The problem (to use Stephen Weatherill’s terminology) is the disconnect between what the Protocol *says* (at least on a casual reading) and what it *does* (on a detailed reading that looks carefully at the whole text).
This, on customs, the Protocol *says* that NI remains part of the UK customs territory, but what it actually *does* is to apply the whole of the EU Customs Code to imports into NI (incl. imports from GB), with a carve-out for the level of tariffs (but not checks) on some goods.
(The *says* bit was rather helpful to the current government, as it was prohibited by the Taxation (Cross-border Trade) Act 2018 from entering into any agreement that put NI into the EU customs territory.)
And that carve-out itself starts off as appearing to apply generally, until you realise that what is drafted as an exception to the carve-out is in fact the general rule (ie that tariffs will apply) unless goods are shown to fall in a class of “not at risk” goods.
The Protocol also *says* that it respects NI’s place in the UK internal market - a point Johnson seizes on. bbc.co.uk/news/uk-northe…
But what it *does* is to create a series of precise ways in which NI forms part of the EU regulatory area for goods, while *saying* this about NI’s place in the UK.
NB that the “Nothing ... shall prevent” language in (1) applies only to NI to GB movements; the language applying to GB to NI movements (in (2)) is all much flabbier (and has to fit around “applicable legislation”).
So we can (rightly) mock Johnson for his dishonest presentation of the Protocol (he, after all, will have been told in detail what it did, as well as what it said).
But at least some of the dishonesty is to be found in the text of the Protocol itself. For which the EU is also responsible (though it presumably had no idea of the extent to which Johnson would pile on additional dishonesty).
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Oh dear, more of this “EU law is code-based and inflexible, English law is flexible and pragmatic” trope. It’s poor stuff. telegraph.co.uk/business/2021/…
This is a re-hash of a paper published by @PoliteiaUK a couple of months ago, accompanied by an equally poor Express article. Brief reasons why it’s hopeless here.
As I explain, what this is really about, to the extent that it makes any real sense, is moving to a US rather than an EU model of regulation. But one can see why, forensically, that call is dressed up as a “common law” (English) v. “civil law” (foreign) issue.
The problem with the current government’s threatened “just say no” strategy is that it requires a level of support from rUK that just doesn’t seem to exist.
What an imaginative government serious about defending the Union would be doing (at least in the background pending the May election) is thinking hard about a new constitutional settlement, and about the mechanisms for getting such a settlement agreed and giving it legitimacy.
In his book “The Passage to Europe”, Luuk van Middelaar called the equivalent EU strategy to demonstrate its relevance to voters the “Roman” strategy politico.eu/article/boris-…
See also “Life of Brian”: “What have the Romans done for us?”
The strategy does not always work. The Jews rose against the Romans and almost threw them out. Wales and Cornwall voted to leave the EU despite the 🇪🇺-flagged projects.
I suspect that, despite @GoodwinMJ’s excitement, the boring truth is that “I’d be likely to vote for a party that wants to tell the truth about British history, good points, bad points, and all” would sweep all before it.
As he says about how we have ended up in the position where it looks as if there will be a pro-independence majority in the next Scottish Parliament. Though also worth raising the U.K. Internal Market Act.
For those at the back who think that constitutional reform is a luxury a Labour government shouldn’t bother with - note that the root problem is a constitutional problem. For the reasons set out in the paragraphs above.