Thread by @michaeldweiss

This piece by @TomRtweets is the best anatomy I've seen as to the ongoing dispute between CIA and NSA on the now much scrutinized GRU "bounties" story. And it's conveniently short: washingtonexaminer.com/opinion/inside…

Note that there was no climb-down from the original leaked allegations, as reported correctly in the NYT that NSA had a lower level of confidence in this intelligence than did CIA. ("Moderate" confidence means pretty good, in laymen's terms.)

The fact that this intelligence made it into the President's Daily Brief (Trump's) also suggested it wasn't quite the nothing-burger it's since been portrayed as in the press. Ditto making it into the WH statement on sanctions:

And @TomRtweets for the first time establishes the five pillars of the CIA assessment -- not just or even mostly based on Taliban interrogations, it turns out. Here they are, as he presents them:

"First, information gathered from detainee interviews and related U.S. military operations in Afghanistan."

"Second, detected financial flows between the GRU, its intermediaries, and Taliban officers."

"Third, highly sensitive and reliable reporting from agents (human sources) inside and outside of the Taliban network (some of this reporting is so sensitive that the CIA delayed sharing it with America's closest foreign partners)."

"Fourth, assessment of the GRU's established covert actions in Afghanistan. It has previously been established with high confidence, for example, that the GRU has supported active combat Taliban elements with funding, explicitly anti-U.S. tactical guidance, and weaponry."

"Fifth, Vladimir Putin's particular ideological animus for the United States and historic animus over 1980s U.S. actions against the [SU] in Afghanistan. At least under its current chief, Igor Kostyukov, the GRU is a near-perfect physical manifestation of this anti-Americanism."

As I and others pointed out from the start of this controversy, inter-agency intelligence disputes happen all the time and are usually predicated on varying interpretations of the evidence (or lack thereof in the case of NSA's wanted "gotcha" intercepts).

But CIA traced this alleged program to Unit 29155, no doubt from one or two of the aforementioned pillars: the financial flows, the "reliable" agents in place inside and outside the Taliban. What led them to suggest the money was for killing US (and British) soldiers?

Well, Unit 29155 doesn't do much beyond sabotage (see the news out of Czechia and Montenegro) and murder (see Gebrev and Skripal). The funds probably weren't for recruiting assets, much less a snazzy new Spring line of shalwar kameez for the Taliban.

Does this mean CIA is right and NSA is wrong? Nope. Does this even mean NSA asserts that CIA is wrong? No; it means NSA wants documentary signals evidence whereas CIA is more likely to defer to HUMINT -- some of which is so well-guarded, it's not even shared with allies.

What this does mean, however, is treating sensitive national security matters as a plaything for domestic party-political agendas is never a good idea, whatever team you play for.

If the CIA wanted to embarrass Donald Trump, for instance, they might have leaked something not in dispute within the IC and that hit closer to home. Such as, oh, that his 2016 campaign chair's GRU business partner fed polling data to Russian intelligence.

Similarly, if you wanted to make a compelling case to get the fuck out of Afghanistan ASAP you might not want to tell POTUS that not only are the Taliban, Haqqani Network and ISIS gunning for us, but now the Russians we drove out of there are, too.

"Mr. President, we are very close to fulfilling our 20 year-mission. But there's a new wrinkle to be ironed out..."

"Give it to me straight, boys."

"It's Ivan, sir. He's back. And boy is he pissed."