We're learning today that alphacoronavirus 1, previously not known to be zoonotic, jumped from dogs to humans > a year ago. Key lessons for where COVID-19 has been pointing us the wrong direction 🧵
1⃣ Singular focus on wildlife trade / wildlife farming as a human-animal interface is a mistake, given other natural pathways of emergence like, here, pet dogs or cats (probably).
(This doesn't mean we have to start getting rid of pets / livestock to prevent pandemics! The point of building strong healthcare systems - including One Health monitoring systems that include vets - is to stay safe by catching these kinds of events early and often.)
2⃣ Why does spillover happen?
Given that there's so much moralistic stuff coming from conservation about how we should prevent pandemics - it's about what you eat! it's about cutting down the rainforest! - it's worth noting this just... doesn't fit that pattern at all.
(One of the biggest misconceptions I wish we could combat: spillover isn't necessarily anyone's *fault*. It's increasingly a product of anthropogenic disturbance, but also a natural part of living alongside animals, even safely - like you live happily along your dog or cat.)
3⃣ Notification systems aren't fixed yet.
A novel coronavirus jumped into human populations last year (!) and we're just now finding out. There's a mismatch between scientific publication schedules, emergency notification systems, and countries' data sharing obligations.
(This is where future international law, including both changes to the IHRs and novel systems like a pandemic treaty, have the opportunity to learn and grow. We have more systems like this for flu; we need broader preparedness for zoonotic emergence.)
4⃣ Viral discovery isn't everything.
Alphacoronavirus 1 was first noticed in the 1940s, and first isolated in 1965. There are hundreds of undiscovered coronaviruses, but the next one to make the jump was actually one we already knew. That was able to happen because....
5⃣ Evolutionary shifts happen constantly.
There are some very smart people who say that we shouldn't try to predict future zoonoses, because of those evolutionary dynamics, and I'm sympathetic to that point for sure...
But then again, I think we sell our ability to guess this stuff short a lot of the time. For example, a recent study by colleagues predicts alphacoronavirus 1 as a high risk for undiscovered zoonotic potential:
🔢 The bottom line is, I would love to see scientists / communicators / the public engage with this as a useful case study. We've been telling so many stories about COVID-19 that just won't generalize well to the next Disease X - or, in this case, even the next coronavirus.
(Oh and one last point: if it seems like this thread makes too much of one emerging virus, just remember the big difference between this and COVID-19 as case studies is transmissibility after the spillover; we've been over-reading COVID-19 as a "lesson" this whole time)
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Something missing in a lot of viral ecology / "stop pandemics at the source" work right now:
If you're not including flu in your schema for pandemic risk, you're not actually talking about pandemics. You're talking about general disease emergence, not pandemic preparedness.
Before COVID-19, the answer to the question "what's the next pandemic most likely to be" was influenza. After COVID-19? It's actually still influenza believe it or not
So much of how we respond when a new virus emerges in a new pathway is to try to hyperfocus on sealing that entryway. But it's a bit like only locking the specific window a burglar came into your house through, and not checking the front door.
Half a million dead. It speaks to the complete and total failure of the American healthcare system. If you come out of this pandemic with the audacity to see pandemics as part of your expertise, and that's not at the front of your list of failures, you're doing your job wrong
There is no talking about pandemics without talking about the moral bankruptcy and structural rotten fucking wood that is a for-profit, privatized, fragmented, discriminatory healthcare system. There is literally nothing but this to talk about anymore
I've spent my entire life working on climate, I've ground myself into a pulp for the last 3 years working on climate + health, and if I had to choose between a global conversation about climate-and-pandemics and a conversation about U.S. healthcare, I'd pick the latter
A few years back, McNeil wrote a book called Zika: the Emerging Epidemic, which I read and reviewed for Quarterly Review of Biology in April 2018.
I was absolutely shocked with how he talked about race, and about women - both in the abstract, and in his specific interactions.
A couple spicy tweets got some conversation going in my Twitter circles, but that was it. Since then, whenever folks talk about his various odd takes, I've always thrown this example out - and folks are often surprised to see it. (I don't think the book was widely read 🙃)
Our ensemble doesn't predict Rhinolophus shameli but our two best models - Trait-1 and Network-1 - both do, bringing their hit rate up to 22/24 and 15/15 respectively. (Network-1 still undefeated!) Updates will follow shortly on viralemergence.org/betacov
As the authors point out, SARS-like viruses are still fairly understudied deeper in southeast Asia, but our model predicts that should be a hotspot of undiscovered bat βCoVs....
So post-workshop, the World Meteorological Organization's Task Team on COVID-19 and Climatic, Meteorological, and Environmental Factors has published some guidance on how to do the science. It's nice, but missing the words "talk to an epidemiologist"
It's tough. I appreciate what they've done here, and they very clearly nod to our piece on how climate-but-not-epidemiology experts got things wrong. But I also still think, 10 months in, the magic words are "talk to an epidemiologist about your understanding of the system."
This is particularly salient given that they actively encourage scientists to do public facing communication that "...includes informing media outlets or policy makers of dissenting views and encouraging the presence of multiple voices in coverage of their work."
I think it's easy to assume more of this is riding on "access and cooperation" between China and the WHO / other countries than history would suggest is actually true (thread)
Take SARS-CoV as a counterfactual, where tracing back to wildlife trade was efficient and transparent. Civets are linked to SARS-CoV before the outbreak ends, and horseshoe bats are implicated as the reservoirs of SARS-like viruses by 2005. Access and cooperation at work! But...
The actual reservoir species isn't fully tracked down and published until 2017. That has less to do with early outbreak transparency, and more to do with the arduous nature of tracing viral origins in the wild: