Here is one more paper that I have newly forthcoming, co-authored with my brilliant doctoral student Marshall Bierson, on how to understand the way that what a person *thinks* makes a difference to the true description of what they *do*.
philpapers.org/rec/BIEWIT-3
philpapers.org/rec/BIEWIT-3
Our focus is on how this idea is developed in Anscombe's early writings, from the first edition of Intention (1957) to 'On Promising and its Justice' (1969), including other important papers like 'On Brute Facts', 'Modern Moral Philosophy', and 'Authority in Morals', as well as /
a lot of so-far unpublished (and often undated) work that is in the @Collegium_Penn's archive of Anscombe's papers. Of particular interest is the question of how allowing what we call "the bearing of thinking on doing" does not show it possible to use a strategy of cultivated /
ignorance as a way of insulating oneself from responsibility for wrongdoing -- a strategy that is blocked, we argue, by the way a person can be responsible for *omitting* to know that which is possible and necessary for them to know.
Full paper here: philpapers.org/rec/BIEWIT-3
Full paper here: philpapers.org/rec/BIEWIT-3
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