Thread by @lymanstoneky

I want to take this article by @BadChinaTake seriously, as it's a serious attempt to explain why the ongoing genocide of the Uyghurs is not really genocide. So, a very brief response. wokeglobaltimes.com/5b22ee3c12424a…

Essentially the entire debate is about intent. Genocide is only genocide if you can demonstrate that the state actually has some intention to be genocidal, so the argument goes. *Accidentally* wiping out a people group is not genocide.

This is a tricky argument, however. It is nearly universally agreed that there was a genocide of Native Americans in the United States, yet nearly 99% of the casualties involved were due to diseases which there was essentially no way to control at that time.

Indeed, the repeated treaties between Native and settler peoples, the long periods of peaceful coexistence by these groups (we remember violence, but peace was more common), and the continued existence of U.S. natives today suggests there was *not* genocidal intent.

Even though some US officers clearly had genocidal intent, @BadChinaTake correctly notes that the intent must be *at the level of policy*, not just bad actors implementing.

This same standard can be applied to many historic genocides. Many colonial genocides did not in fact have biophysical extinction as an intentional aim.

So why does international law require a demonstration of intent?

Several reasons, but the most compelling one is genocide law largely originates in the response to the experience of the Holocaust, and a desire to punish Nazis ***but let off the Soviets***.

Because the Holodomor did not appear to be a case of the Soviet government attempted to exterminate the Ukrainian people, it doesn't count, even if more died due to state policy than in the Holocaust.

"Genocidal intent" does not enter the convention out of some rational consideration of "what constitutes genocide," but because the Soviets (who led the effort; the US did not sign it!) wanted *protection* for their crimes.

The early drafts of the document also argued that *political* killings were genocide: again, the Soviets opposed this and got it removed.

I understand the desire to argue under the Genocide Convention rules, but we have to recognize those rules were literally written by genocidaires largely to protect *themselves* from Nuremberg.

So, on the question of intent, I think the Genocide Convention (and accompanying jurisprudence) is wrong. The intent you should have to show is that the state intended *prejudicial hostility* to a group, and it plausibly could have *resulted* in extinction.

So if you kill 50% of the Uyghurs *because they are Uyghurs*, but you promise to stop at 50%, that is genocide, even though your intent was not complete extinction.

The idea that it's not genocide if you intend to let some survivors escape, eh, no. I don't think we have to accept that.

But suppose the standard of intent @BadChinaTake advocates for is correct.

I still think China fails the test.

The reason is, and I am not joking here... Dzungaria.

The PRC asserts that it is the valid inheritor to all the claims and commitments of the ROC and the Qing Dynasty. Unless the PRC has waived a right, they assert that they maintain all rights that the Qing Dynasty held.

That is, it is the contention of the PRC that they did NOT CONQUER China from the Qing Dynasty (or ROC), but rather engaged in a revolution and seized control *of the same state*, and thus inherited the state itself.

This matters because it means we can identify actions undertaken by the Qing Dynasty as actions *by the same state*. Unless China is willing to assert that they are *not the same state* as the Qing Dynasty, they must account for patterns begun under the Qing.

The Qing Dynasty engaged in the direct extermination of the Dzungar people, who lived predominantly in present-day Xinjiang. Nor were the Dzungars the only ethno-religious minority group the Qing sought to eradicate in the region.

At the start of the Dzungar genocide, there were 600,000 Dzungars.

Today, there are believed to be about 15,000 Dzungars, primarily living in Mongolia, not China.

This matters, because as @BadChinaTake s notes, China's actions in Xinjiang are not only against Uyghurs, but against virtually all Turkic Muslims.

We also observe actions taken in Inner Mongolia against Altaic people (related to the Dzungars), and of course there's Tibet.

So we can in fact establish a pattern of behavior: forced migrations, ethnic resettlement, mass murder, internment, prevention of reproduction, etc, dating from the 18th century to today.

You cannot use the US' historically genocidal actions against native peoples to launch sanctions against the US today because we *stopped doing the genocidal actions*.

But if the actions continue, prior patterns can be used as evidence.

As long as China continues to engage in actions that meet the definition of genocidal activities in Xinjiang and elsewhere against a broad spectrum of ethnic and religious groups AND asserts state continuity with the Qing, Dzungaria is evidence of intent.

We know what their intent is because this is not the first time China has launched a Han settlement/minority suppression campaign in Xinjiang. It's like the 5th time they've done this and it's always ended in genocide.

If China wishes to abrogate all claims to Qing continuity, including surrendering territorial claims dating to the Qing, then that would resolve this particular predicament.

But maybe you think this is a ridiculous argument. Citing *18th century genocides*? That's ancient history!

Sure! But China routinely cites Qing dynasty treaties as relevant, so it's relevant.

But.... yeah it seems weird right? What about THIS CENTURY evidence?

Well, the key argument that @BadChinaTake makes about intent is that China does not intend elimination; they intend to *establish security*. They are taking overbroad actions to go after terrorists and security threats.

