Keeping below 1.5°C requires rapid emission reductions at the global level.
What do scenarios imply for key regions?
In this thread, I show the fossil CO₂ emissions in key regions. These scenarios do not include equity considerations, these are cost-efficient pathways.
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2. In the OECD, fossil CO₂ emissions are are already in a decline.
On average, from 2020, a 44% reduction by 2030 & 95% by 2050. This requires accelerating climate action beyond current levels.
3. Asia is a big challenge. Emissions are growing strongly now, but has to drop by 47% from 2020 to 2030 & by 88% to 2050.
This requires a dramatic reversal of current trends. In many respects, this makes the challenge harder in Asia (developing) compared to OECD (developed).
4. Latin America has reductions of 34% from 2020 to 2030 & 100% by 2050.
Latin America has considerable CO₂ removal, by BECCS here, because of the large potential. On top of this, there is afforestation (not shown).
In cost-effective pathways, Latin America goes zero first!
5. Middle East & Africa has reductions of 37% from 2020 to 2030, 80% by 2050.
There is also considerable CO₂ removal potential (BECCS) in this region, though large spread across models.
Big challenges for parts of this region given the need for development (Africa).
6. Eastern Europe & the former Soviet has reductions of 50% from 2020 to 2030, & 92% by 2050. These are among the most rapid reductions in models.
This region also has significant potential for BECCS (& afforestation).
7. Two points worth noting:
* These are cost-efficient pathways, no equity considerations. This is a problem with current scenarios.
* This is fossil CO₂ emissions, LUC not included here (because I do not have historical data by region for LUC so could not show recent trends).
8. One of the reasons I am skeptical we can reach aggressive climate targets, is the ability to get the transition happening so fast in developing regions (eg Asia). Or getting OECD to go even faster, to give space for other regions. cicero.oslo.no/no/posts/klima…
9. That was it... Just giving some background on regional reductions, according to integrated assessment models.
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This question is ambiguous: "How high above pre-industrial levels do you think average global temperature will rise between now and 2100?"
* ...pre-industrial... between "now and 2100"?
* Where we are currently heading or where we could head? This is largely a policy question?
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One of the key arguments that Norway uses to continue oil & gas developments, is that under BAU it is expected that oil & gas production will decline in line with <2°C scenarios, even with continued investment.
Let's look closer at these projections & reality...
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Here is the projections from the 2003 report from the petroleum agency.
In reality (tweet 1) there was a dip around 2010, but production is now up around 250 million cubic again.
The forecast was totally & utterly WRONG!
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In 2011 there was a forecast for an increase in production to 2020, but then a decline. This is probably since they started to put the Johan Sverdrup field on the books.
The increase in production was way too low, again, they got it wrong.
CO2 emissions by fossil fuel:
* We thought coal peaked in 2014. No, & up another 1.1% in 2023
* Oil up 1.5%, on the back of a 28% increase in international aviation & China, but oil remains below 2019 level. 🤞
* Has the golden age of gas come to an end thanks to Russia?
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By top emitters:
* China up 4.0% & a peak this year would be a surprise
*US down 3.0%, with coal at 1903 levels
* India up 8.2%, with fossil CO2 clearly above the EU27
* EU27, down 7.4% with drops in all fuels
* Bunkers, up 11.9% due to exploding international aviation
Is the new @DrJamesEHansen et al article an outlier, or rather mainstream?
At least in terms of the key headline numbers, it seems rather mainstream, particularly if you remember most headline key numbers have quite some uncertainty!