Vital and long overdue. This firm’s nonsense analysis has been critical to persuading both tech-illiterate elites & ordinary voters that there’s some credible evidence of electronic vote fraud. It’s a bad joke, but the technobabble sounds impressive. washingtonpost.com/investigations…
Some of this stuff requires no real technical background to see through. Ramsland, for instance, has been obsessed with the Spanish firm Scytl, which provides public-facing web applications for reporting vote tallies. They make the state election website look pretty, basically.
Scytl does not, needless to say, count votes. That’s done domestically, by local governments. Yet Ramsland has insistently peddled incoherent claims about Scytl somehow being involved in vote fraud (via nonexistent German servers, no less).
It is frankly difficult to understand how Ramsland could believe his own claims if he is himself technically competent. Either he knows it’s BS, but finds it lucrative to give a patina of infosec credibility to what Republicans want to hear, OR....
...and this seems depressingly plausible: Ramsland himself doesn’t understand the tech, but has realized it’s easy to blag your way into being regarded as a cybersecurity expert if you learn a little bit of jargon to sling around.
Possibly he has some actually-technically-competent people working for him, passing on findings he doesn’t really understand, which he then clumsily shoehorns into his prefab narrative. If so, I have no idea how those folks sleep at night.
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I guess given a choice I’d pick “be careful...” because I’d rather focus on the thing I can control. But it’s a silly dichotomy.
Two minor additional points. First: It’s usually worth trying not to offend people *even if you think they are wrong or oversensitive to be offended.* There are reasons to break the rule, but it should be for a reason.
I think a lot of disinfo flourishes by hitting a sweet spot: Too complicated to shoot down in a couple sentences, too obviously absurd to people with real expertise to be worth wasting time on, but superficially persuasive to people with no relevant background.
Any actual infosec professional watching one of the PillowGuy videos is going to think: “Well, this is clearly moronic; none of my peers would be fooled by this, and I’d get no added cred with them wasting hours explaining each kindergarten error.”
It probably doesn’t seem URGENT to respond anyway—after all, none of your peers are fooled, and it’s not getting much MSM traction after the initial reports. But to a lot of normal people, all the technobabble sounds very impressive.
I mean, look, leave aside the ethics of the subscription model: This sounds like absolutely INSANE design. You have a critical feature of a safety product that must be *activated via a networked mobile device every single time you turn it on*?
I dont even really have a problem in principle with “this is an advanced safety feature you can pay to have activated or not.” But as it’s described, they’re building a bunch of complex dependencies into a feature that defaults to failing closed...
I’m frankly unsure whether this whole pseudo-judicial governance structure is an actual improvement over Facebook just saying “Because we feel like it.”
Whatever rubric of rules and procedures they try to set up, moderation decisions as applied to world leaders with millions of followers are always in practice going to be sui generis, high-level judgment calls, which is probably as it should be.
And while I think it’s good and healthy to articulate a public rationale for the decision, there’s also value in reaffirming that “because we feel like it” is in fact all the rationale they ultimately need.
One reason this belief is sticky is that press (understandably) keep saying there’s “no evidence” of fraud. What there actually is, is a huge amount of terrible “evidence” of fraud. All of which is easily—but in the aggregate not briefly—debunked.
So CNN says “no evidence” and people disposed to believe say: “Aha, they won’t even address all the proofs I saw in Mike Pillow’s videos & on OAN & in Parler threads.” And if you do address some, there are a dozen other ones you didn’t, or you didn’t address every aspect, etc.
An overloaded information ecosystem is a great petri dish for motivated reasoning, because even if enough people with the relevant legal or procedural or technical expertise take on the thankless task of refuting all this stuff, no normal person actually has time to read it.
This seems pretty unfair; the IG report was clear that the serious defects with the Carter Page FISA applications (especially the later ones) were down to material omissions by the FBI. The system is not set up to enable legal reviewers to catch that. washingtonexaminer.com/news/fisa-cour…
There are definitely points where the reviewers could & should have kicked the tires harder, but the fundamental problem was their dependence on the information the case agents choose to share (or, as in this case, fail to share).
The better version of this critique is that the amicus role is more usefully filled by folks with a civil liberties background, not someone whose natural disposition is going be to side with their former DOJ colleagues.