But this totally upends the North Sentinelese metaphor @BadChinaTake used, because it suggests the remedies are *not appropriate*, whereas in the metaphor he used, remedies *were appropriate*.

The issue is that China uses ethno-religious identity as a proxy for security threats. They use targeted rhetoric about security, but in fact apply actions to entire people groups. It is not clear to me that we should listen to the rhetoric and ignore the actions.

That is to say, when China says, "this policy is about going after terrorists" but then has minders go into total randos houses, separates kids, sterilizes women.... folks, no, it is *not* about that.

The mismatch between who China *says* they target and who they *actually* target is sufficiently large to raise important questions about intent. The violent rhetoric used combined with the numerous interventions which are clearly NOT security related answers those questions.

That is to say, "security as intent" is not evidence against "genocidal intent," because China's *conception of security* entails genocidal activities which also almost certainly do not impact the security situation (e.g. kidnapping children and sterilizing women).

I agree with @BadChinaTake that the intention is security, but China's *conception* of security is sufficiently paranoid and ethnocentric that it *entails* genocide. Genocidal intent is a subset of the set of security intent.

And this is true in almost all genocides, by the way. Virtually every genocidaire has security intentions. The Dzungarian genocide was about security intentions!

So my argument thus far is:
1) The restrictive genocide definition @BadChinaTake and the report he's engaging with asserts is *too* restrictive

2) But even under that definition, China's state claims indicate a *pattern* of genocides in Xinjiang

3) Security intent is irrelevant

3) (continued) because the security intent is mismatched to actions taken, and the actions taken target whole groups, not just security threats, and often are unrelated to security

I have two more arguments then I'm done.

The next issue is with reproductive policy, an issue near and dear to my heart and, hey, my actual expertise!

@BadChinaTake makes the same argument that many defenders of the PRC make: China is *merely* extending to minorities the policies it has applied to Han people for a long time.

So on the one hand, this is actually very true. To a non-trivial extent, all that we are seeing in Xinjiang is the One Child Policy being applied to a non-Han minority group.

The issue is that China.... repealed the One Child Policy. And is discussing repealing even two-child limits in Han-majority regions in the northeast. These regions have large Manchu minorities, but Manchus are highly Sinicized and not threatening to the state.

For the last decade, China has been systematically *relaxing* its birth limits, and local governments and provincial governments have even begun to roll out *pronatal* programs. The latest high-level policy meetings all feature explicit efforts to *increase* the birth rate.

So contrary to what @BadChinaTake suggest, we are *not* seeing China "balance" its reproductive policies.

We are seeing China shift from "Majority control, minority liberty" to "Majority liberty, minority control," as I demonstrated very clearly here: foreignpolicy.com/2020/06/30/chi…

That once upon a time China did worse stuff to Han women than they're currently doing to Uyghur women is no critique, because the government clearly did not intend to eradicate the ethnicity that made up 95% of the population.

That China has adopted a dramatic birth control regime *only for certain minorities* in a period where 1) minority population share is steadily rising and 2) pro-natal efforts for the majority are gaining steam is compelling evidence of *differential intent*.

The PRC has specific, prejudicial intent to reduce birth rates for problematic minority groups, for the purpose of reducing the share of the population they make up.

Whether they intend to reduce it *to zero* or would stop at 2% or 4% or whatever is not important: the policies being implemented *could plausibly* reduce it to near-zero if continued.

So *on the facts*, @BadChinaTake is simply incorrect about reproductive policy in China and Xinjiang, and the reality offers an *extremely* compelling demonstration of genocidal intent.

Finally, my last point is about prematurity of designation.

A big argument @BadChinaTake makes is that there ARE crimes against humanity happening but NOT genocide.

I strongly agree with @BadChinaTake that assigning incorrect terms can have really adverse effects. For example, I strongly objected when US progressives were calling deportations "ethnic cleansing." thefederalist.com/2018/06/19/agg…

And I agree with @BadChinaTake that the case for the genocide designation in Xinjiang today is FAR LESS CLEAR than the case for genocide in Xinjiang in the 1750s, or the case for genocide in Rwanda, or something like that. Totally agree!

That said, "You can't use the word genocide until the mass killings are already well underway" is probably not a good standard. Especially since the use case here is *lobbying governments to impose sanctions* not *winning a court case*, using *recognizable terms* matters.

Especially since international responses might have some impact on whether China in fact engages in even worse activities, I think it is worthwhile to label it genocide even if it's kinda only juuuuust over the line.

Because there's no dispute that we're seeing egregious crimes against humanity, Sinicization efforts, widespread violent Islamophobia, etc.

So my rebuttal to @BadChinaTake :
1) the genocide definition used is too restrictive
2) the pattern of genocide is longer than you'd think
3) genocidal intent is a subset of security intent
4) reproductive policy IS genocidal
5) the marginal use case is justifiable

SO THAT'S MY VERY SHORT RESPONSE