Satellite imagery of Ndjamena reveals the heightened state of alert in the Chadian capital after President Idriss Deby was killed whe commanding troops at the front on April 20. 🛰️📸: @Maxar (google.com/maps/@12.11039…)
The death of Déby, who ruled the country with an iron fist for three decades, comes barely a week after FACT rebels crossed from Libya into Chad. One of their shells apparently exploded near Déby's vehicle. More by @declanwalsh/@AdamouNdjam/@ElianPeltier: nytimes.com/2021/04/22/wor…
The FACT (Front for Change and Concord) rebels threatened to march on Ndjamena this weekend. Whether they can deliver on that threat is unclear: Chadian Army claim heavy rebel losses and foreign officials are unsure how far they are from the capital.
As fighting in Libya ended, Chadian fighters returned home for the uprising they launched against Déby on April 11. Small but interesting detail: one of Toyota's seen in footage published yesterday, apparently from around Miski, indeed shows a Libyan license plate.
The FACT rebels appeared to be traveling in the same kind of armored vehicles that the United Arab Emirates had donated to Haftar's Libyan National Army, @_hudsonc told @nytimes. They may have brought advanced weaponry from Libya to Chad too. nytimes.com/2021/04/22/wor…
It's worth pointing out that some of the footage of the FACT fighters is archival, not recent — e.g. this footage
In recent months, one of Haiti's most powerful gangs — 5 Segonn — promoted itself with brash rap videos. Recently, however, the gang has obtained better weapons and is presenting itself as a paramilitary force. Our visual investigation takes a deep dive: nyti.ms/4bPiJXx
The rise of Haitian gangs started a few decades ago, when they were used by politicians to suppress voter turnout or anti-government protests, and by oligarchs for land grabs and attacks on rivals. Now, they've found independent financial lifelines, changing the dynamic.
But since the 2021 assassination of President Jovenel Moïse, the security situation in Haiti has deteriorated and these gangs have stepped in to fill the void. They now control or exert their influence across most of the capital, Port-au-Prince.
Satellite imagery of Port-au-Prince, captured on March 14, shows the deteriorating conditions in Haiti's capital due to ongoing gang violence. This image (wide and crop) show roadblocks, burning debris and trash blocking Rte de Delmas near the city's main hospitals. Image: @Maxar
Smoke can be seen rising near St. Francois de Sales hospital, in Port-au-Prince, March 14, 2024. Image: @Maxar. A unified front of gangs forced Haiti's prime minister to resign. More: nytimes.com/2024/03/14/wor…
@Maxar Shipping containers are used to block access to heavy cranes in the port of Haiti's capital, as seen on the @Maxar satellite image.
The Biden admin has hailed its efforts to restrict Iran's oil revenue — and its ability to fund proxy militias. But lax government oversight allowed deceptive tankers to move $2.8 billion worth of oil, all with American insurance. Our visual investigation: nyti.ms/3I0dQOr
Since this investigation — with @BlackiLi, @_neilbedi, @ajcardia and @bottidavid — relied heavily on openly available online sources and tools, I wanted to give some insights in our reporting process below.
@BlackiLi @_neilbedi @ajcardia @bottidavid Last year, we wrote about how tankers “spoofed” their location while picking up price-capped Russian oil. From that reporting, we knew this was happening in Iran too: four of the six ships we identified in Russia had been involved in Iran before that.
Just moments ago, reports of yet another drone attack in Moscow (early hours of August 1), making it the fourth attack in the span of just one week. Threading details as they emerge below:
This video shows smoke rising at a skyscraper in Moscow City, a symbol of Russia's economic resurgency under Putin. The area was also hit by a suspected Ukrainian-made Bober drone on July 30. https://t.co/4fdGOS8yDnt.me/ENews112/14811
According to Tass, the Russian state news agency citing “emergency services”, one drone was shot down in the Moscow Region while another one hit, indeed, one of the Moscow City skyscrapers.
https://t.co/fl9oG1SUB7t.me/tass_agency/20… t.me/tass_agency/20…
“The only way to stop this,” Ukraine's military intelligence told us, “is the immediate withdrawal of Russian occupation troops from Ukraine.” Our latest visual investigation into Kyiv's growing fleet of homegrown kamikaze drones that have hit Moscow: nyti.ms/455tphc
Public glimpses of Ukraine's long-range kamikaze drone program are rare. The first came in December, when influencer @igorlachenkov got an unexpected phone call from GUR, Ukraine's military intelligence. They needed money, and fast, for a “drone that can fly very far.”
@igorlachenkov Lachenkov, who had been raising money for the war effort, asked his million followers on Telegram for donations. 20 million hryvnia, or about half a million dollars, was needed to fund five Bobers — Ukraine's equivalent of the Iranian-made Shaheds used by Russia.
We tracked how several tankers, all acquired by shell companies after Russia invaded Ukraine, secretly moved at least half a billion dollars worth of Russian oil — an apparent effort to deceive their U.S.-based insurer. Our latest visual investigation: nyti.ms/43DQxTn
All the ships were “spoofing” their location: They sent out signals that showed they were in one location, while really they were somewhere else. Our investigation relied heavily on openly available sources and tools, some below are some insights into our reporting process.
Since the U.S., European Union and G7 countries imposed a price cap on Russian oil, there's been quite some chatter about Russia amassing a “dark,” “shadow” or “ghost fleet” — but little specifics. So we decided to take a closer look at what we could find. (Many dead ends, too.)