difference between Austrians economists who have earned the right to refer to themselves as such and the rest is as great as that between qualified surgeons and peddlers of snake oil.
Read 8 tweets
26 Mar
(1) "Near zero" isn't zero; therefore (2) the question remains whether the SLR requirement with reserves exempted is or isn't sufficiently high. It isn't true, therefore, that the case for reverting to the old formula is a no-brainer. 1/2
In fact there are plenty of studies suggesting that the social or welfare costs of bank capital requirements aren't zero. See, e.g., sciencedirect.com/science/articl… and piie.com/system/files/d… (I could offer many other sources).
Finally, unless debt and equity finance are perfect substitutes for banks, more capital invested in banks means less capital invested elsewhere. This surely is a potentially relevant social cost of minimum capital requirements that's distinct from any reduction in bank lending.
Read 5 tweets
26 Mar
I heartily agree with @alexwsalter and @smithdanj1's claim that having the Fed "stabilize total dollar spending...is the best we can do when it comes to fighting recessions."

On the other hand,...
I'm taken aback by their claim that "We now know the Fed has a great deal of control over the price level, but much less over employment" and that it only "uses the 'full employment' part of its mandate to justify irresponsible behavior."
Surely, if "we" have learned anything this past decade, it's (1) that far from proving itself very capable of controlling the price level, the Fed has not even been able to achieve its inflation rate target and (2) that it has also tended to underestimate "full employment."
Read 7 tweets

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