Another thread, this time just dealing with Gov. Brainard's claim that competitive banknote issuance "led to the need for a uniform form of money backed by the national government." There are more myths here than you can shake a stick at.
(1) Most antebellum notes weren't discounted because their backing varied from bank to bank. Discounts often reflected transport and other costs of returning notes to their sources for specie. Laws against branching and poor transport were the main cause of such discounts.
(There were of course also plenty of bad banks. But laws were to blame for those, too! Notes of doubtful banks were not generally accepted: brokers would by them, and notes of failed banks, at heavier discounts.)
Discounts declined dramatically between 1837 and 1863. By the last year, most discounts were under 1%. All New England currency had long been at par for that entire region.
Establishing a uniform currency was not the Union government's main goal when it passed the national currency (bank) acts of 1863-4. The goal was to sell more war bonds--that is, to sell the new "uniform" backing for banknotes and thereby place funds at the govt's disposal.
That uniform bond backing is NOT what made national banknotes a uniform currency. This was done by requiring, in the 1864 act, that all national banks accept other national banks at par, Hey Presto! Uniformity. But it came at no small price.
It was but one of many factors (the bond backing requirement was another) to blame for the notorious "inelasticity" of the new national bank currency: jstor.org/stable/3117442…
That inelasticity was entirely the result of Civil War legislation better suited for steering $$$ to the gov't than for providing for a safe, sound, and stable currency system.
All things considered, I believe we'd have been better off had state banks not been forced to stop issuing currency. Read and judge for yourself: onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.111…
Read about the crises that resulted, how having a truly competitive, market-based currency system would have improved things, and how we got stuck with the Fed instead here: cato.org/publications/p…
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I am _not_ saying that today's private digital currencies are just dandy. In fact, many have very serious serious shortcomings.
I'm saying that that isn't a lesson one can even begin to draw from US experience with private banknotes. That's so not only because of what I've said about that experience. Nor is it so just because conditions have dramatically changed.
Allow me to elaborate. Gov. Brainard says that "the period in the nineteenth century when there was active competition among issuers of private paper banknotes in the United States is now notorious for inefficiency, fraud, and instability in the payments system." and that
"It led to the need for a uniform form of money backed by the national government." The clear implication, given the context, is that competitive, private currency provision was inherently subject to all the mentioned problems.
As I said, this is a myth. Antebellum banks were often weak, and their notes weren't uniform, but bad regulatory regimes, not private currency issuance per se, were to blame. As @lawrencehwhite1 pointed out, my critique of Greenberg touches on this: alt-m.org/2021/03/31/jos…
Thanks for the feedback, Claudia! Allow me to give a few examples of what I had in mind in complaining that the Fed's Covid-crisis forward guidance was inconsistent with its supposed move to more strictly data-driven AIT.
Thread: I don't think I've been at all coy when it comes explaining why I doubt that Bitcoin will ever become a generally-accepted and widely-used medium for everyday payments, that is, "money." Misunderstood; but not coy.
Still, for @allenf32's sake I will sum-up my view here.
But first I note that those reasons are irrelevant to the point I made in a tweet to which Allen responds. There I answered someone who, having found an instance of my claiming that BTC was unlikely to become money, or "currency," offered it as proof that I was "bearish" on BTC.
But to be "bearish" is to believe, not that an asset isn't about to become money (very few assets ever will), but that it's value will decline. And I have never taken any stand on the future course of BTC's price. BTC can continue to appreciate without becoming money.
In _Denationalisation of Money_, Hayek supposed that competing private fiat-like monies would vie for market share by demonstrating their stable purchasing power. But, as I observed many years ago, Hayek overlooked something of fundamental importance.
He assumed that private individuals, in deciding which monies to prefer, would judge them by their _macroeconomic_ merits. In that case, the macroeconomically best would win. Hayek assumed this would mean those with the most stable purchasing power.
Granting Hayek's assumption for the sake of argument, his conclusion was a non-sequitur. In choosing what money to prefer, why would people act differently than they do in choosing other goods or assets? Why not pick the fiat-like money promising the greatest _private_ gains?
The Fed has a ways to go to get its Fintech access rules in good order. Fortunately, the ones I've posted are preliminary only. The Fed is now seeking comments for their improvement: federalreserve.gov/newsevents/pre…: